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Abstract 
 
This dissertation addresses the question: what is personal autonomy? It begins by 
examining the main theoretical accounts of autonomous agency currently on offer. Although 
each of the available approaches faces significant criticism, I defend a revised internalist (and 
functionalist) account of autonomous agency which draws primarily upon the work of Frankfurt, 
Dworkin, and Bratman. Next, I show that recent work in scientific psychology (viz. research on 
automaticity) reveals new dangers for any account of autonomous agency (including my own 
newly revised internalist account). My response to the identified threat of automaticity draws 
upon research in the psychology of attention and, more extensively, on theorizing upon the unity 
of consciousness. I use a number of insights gleaned from these areas of research to then 
construct a more robust theoretical understanding of autonomous agency—one that addresses the 
worries generated by automaticity by proposing new and additional necessary and sufficient 
conditions for autonomy. What these new conditions entail is that individuals must possess a 
particular form of unified consciousness across time in order to have acted autonomously.  
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Dedication 
 
For all those communities and individuals who have been unjustly stripped of their autonomy by 
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deprived of their autonomy by such powers to this day.  
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Introduction 
From a pre-theoretical view-point, many of us may believe that we often act in the world in 
ways which are thoroughly intentional, willed, and autonomous. We may believe that we select 
for ourselves, for instance, things like which movies we want to go see, which meals we prefer to 
eat, which causes we would like to support, and what we would like to do with our lives. And 
how our behaviours unfold in the world may appear (for the most part) to be consistent with 
what we take to be our autonomous choices and actions. But against this foreground of our own 
pre-reflective understanding of ourselves (i.e. our unexamined self-conceptions) as relatively 
independent, autonomous agents, lies the backdrop of the world in which live and function—a 
world that is undeniably full of heteronomous influences upon our behaviour. This contrast 
between how free or unrestricted we might, in general, assume ourselves to be, and the concrete 
material constraints imposed by the world in which we live can sometimes come to collide in our 
experience, leaving us feeling powerless, helpless, and (self-)deceived. These kinds of 
disappointments can often spawn philosophical investigations into the sources of our troubles, 
confusions, and errors. In terms of the picture provided above, such a collision or confrontation 
of opposing factors may induce us to begin questioning our assumptions about just how free or 
independent we really are. That is to say, such disappointments may lead to our reconsidering the 
bounds of our own autonomy, or even just exactly what it means to be an autonomous agent.  
The principal aim of this dissertation is to address the above question; namely, “What is 
autonomous agency?” It is a question that has generated a number of different theoretical 
responses in recent decades—the more prominent of which will be considered in the following 
chapter. However, each of the major theoretical models that have been advanced to make sense 
of personal autonomy has faced some significant critique and resistance. Moreover, much of the 
2 
 
philosophical theorizing upon autonomy would benefit from greater contact with certain 
important areas of more recent empirical discoveries about human psychological and behavioural 
functioning. This dissertation is thus, in part, an attempt to bridge the gap between our theoretical 
understanding of autonomy and certain aspects of our more recent scientific knowledge of 
human psychology. In particular, it is my contention that the recent findings in psychology on 
the phenomenon of automaticity reveal it to be a significant threat which radically challenges 
important aspects of our previous ways of thinking about autonomy. 
The above points identify some of the central concerns that motivate this dissertation, and 
they also inform the general structural outline for how it is to proceed. The first thing to be 
considered will be the prominent models of autonomy currently on offer—these will be assessed 
in term of their independent plausibility, as well as in terms of their robustness in the face of 
automaticity. Second, a thorough elaboration of the ways in which automaticity has been studied 
as well as what those studies reveal about the phenomenon and the nature of the threat that it 
poses to autonomy will be considered. Finally, an examination of the research and resources 
available for responding to the problem of automaticity will then be examined in the service of 
finding some way to buffer an adequate theory of autonomy from the dangers presented by 
automaticity.       
 In Chapter 1, I begin by outlining the three dominant approaches to understanding 
autonomy, starting with the “responsiveness to reasons” view, followed by the “responsiveness 
to reasoning” view, before ending with the “coherence” view. I then provide some reasons in 
favour of adopting the coherence view of autonomy over the other two approaches since it 
appears to be most well suited to developing an understanding of self-governance that does 
justice to the idea that the power of self-governance is essentially a power of the agent. Later in 
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chapter one, I go on to cover three important models dedicated to establishing a coherentist view 
of autonomy. I begin by presenting Frankfurt’s original proposal which is couched in terms of a 
hierarchical structure of desire and volition, followed by an important amendment to such an 
approach by Dworkin, before finally examining Bratman’s more recent—though nevertheless 
deeply indebted to the earlier views of Frankfurt and Dworkin—temporally extended model. 
Following the examination of the three important coherentist proposals, I turn my attention to 
addressing the most significant objections to such an approach, and I argue that we need to reject 
the conceptualization of the sort of hierarchical structuring that was relied upon in each of the 
three coherence views covered. My proposal is that we can replace such a way of understanding 
the architecture of autonomy with one that instead focuses upon the fact that what underlies the 
hierarchical metaphor is simply a sort of coherence between desire and volition. In the final 
section of the chapter, I reveal that even with the most significant objections to the coherentist 
approach now addressed, there remains another significant threat to any model of autonomous 
agency that demands our attention. This is the threat that may be perceived by recognizing the 
extent to which our behaviours fall under the control of automatic processes. In the 
psychological literature, the sorts of behaviours that are automated in this way are known as 
instances of automaticity. The encounter with the notion of automaticity at the end of chapter 1 
sets the stage for a deeper analysis of the research into the phenomenon in order to develop a 
more thorough understanding of the type of danger it presents to autonomous agency to begin in 
the following chapter.   
In chapter 2, I begin by providing a basic outline of some of the research and central 
components of automaticity before distinguishing the notion of automaticity from the related 
legal notion of automatism (in order to avoid any confusion). After comparing and contrasting 
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these two related ideas, I then return to a more thorough and detailed analysis of automaticity, 
drawing upon a number of experimental studies in order to provide various concrete connections 
and access points from the empirical research to our understanding of the broader theory. The 
work done in these sections reveals a number of core features of automaticity uncovered both in 
the lab, and in real life studies established by self-reports (viz. in section 2.4 on actions not as 
planned). Later, because there is some significant behavioural and conceptual overlap between 
automaticity and habit, I examine the notion of habit and compare and contrast it with 
automaticity as well. I then go on to highlight the fact that a conscious dissociation from 
behaviour is at the very heart of automaticity before providing a number of examples designed to 
show precisely why automaticity is a serious threat to autonomy. With this greater understanding 
of automaticity finally in our possession, I suggest at the end of the chapter that we next begin to 
look into automaticity’s experimental contrary—i.e. attention theory and research—in order to 
both sharpen our grasp of the contours of automaticity as well as determine whether or not we 
may therein find resources with which to buffer an adequate account of autonomy from the threat 
of automaticity.    
Chapter 3 begins by noting that the field of attention research is not guided by a single 
accepted definition of what attention in fact is. This state of affairs has led theorists to develop a 
number of different and competing views of how best to both conceptualize as well as study 
attention. Most of the theoretical developments in the area have been shaped by the apparent 
shortcomings of earlier models. For this reason, I examine a number of the more prominent 
theoretical approaches to attention in the chronological order in which they appeared on the 
scene. Proceeding in this way allows us to both develop an appreciation for the obstacles faced 
by attention theory as it changed and grew over time as well as isolate questionable assumptions 
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made about attention in the early days of its study. The historical review of the theorizing and 
research on attention that is provided in this chapter begins with a preliminary on “divided 
attention” or “dual-task” research methods—since these types of studies are central to the 
majority of the work done in the field overall. This is followed by an examination of Broadbent’s 
bottleneck theory of attention which was largely responsible for galvanizing the modern 
movement to study the phenomenon of attention. Next, I examine Kahneman’s effort theory, 
followed by Wickens’ multiple resource model, before closing out the review with the more 
recent “attention as selection-for-action” account. Following the review of the development of 
theorizing and research on attention, I then examine the relationship between attention and 
memory in order to point out the difficulties of disentangling these two related phenomena at the 
level of experimental design and interpretation of results. From there, I transition into an 
examination of a prominent multi-component model of memory advanced primarily by Baddeley 
that introduces the problematic notion of a “central-executive” that Baddeley initially 
characterizes as almost exclusively attentional in nature. One of the core problems with such a 
characterization being that it fails to connect with the most pertinent features of our ability to 
centrally control behaviour; namely, the volitional and intentional nature of personal agency. At 
the end of the chapter, I take stock of what the examined attention research and theorizing has to 
offer to our project of developing a model of autonomy that is resistant to the danger presented 
by automaticity. Finally, I conclude that although attention seems to play a part in mitigating a 
certain aspect of automaticity, it does not alone appear to provide us with the necessary tools to 
adequately confront the threat presented by automaticity to a theory of autonomy, and that we 
need to extend our search for an answer to that problem by considering the sorts of control that 
might accompany or underlie a particular form of unified consciousness.  
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Given that the research on attention did not provide us with sufficient resources to address 
the problem of automaticity, chapter 4 sets out to explore what further support for an adequate 
theory of autonomy can be gleaned from research on the unity of conscious experience. To begin 
this chapter, I provide a brief characterization of just what is meant by ‘consciousness’ and how 
it will be treated and understood throughout the chapter. From there, I examine the notion of the 
unity of consciousness, and explore some of the candidate types of relations (proposed within the 
literature on the topic) to potentially underlie such a form of unity. This provides us with a 
number of leads to consider as possible barriers to automaticity. With these details in hand, I 
return again to spell out in greater detail the precise ways in which instances of automaticity 
work to undermine autonomous agency. Following this more detailed analysis of the threat of 
automaticity, I then transition into my proposal for a solution to the problem of automaticity and 
the changes that this requires of our coherentist model of autonomy. Central to my revisionary 
proposal is the notion that autonomy requires a certain form of unified consciousness which I 
label “symmetrical unity.” After the case for the modification to the internalist/coherentist 
approach to autonomy is made, I then consider and reply to several objections to the proposed 
additional requirements of autonomy. None of these objections, I argue, prove fatal to the 
suggested revisions to the adopted coherentist model of autonomy. Finally, to close out the 
chapter, I provide some concluding comments about what I take to be fruitful areas of continued 
future research.   
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Chapter 1 
 
There is a recurring theme that runs through most attempts to clarify the notion of 
autonomy. It is indicated by the etymology of the term: autos (self) and nomos (rule or law). 
The word was first applied to the Greek city-state. A city had autonomia when its citizens 
made their own laws, as opposed to being under the control of some conquering power.  
 
- Gerald Dworkin 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Although the genesis of the notion of autonomy may have occurred within the politico-
judicial sphere as a label for city-states that sought to assert their sovereignty by legislatively 
conducting their own affairs independently from external rule, the term has since been applied to 
individual persons. As a personal attribute, the concept of autonomy
1
 has been employed by 
philosophers and theoreticians in, as Gerald Dworkin says, “an exceedingly broad fashion” 
(1981, p. 54). It has been equated variously with notions of liberty, independence, dignity, self-
governance, values, and freedom of the will (among other things).
2
 It is thus appropriately taken 
to be what Ned Block (1995) has coined “a mongrel concept”—that is, a concept which lacks a 
singular common use and meaning, and yet, is treated as denoting something in particular.
3
 More 
commonly, one might think of it as an umbrella term—that is, a term that covers a broad class of 
related concepts. Although we are right to treat the concept of autonomy in this way, there does 
appear to be a general consensus among theoreticians that a core understanding of the term 
involves the original idea of self-governance. The point of agreement seems to be that whatever 
                                                 
1
 From this point forward, unless otherwise stated, any mention of autonomy will refer to the personal aspect of 
the term. 
2
 For some of the additional uses of autonomy see for example Nomy Arpaly’s (2004) “Which Autonomy?” 
3
 Similarly, Stefaan Cuypers (2000), in a nod to Wittgenstein, calls autonomy a “family resemblance” concept. 
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else autonomy might involve, it must in some way be concerned with how persons—like the 
city-states to which the term was first applied—individually govern themselves. In accordance 
with the general view, this dissertation will consider autonomy as a sort of self-governance.
4
 
About the only other point of widespread agreement between authors about autonomy is that it is 
generally taken to be something that it is good to have. 
In addition to its being used to refer to a number of different things, autonomy is appealed 
to in many different intellectual and social contexts for a number of different purposes. For 
instance, it is frequently appealed to—and intimately connected to moral thinking—within the 
educational, medical, legal, and political spheres. This widespread application of the notion 
speaks to its importance to people generally as well as to social institutions and the interactions 
between individuals and these institutions. With respect to the educational domain, the notion of 
autonomy is involved in, for example, the adjudication of conflicts of interest and determining 
degrees of control over resources between educational institutions and governmental bodies.
5
 In 
terms of its influence upon individuals within the educational system, it can be involved in things 
like curricular freedom and teacher leadership building, as well as, establishing policies which 
promote the development of independent learners capable of self-guided critical thought (as 
opposed to indoctrinated and dogmatic devotees).
6
 In the medical profession, the notion of 
autonomy often plays an important role in things like the development of patient care practices, 
                                                 
4
 Admittedly, as Feinberg (1986) recognized, the notion of autonomy as ‘self-governance’ can be treated in 
various ways as well—for example, it can be thought of in terms of a capacity for self-control, or the condition of 
self-determination, or as a sovereign right to self-rule. But of these three views, what remains central to elucidating 
the concept of autonomy is an analysis of, as Christman suggests, “the actual condition of autonomy defined as a 
psychological ability to be self-governing” (1988, p. 110). It is this latter consideration articulated by Christman that 
will be the primary focus of this dissertation. 
5
 This use is closer to its original politico-judicial sense.    
6
 The philosophy of education and educational policy research has a rich history and vast body of literature 
dedicated to the topic of autonomy in education. To name a few notable contributions see: R. F. Dearden (1972) 
“Autonomy and education”; C. Winch (2006) “Education, autonomy and critical thinking”; J. White (1991) 
“Education and the good life: Autonomy, altruism, and the national curriculum”; and H. Siegel (1997) “Rationality 
redeemed?: Further dialogues on an educational ideal”.   
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policy formation, and the understanding of informed consent.
7
 In law, the concept of autonomy 
plays a fundamental role in establishing and protecting the liberty of both individuals and groups 
as well as establishing limitations upon the liberty of groups or persons when such liberty 
conflicts with the public interest.
8
 It is also invoked in legal defenses where claims about a lack 
of personal autonomy (due to coercion or duress), may be deployed in an attempt to excuse 
defendants from criminal liability.
9
 It is in part because a theory of autonomy has such far 
reaching interest and is often implicated in these and other important areas of human interaction 
and conflict resolution that advancing a more realistic
10
 and refined account of personal 
autonomy is warranted. A better understanding of just what constitutes autonomous agency 
allows for more accurate and refined application of this concept to the various areas of interest 
mentioned above.  
In addition to these social implications, a refined theory of autonomy is also beneficial for 
what it can tell us about ourselves as individual agents. The more clearly we can come to 
understand what is involved in acting autonomously, the more effectively we may be able 
develop the skills and habits that are supportive of greater degrees of self-control. Moreover, 
such clarity should also help us to be both better able to identify and more prepared to resist 
those influences that might undermine our autonomy. Therefore, it is not only in response to 
social concerns that developing a more refined and detailed account of autonomy is warranted, 
                                                 
7
 For a concise overview of the influence of autonomy in medical decision making see H. Brody (1985) 
“Autonomy revisited: progress in medical ethics: discussion paper”. Also, for an excellent treatment of some of the 
multiple dimensions along which autonomy may be practically assessed in the medical setting see B. L. Miller 
(1981) “Autonomy & the refusal of lifesaving treatment”. For more recent selections on considerations of autonomy 
in medical ethics see R. Kukla (2005) and K. Baeroe (2010) in references.  
8
 See Sellars (2007). 
9
 See Richards (1989). 
10
 By my use of the term ‘realistic’ here, I mean an understanding of autonomy that captures a more detailed 
and nuanced rendering of real human psychological functioning than is currently available in the philosophical 
theorizing on the subject.  
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but also, because doing so has the potential to help us, as individual persons, to better navigate a 
world filled with heteronomous influences. 
The next section provides a brief outline of some of the principal theoretical attempts to 
explain autonomy in addition to some reasons for thinking that only one of these views is on the 
right track and worth developing.     
 
 
1.1 Three Approaches to Autonomy  
 
Positive philosophical theorizing about autonomy has for the most part proceeded along 
three general lines of development. These general theoretical trajectories have been categorized 
by Sarah Buss (2008) as “responsiveness to reasons”, “responsiveness to reasoning”, and 
“coherentist” accounts respectively.  Although any particular view that falls under the heading of 
one of these general accounts of autonomy may blend aspects of one general account with those 
from another, what sets an account apart from its competitors is its emphasis upon the centrality 
of certain features or conditions of autonomous agency. For “responsiveness to reasons” 
accounts
11
 what is central is that an agent has the capacity to appreciate and in fact does consider 
the multitude of reasons there are—or at least a reasonably large set of these—for acting in any 
number of possible ways within a given situation. This type of account is considered ‘externalist’ 
since the reasons that an agent must be most responsive to have to do with the facts of the 
situation in which she finds herself.
12
 The idea here is that if an agent is not sensitive to a fairly 
                                                 
11
 See Berofski (1995), Wolf (1990), and Fischer & Ravizza (1993; 1998) for insights into this view. 
12
 Even though what an agent need be responsive to on this account can include facts about the agent’s desires 
and interests, it concerns these primarily in terms of how they act as reasons among (or in relation to) the recognized 
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large number of reasons for and/or against various courses of action in a given situation, then she 
is not likely to do a good job of navigating that situation. And if she is unaware or unable to 
become aware of such reasons, there is a sense in which her power of agency is severely 
impoverished. In short, this account considers ignorance of or ineptitude with respect to 
identifying and working with the available reasons for action to be a barrier to effective and 
autonomous agency. One of the background worries that motivates this view is that a person who 
is insufficiently responsive to the reasons there are for action may be more likely to engage 
unthinkingly in activities that end up thwarting her own interests or aims. For example, an 
individual may wish to take the subway east in order to get home but fail to recognize that she is 
boarding the subway train from the westbound platform. She thus fails to take account of the 
existing reason (provided by the fact that she is boarding the train from the westbound platform) 
to correct her behaviour and bring it in-line with her goal of getting home. According to 
advocates of this view, it is these sorts of unwittingly self-interest undermining cases that make it 
difficult to treat such activity autonomous or self-governed.  
Accounts that focus upon “responsiveness to reasoning”, on the other hand, tend not to be 
as concerned with the reasons that are available to an agent in a given situation nor whether the 
beliefs that the agent has about these reasons be true or false. Instead, theorists who adopt this 
approach are concerned with an agent’s ability to evaluate her motives in relation to her other 
beliefs and desires.
13
 For them, what is most central to autonomous agency is this capacity for 
the calculative assessment of one’s motives, which includes the ability to recognize the status of 
                                                                                                                                                             
facts about the external situation that she finds herself in—or more precisely, the reasons for action that those 
situational facts provide.   
13
 This view is derived from the work of authors like Christman (1991; 1993) and Mele (1993). It is more 
commonly thought of as a historical account of autonomy in that the background beliefs, desires, and values against 
which new motives are weighed consist of preexisting or previously adopted positions. It is important to note, 
however, that for Christman at least, active endorsement of the formation of one’s more stable or entrenched (i.e. 
historical) beliefs and values is not required. Rather, for him, it is enough that an agent did not resist or would not 
have resisted their development had she paid attention to them. 
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one’s motives among the host of one’s other beliefs and desires in light of this assessment. 
Furthermore, they contend that when this critical, evaluative process of practical reasoning is 
thwarted either by manipulation or indoctrination—i.e. where one’s ability to effectively assess 
one’s own motives in relation to one’s other beliefs and desires is hindered—one cannot be 
considered to act autonomously. An important component of this view is that it allows for the 
agent to revise her previous beliefs and values in light of new information or experience 
(regardless of whether or not this sort of revision is uncommon or rarely actually occurs 
throughout the course of an individual’s life). That is to say, the faculty of reasoning that 
theorists from this perspective regard as central to autonomous agency not only functions in 
terms of evaluating new motives in relation to views already held by the agent, it also works to 
grant the agent the ability to revise previously held beliefs and values. It thus permits that 
significant transformations may occur with respect to what an agent might take to be her core 
values. This view might appear to be more ‘internalist’ than the one previously mentioned, since 
it is not so much the considered reasons themselves that are most important, but rather, it is her 
ability to work with these reasons well. That is, it is her personal capacity for the evaluation and 
integration of reasons, and ability to grasp what follows from her calculative deliberations that 
matters most on this view. Nevertheless, the view can still be characterized as externalist since 
the type of reasoning at issue might itself be considered a sort of independent formal system (or 
culturally codified process) that an agent may dismiss if she so chooses.   
Last on the list of the main positive theoretical accounts of autonomy is what Buss (2008) 
calls the ‘coherentist’ approach.14 These types of accounts are more commonly treated as 
“higher-order” or “hierarchical” views but, for reasons that I will provide later (in section 1.3), I 
                                                 
14
 This approach to autonomous agency, advanced by philosophers like Harry Frankfurt, Gerald Dworkin, and 
Michael Bratman (see references), will be covered in greater detail later in this chapter. 
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prefer Buss’ characterization of what is central to these views as a matter of coherence. On 
coherentist accounts of autonomous agency what is of primary importance is that an agent must 
approve of, or endorse, her motives and desires in order for the actions that result from them to 
be considered autonomous.
15
 Coherentist accounts of autonomous agency are considered 
internalist because the kind of endorsement that is key on this view is a power of the agent 
herself. For them, what counts most is not so much the reasons that one may perceive to be 
pertinent, or the method by which one may come to various calculative and practical conclusions 
(these are externalist characteristics of the other two accounts previously outlined), but rather, it 
is the power of the agent to reflectively either endorse her desires and motives or reject them as 
unwelcome intrusions upon her mental life. Moreover, on this view, if an agent is powerless 
except to disown the desires and motives that lead her to perform some action, then there is a 
rather strong sense in which she is not autonomously engaged in that action. In other words, she 
is not capable of governing herself in such instances and her disavowal of the desires and 
motives that move her acts as a sign of protest and frustration with her impotence in these types 
of situations. 
Although each of the above mentioned approaches has something to contribute to our 
knowledge of what it might mean to be autonomous, it seems that, insofar as we want to restrict 
our focus to the idea of ‘self-governance’, the coherentist proposal appears most well suited to 
attain the objective.
16
 The case for the superiority of the coherentist proposal is made by the fact 
                                                 
15
 This kind of agential ‘endorsement’ is spoken of in various ways by different theorists. It may also be 
referred to as ‘acceptance’ of one’s desires and motives, or ‘putting one’s weight behind’ them, or ‘taking a stand’ 
with respect to them, or believing them to ‘make sense’ in light of the kind of person one is, or ‘identifying’ with 
them. In each case, what is important is an agent’s attitude towards her own desires and motives. This view clearly 
involves a form of metacognition as would appear to also be the case for the responsiveness to reasoning view; 
however, the responsiveness to reasons view, at least prima facie, does not appear rely upon such a form of 
metacognition.      
16
 That is not to say that the coherentist view doesn’t face any substantial objections, it certainly does, but the 
most notable of these will be addressed later on in this chapter (in section 1.3).   
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that the ‘reasons’ available to an agent (even if these are exhaustive), and the process of 
‘reasoning’ that she may make use of in a given instance are not essential to who she is as a 
deciding agent.
17
 That is to say, they are not a part of her power to decide to act one way or 
another.
18
 Rather, they merely inform her and help her to make good, or rational, or expedient, or 
prudential choices. A natural consequence of the externality of these elements is that she may 
reject them. And if an agent may reject the counsel of the reasons available or the process of 
reasoning she normally relies upon, and yet still act decisively and with an awareness that she is 
acting under her own power to act, then the process of reasoning and the reasons there are cannot 
be necessary for her to act autonomously. Perhaps most problematic about the two externalist 
proposals is that they tend to over-intellectualize autonomous agency—that is, they render it too 
rationalistic—by treating the reasons and reasoning processes as key factors responsible for 
doing the bulk of the work. In a related vein, philosopher J. David Velleman (1992) recognized, 
when analyzing the standard ‘belief and desire’ account of action that:  
 
In this [the standard] story, reasons [or, we might here add, ‘a process of reasoning’] 
cause an intention, and an intention causes bodily movements, but nobody—that is, no 
person—does anything. Psychological and physiological events take place inside a person, 
but the person serves merely as the arena for these events: he takes no active part. (p. 461)  
 
My worry about the two externalist accounts of autonomy runs parallel to Velleman’s concern 
with what he suggests is the standard account of action: the issue is essentially that the more that 
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 To borrow a line from one of Christman’s footnotes: “…adding an ‘external’ rationality condition as a 
requirement of autonomy…effectively separates the property of autonomy from the actual decisions and judgments 
of real people” (1991, p. 9). 
18
 Nagel (2003) makes a keen observation on this point. He claims, “When someone makes an autonomous 
choice such as whether to accept a job, and there are reasons on both sides of the issue, we are supposed to be able 
to explain what he did by pointing to his reasons for accepting it. But we could equally have explained his refusing 
the job…by referring to the reasons on the other side…[thus ‘reasons’ centered approaches] cannot explain why the 
person accepted the job for the reasons in favor instead of refusing it for the reasons against” (p. 234-235). It seems 
clear then that explaining the agent’s decision will have to involve some reference to his power to decide.       
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is made about the importance of what are, for the most part, transient reasons and processes of 
reasoning that are dissociable from the agent’s capacity to decide, the more the agent is sidelined 
from the picture of (in our case autonomous
19
) actions and agency. Nagel makes a related 
pronouncement: “The more completely the self is swallowed up in the circumstances of action, 
the less I have to act with” (2003, p.238). In our case, the “circumstances of action” amount to 
the formal features (e.g. the type and structure of the process of reasoning), and changing 
components (available reasons) of externalist views of autonomy. And the greater the emphasis 
upon these factors, the more the former of intentions and enactor of behaviours (i.e. the agent) is 
displaced or demoted.
20
 It would appear then, because the objective is to get clear on what it 
means for an agent to be self-governing, that taking the focus off of agential power and placing it 
upon externalist features
21
 is fundamentally wrongheaded. 
The above is not to say that reasons at hand and reasoning processes will entirely fail to be 
of use to our understanding of autonomy—on the contrary, they will likely have a significant role 
to play
22—rather, the suggestion is merely that we should be careful not lose sight of the 
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 I should here say something about the difference between basic agency or action vs. autonomous agency or 
autonomous action. The standard or basic view of action can be expressed along broadly Davidsonian lines, wherein 
one or more belief(s) and desire(s) provide the reasons which lead to the intention to perform some action. Even if 
we build a more robust conception of the agent into this view (as Velleman would argue, is needed), there are still 
ways in which an agent can perform actions without being entirely autonomous. For example, a mugger could point 
a gun at me and demand that I hand over my wallet—now, assuming that I desire to live through this experience and 
believe that not handing over my wallet could get me shot and possibly killed, this belief and desire may lead me to 
form the intention to hand over my wallet to the mugger, and to actually do so. In such a case, although I may act 
with intent, my actions are the result of coercion or duress rather than my own self-governance. That is to say, had 
the mugger not made such a demand while pointing a gun at me, I would not have handed him my wallet of my own 
volition. Put simply, actions (as standardly conceived) may be heteronomous, whereas autonomous actions are not.      
20
 Nagel goes so far as to claim that “As the unchosen conditions of action are extended into the agent’s 
makeup and psychological state by an expanded objectivity, they seem to engulf everything, and the area of freedom 
left to him shrinks to zero” (2003, p. 244). This seems to me to take things a little too far to the extreme. 
Nevertheless, I think that the worry that motivates such a view is a legitimate one.  
21
 Or at least, in the case of forms of reasoning, features that may be externalized. 
22
 This is due to the obvious fact that autonomous agents so often do engage in deliberative activities—
weighing both the available reasons and the relationships between these and their beliefs and values—in the service 
of arriving at some acceptable and attainable end. In other words, although reasons and particular reasoning 
processes are inessential to acting autonomously, they are nevertheless typically what informs the agent’s own 
power to decide. 
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fundamental importance of the power to decide that belongs to the agent alone independently of 
the situation in which she finds herself. And one way of failing at this task is by developing a 
highly formalized, predominantly externalist account of autonomy. In order to quell the worries 
of those who may think that shifting away from reasons and reasoning based approaches could 
leave us with an impoverished theoretical workspace, it bears mentioning that an additional 
benefit of the coherentist approach is that it can readily accommodate key features of 
“responsiveness to reasons” and “responsiveness to reasoning” accounts while still maintaining 
the centrality of the power of the agent. That is to say, there is nothing stopping an agent, on the 
coherentist account, from either considering a vast number of reasons for action within a given 
situation or, from evaluating her motives in terms of their fit with the other beliefs and values she 
holds. Instead, according to coherentists, one may engage in either one or both of these 
activities—the only difference being that, for them, autonomy is primarily a matter of the agent’s 
providing assent to whatever reasons or motives are in the end acted upon. For the reasons 
mentioned above, this dissertation will focus primarily upon the coherentist view of autonomy.              
However, before taking a look at some of the thoroughly developed coherentist proposals 
on offer, a caveat: although in this dissertation I will deal with notions of self-governance and 
aspects of unified consciousness that are endemic to personal identity, I will mostly steer clear of 
debates over the actual existence of a ‘self’ and what that might entail. One reason for avoiding 
the issue of personal identity (or the self) is that we may come to a functional understanding of 
autonomous agency that can accommodate various conceptions of the self and I take such a 
noncommittal stance on the subject to be a virtue of the approach here taken. Therefore, ‘self-
governance’ should herein simply be read to mean (roughly) acknowledged personal authorship 
and control, by the agent, of the actions he or she commits. Put simply, the question that will be 
17 
 
considered is: what is autonomous agency? And not: what is the self? Also, the primary focus of 
this dissertation will center upon our understanding of autonomous agency rather than merely 
one-off autonomous actions
23—the former being more global in scope and extended across time 
than the latter more local idea. This is not to say that the examples used will always refer to 
drawn-out or long-term courses of action. Instead, the provided examples will often deal with the 
short-term behaviours of an agent. However, these examples will be deployed in the service of 
understanding a more robust and general theoretical notion of autonomy than one that is 
concerned merely with singular and isolated actions. 
One of the more recent and thoroughly developed coherentist accounts is Michael 
Bratman’s planning theory of autonomous agency. The planning theory Bratman develops 
involves explicit reference to self-governing policies that have the authority to play the role of 
the agent in autonomous action. These policies are temporally extended and serve to support the 
motivational maintenance of certain behaviours. But before elaborating upon the planning theory 
in any great detail, it is important to note that the theory has been advanced by Bratman as an 
improvement to the hierarchical model
24
 originally developed by Harry Frankfurt.
25
 The 
hierarchical model proposed by Frankfurt situates the autonomous agent at a level above basic 
desires and drives—a placement that grants the agent the purview to either endorse or refrain 
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 There is a sense in which autonomous action appears impossible without a persisting autonomous agent, but 
I will not argue this point here. 
24
 Until otherwise stated, I will preserve the original terminology and structuring of Frankfurt’s model of 
autonomous agency, including talk of lower or ‘first-order’ desires and higher or ‘second-order’ desires and 
volitions, as well as the hierarchical picture that such a view paints. This will be done out of respect for the integrity 
of the view as it was first developed and introduced. Later, in section 1.3, I will argue that shifting our perspective of 
the view to one that treats it as, in a more basic way, simply encapsulating the notion of coherence will help to 
buffer the original account against its most common criticisms.  
25
 According to Bratman, the planning theory he provides can avoid certain damaging criticisms of the sort 
leveled at Frankfurt’s original model (e.g. the regress problem). See Bratman (2000, p. 34).  
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from endorsing a lower, first-order desire by way of what he calls a ‘second-order volition’.26 It 
is a person’s ability to form second-order volitions that distinguishes them—with respect to the 
capacity for the kind of self-governance implied by autonomy—from other creatures according 
to Frankfurt.
27
  
Because Bratman’s project draws upon Frankfurt’s earlier model, I will first spend some 
time clarifying central aspects of the original hierarchical model. This will be followed by a brief 
treatment of some potential amendments (provided by Dworkin) to such a view. I will then 
outline Bratman’s planning theory with an emphasis upon that component of his views that he 
calls self-governing policies. Later, I will defend against some criticisms of the original 
Frankfurtian view as well as raise some concerns of my own with Bratman’s attempted solution 
to these criticisms including a potentially serious problem for his particular account of autonomy.  
 
 
1.2 Autonomy as Coherence 
 
1.2.1 The Original Hierarchy 
 
Frankfurt’s seminal contribution to debates about autonomous agency was set forth in his 
paper “The Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”. There he distinguishes between 
the common understanding of personal freedom—namely, the ability to do what one wants—and 
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 It is important to note that in “The Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” Frankfurt does not 
seem concerned about the possibility that one’s autonomy may be undermined as a result of second-order volitions 
having been previously conditioned by, for example, various social influences throughout one’s development. In 
response to these potential concerns, Dworkin has identified the need for what he calls ‘procedural independence’; 
see his (1976), “Autonomy and Behaviour Control”. More will be said about this potential amendment to an account 
of autonomy later in section 1.2.2.  
27
 For example he claims, “It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to 
be found in the structure of a person’s will” (1971, p.12). 
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a higher-order reflective capacity to either adopt or reject one’s initial or first-order desires and 
inclinations. It is this second-order reflective capacity that is central to Frankfurt’s 
characterization of the person (or the agent as we are wont to say). Not only are people pushed 
and pulled by various first order desires and motives, but, says Frankfurt, “[We] are capable of 
wanting to be different, in [our] preferences and purposes, from what [we] are” (1971, p. 12). 
Thus, whereas first-order desires concern our wanting either to do or not to do some particular 
thing, our second-order reflective capacity allows us to form desires and attitudes about those 
very first-order desires; that is to say, we may have desires and attitudes that have other of our 
desires as their contents. For example, one may desire to yell at a telemarketer for having been 
called and woken-up in the early hours of the morning while also not wanting to have such a 
desire because it will result in a worsened attitude toward the rest of the day. Such ambivalence 
with respect to desires, it seems, is not an uncommon occurrence in the day-to-day experience of 
most people.  
Another important notion in Frankfurt’s account is that of the individual’s will. For him, it 
is not just our ability to have various desires with other of our desires as their objects that alone 
defines our particular kind of agency, but also, that certain of our desires have the capacity to 
serve as what carry us “all the way to action” (1971, p. 14). He thus equates the will with “the 
notion of an effective desire” (1971, p. 14)28; that is, with a desire that is motivationally powerful 
enough to result in the attainment of it’s object. But more important than this technical 
                                                 
28
 It should be noted, however, that equating the will with an effective desire, as Frankfurt does, seems to 
render the notion of akrasia or the “weakness of will” conceptually impossible. One way to keep open the 
conceptual space needed for such a notion would be to say instead that will is an effective desire that is the object of 
a (positive) second-order volition. This way, an effective desire that opposes one’s second-order volition can be 
treated as weak willed. However, Frankfurt could simply maintain that weak-willed action is just action against 
one’s better judgement. In that case, one’s will would remain merely one’s effective desire, and it would be weak 
when it is contrary to one’s better judgement—however, relying upon the notion of one’s ‘better judgment’ here 
may be too strongly dependent upon reasons to fit neatly within Frankfurt’s internalist model. It is for this reason 
that I prefer the previously mentioned modification to the notion of the will as a way of making conceptual space for 
weakness of will.  
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specification of the will—and more centrally distinguishing of characteristically human 
agency—is what he calls, ‘second-order volition’. To illustrate this latter notion (and the 
complex structure of human willing), Frankfurt first begins with the example of a physician who 
believes that he would be better suited to help his psychotherapy patients if he understood what 
their craving for a drug was like. We are invited to suppose that this belief leads the physician to 
form a second-order desire in favour of the first-order desire to take the drug. Now it may be true 
that the physician wants to have the desire to take the drug while altogether not wanting that 
desire to become effective. This leads to the somewhat awkward sounding statement by 
Frankfurt that, “…insofar as he now wants only to want to take it, and not to take it, there is 
nothing in what he now wants that would be satisfied by the drug itself” (1971, p. 15). In other 
words, that one has a certain second-order desire does not entail that one also has the relevant 
and compatible first-order desire. And when this is the case, the individual’s second-order 
desiring does not amount to a second-order volition. However, in instances where the individual 
has both the first-order desire and the complimentary second-order desire that the first be 
effective in moving him to action, only then does the individual have a second-order volition 
according to Frankfurt. And, as mentioned, it is these second-order volitions that are the 
hallmark of the deliberate (and we might say autonomous) agency of persons for Frankfurt.   
In contrast to the willful agent (i.e. one who exercises second-order volitions) lies what 
Frankfurt calls the ‘wanton’. A wanton, he suggests, is an individual with no interest in his (or 
her) own will. For Frankfurt, the issue of wantonness is a matter of degree. That is to say, 
depending upon the frequency with which individuals fail to form a second-order volition, we 
may correspondingly attribute to them a greater or lesser amount of wantonness.
29
 But this is not 
                                                 
29
 This point clearly establishes that Frankfurt’s focus here is squarely set upon a protracted view of agency 
(i.e. the idea of the person over time) as opposed to merely local actions. 
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to say that the wanton is thoughtlessly engrossed with first-order desires, since some of these 
may conflict or be nullified even by deliberation. Indeed, Frankfurt suggests, “a wanton may 
possess and employ rational faculties of a high order. Nothing…implies that he cannot reason or 
that he cannot deliberate concerning how to do what he wants to do” (1971, p. 17).30 What sets 
the wanton apart from other rational individuals is not that he lacks the capacity for reflection, 
but rather, that, in the end, he does not care by which first-order desire he is led to act: he is 
merely occupied with the strongest of his basic inclinations and desires.  
To highlight the differences between the willful
31
 and the wanton, Frankfurt provides the 
example of the unwilling and the wanton drug addicts. The unwilling addict experiences a deep 
tension between two competing first-order desires; namely, the desire for the drug and the 
opposing desire to resist taking it. But what defines the unwilling addict is that he forms the 
second-order volition to resist taking the drug. Regardless of whether he finally succumbs to the 
pull of the addiction, there is a sense in which, though the desires that move him belong to him 
alone, he may still regard the forces which result in his taking the drug as not his own. The 
wanton, on the other hand, although he may also contain the conflicting first-order desires to 
either take the drug or not to, is not concerned about the outcome of this conflict.
32
 As we might 
expect, he is indifferent to such aspects of his mental life. But this indifference towards his 
involvement in the selection between opposing first-order desires means also that he will not 
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 Frankfurt would later reconsider the implications of this claim. See his “Identification and 
Wholeheartedness” (1987, p. 176). 
31
 By use of this term I mean to express both the positive and negative aspects of second-order volitions (i.e. to 
either be willing or unwilling for one or another of one’s first-order desires to be effective). 
32
 It should be noted however, that forming a second-order volition does not require that one’s first order 
desires be in a state of conflict. Indeed, on Frankfurt’s view, one may also be a willing addict. That is to say, even 
though an agent may have an irresistible desire to take a drug at the level of the first-order, so long as the agent 
forms a second-order volition to take the drug—one might imagine, for example, that the agent enjoys the 
psychological effects that the drug produces and the social atmosphere of the drug user lifestyle—his taking it is 
done autonomously. Admittedly, some readers might find this facet of the view problematic. They may instead see 
the second-order backing of an irresistible first-order desire as something closer to acquiescence than autonomous 
agency but I will not defend Frankfurt’s view from such worries here.      
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come to full satisfaction upon the overcoming of one of these desires in favour of the other since, 
he is not himself invested in the outcome of this conflict.  
An important part of what it means to invest oneself in the outcome of lower order 
conflicts between desires is that one forms a second-order volition in favour of a particular one 
of them. Of this process, Frankfurt claims, an identification is made between the agent and one 
of his first-order desires. And this espousal of and identification with a certain desire means that 
there is a corresponding withdrawal from those desires that lie in opposition to it. These two 
notions of identification and withdrawal are paramount to a proper understanding of Frankfurt’s 
characterization of the structure of human willing. Another noteworthy aspect of that structure is 
the sense in which an agent may be said to exercise ‘freedom of the will’. In short, Frankfurt 
claims that, “It is in securing the conformity of his will to his second-order volitions, then, that a 
person [or agent] exercises freedom of the will” (1971, p. 20). Thus, it may be said of both the 
unwilling addict and the wanton addict that neither of them exercises freedom of the will with 
respect to their drug taking. However, though they are each not free in this regard, they are 
individually so for different reasons: the unwilling addict because he does not obtain the will that 
he wants, and the wanton addict because he has no volitions of the second-order concerning his 
conflicting first-order desires.  
Perhaps the strongest and most persistent objection to the hierarchical model proposed by 
Frankfurt has to do with the lack of a firm ceiling to these higher-order reflections. In other 
words, there seems to be no limit to the potential conflicts between desires at ever higher levels. 
Moreover, there doesn’t appear to be any non-arbitrary reason as to why one should halt one’s 
ever higher reflective ascension along the graded ladder of desires.
33
 One may thus reasonably 
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 This is the regress problem that Frankfurt’s view is often charged with. It will be addressed later in section 
1.3. 
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ask why it is the second level of this hierarchical structure that is to provide the privileged seat of 
agency. But this is not a problem of which Frankfurt was unaware, and he first sought to remedy 
it by appeal to the notion of identification. Of this process, he says, “When a person identifies 
himself decisively with one of his first-order desires, this commitment “resounds” throughout the 
potentially endless array of higher orders” (1971, p. 21). It matters not, he says, whether we here 
interpret him to mean that such an identification results in a series of ever higher confirming 
desires or if it simply means that the question of even higher orders of desires ceases to be of 
importance to the agent. Indeed, for all practical purposes, wherever the agent comes to an 
identification of this sort—one presumed to typically occur at the level of the second-order—is 
simply where the agent’s power is alleged to be located. Nevertheless, many philosophers have 
found such a response to the problem to be unsatisfactory, and Frankfurt’s later appeal to the 
notions of satisfaction
34
 and necessary volitions
35
 have not quelled the concerns with his account. 
That is not to say that the hierarchal story of human agency that he developed has not had a 
significant impact on the imaginations of philosophers and shaped much of the theorizing done 
in the field. Surely, it has been of no small import. Rather, it seems that whatever position the 
hierarchical structure of volition is to ultimately occupy in a thorough account of autonomous 
agency, unless an adequate solution to the above mentioned regress problem is provided, its role 
can only ever be a partial one.  
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 Frankfurt’s use of the notion of ‘satisfaction’ refers to an overall state of tranquility with respect to one’s 
mental economy. And this is a state of the agent that does not require any kind of acceptance at a higher order. See 
footnote 62 on page 38 of this chapter for greater detail. For the full account see Frankfurt’s (1992) “The faintest 
passion”. 
35
 Necessary volitions, for Frankfurt, simultaneously constitute and constrain the character of an agent’s 
willfulness. See his (1982) “The importance of what we care about” anthologized in his (1988) book by the same 
title and his (1993) “Autonomy, necessity, and love” anthologized in his (1999) book entitled “Necessity, volition, 
and love” for greater detail. 
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1.2.2 Dworkin’s Amendment 
 
The above mentioned regress problem is not the only concern that faces a hierarchical 
account of autonomous agency. Indeed, Gerald Dworkin, although also an advocate of a 
hierarchical approach to autonomy
36
, has identified another concern for this type of account. 
According to Dworkin, there is a problem with simply taking a second-order endorsement of (or 
a positive attitude toward) a first-order desire or motive to amount to an agent’s acting 
autonomously. The problem arises because second-order endorsements and attitudes can 
themselves be influenced in ways that we would normally take to undermine a person’s self-
governance. For instance, one may be the victim of deception or of coercive threats or incentives 
(or both), and these may have the effect of undermining or reversing the type of endorsements 
that an agent would have otherwise made had such compelling forces not been implicated in the 
process. In these cases, Dworkin suggests, “…a person will feel used, [and] will see herself as an 
instrument of another’s will.” (1988, p. 14). He also maintains that, “Her actions, although in one 
sense hers because she did them, are in another sense attributable to another” (1988, p. 14). They 
are attributable to another in these types of cases because the agent’s second-order endorsements 
and performance of an action is here manipulated, or forcefully imposed upon the agent by 
another. Dworkin believes that these kinds of influences result in an agent producing involuntary 
behaviours and, when this kind of thing happens, it fractures the connections that regularly hold 
between an agent’s actions and his or her character. The upshot of all this, according to Dworkin, 
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 Interestingly, both Dworkin and Frankfurt independently published hierarchical accounts of autonomy within 
a few months of each other, Dworkin publishing first the article “Acting Freely” in November of 1970, followed by 
Frankfurt’s widely influential “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” published in January of 1971. 
According to Dworkin (personal communication, May 27, 2012), both he and Frankfurt developed the idea 
independently although they had each been in communication with Robert Nozick on the topic. 
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is that when an agent is the victim of deception or coercion, that agent’s actions are not 
autonomous.
37
 
Another more worrisome way of conceiving of the problem identified above by Dworkin, 
is to consider that not only might the kind of deception or coercion that undermines one’s self-
governance occur at a specific and isolated instance, but rather, it can occur over a period (or 
even over the course) of an agent’s development, in a kind of insidious and manipulative way, to 
impart second-order tendencies to endorse certain motives. That is to say, such influences might 
taint the formation of an agent’s preferences. This is the kind of concern that in part motivates 
Christman’s historical account of autonomy previously mentioned (in footnote 13). To illustrate 
the kind of impediment such influences pose to autonomy, one might here imagine an individual 
who was raised in an isolated, strict, and deeply ascetic religious cult. Such an individual may 
have been conditioned over the years, by way of harsh punishments for disobedience, to forfeit 
various forms of pleasure seeking behaviours or self-fulfilling activities—such that, as an adult, 
this individual has, by external compulsion, come to unreflectively internalize a preference for 
the motive of personal restraint even in the absence of other cult members or any threat of 
punishment. Normally speaking, we would not consider preferences formed in this way to be 
expressive of the agent’s autonomy since they more accurately reflect impositions or directives 
inculcated by the group (i.e. other cult leaders and members). In other words, preferences formed 
in this way reveal chiefly the control of the group upon the agent’s desires and actions and not 
her own freely reflective control over herself.
38
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 The solution to this problem of second-order preference manipulation, according to Dworkin, is to propose a 
necessary condition for autonomy, one that he calls ‘procedural independence’. This condition will be explained 
later in this section.   
38
 Christman (2007, p. 21) proposes three primary conditions of autonomy—revised from his earlier 1991 
draft—in order to block such examples from counting as instances of autonomous agency, but these will not be 
taken up here for three reasons. First, practically speaking, his conditions demand too much of the agent by way of 
accurate and comprehensive memory and ability to identify a number of often subtle preference inducing factors of 
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According to Dworkin, there are additional and related factors that subvert the free and 
unencumbered functioning of an agent’s capacity to form second-order endorsements and 
preferences. Here Dworkin has in mind influences that “…keep the agent in ignorance of the true 
determinants of his behaviour…[and] which rely on causal influences of which the agent is not 
conscious…” (1976, p. 26). He provides the examples of subliminal motivation (if it were 
possible) and instances of induced cognitive dissonance
39
 since, in such cases, agents are not 
cognizant of the real forces that control their actions.
40
 These types of influences, according to 
Christman, can be made to “…force a person to (prefer to) do something” (1991, p. 3), and they 
also keep people unaware of the manipulation of their preferences. What is distinctive about 
these types of influences is that they serve to undermine the agent’s ability to adequately reflect 
upon her first-order motives by keeping her unaware of the ways in which her reflections, 
preferences and endorsements are being controlled by external events. In such instances, an 
agent may believe herself to be acting autonomously
41—since, her action, being as it is the result 
of a higher-order endorsement of a lower-order desire, is structurally identical to normal 
autonomous agency
42—but she cannot be taken to be expressing genuine autonomy since her 
                                                                                                                                                             
one’s potentially distant personal history. Also, it requires too much expertise with respect to an agent’s ability to 
identify and adequately account for the equally obscure “reflection-distorting factors”. Next, if an agent’s second-
order preferences were successfully (even though forcibly) ingrained by the group, then we have no reason to think 
that she would feel alienated from them, since, such preferences—regardless of having been implanted by way of 
external manipulation from the group—over time, infect by conditioning, or simply become part of her sense of her 
own character. This point is echoed by Thalberg who claims that, “…harshly conditioned adults and children…show 
none of the reluctance…found among “unwilling” addicts, alcoholics, and smokers” (1978, p. 222). And last, 
Dworkin’s simpler requirement of procedural independence seems to be a sufficient means of resolving the 
identified problem.    
39
 For an explanation of the theory of cognitive dissonance see Festinger (1957) or Festinger & Carlsmith 
(1959). For a modern treatment of the view see Harmon-Jones & Mills (1999). 
40
 One might, for example, add things like being hypnotized or unknowingly having been made to ingest drugs 
to the list of these kinds of factors.  
41
 At least, that is, until she discovers (if she ever does) the previously unknown sources that were responsible 
for shaping her second-order thoughts and subsequent behaviour. 
42
 As Dimock notes, “…external influences can undermine a person’s autonomy without thereby undermining 
the subjective conditions of autonomy (such as the ability to reflect upon her desires)” (1997, p. 84).   
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actions are being governed by forces of which she is entirely unaware and that are thus 
unaccounted for and unapproved of. 
The previous three paragraphs brought to attention different but closely related factors 
which threaten to undermine an account of autonomy that relies primarily upon higher-order 
endorsements. To be sure, if the kind of higher-order attitudes and thinking involved—that is, the 
thought and attitudes occurring at the level presumed to be the locus of autonomous willing—can 
themselves be manipulated and controlled to such a degree that we are not prepared to grant that 
the actions that follow from them amount to autonomous ones, then mere higher-order 
endorsement alone cannot secure the autonomy of the agent. But we need not be overly alarmed 
by what these factors represent. Indeed, it would appear that these factors (e.g. coercion, 
indoctrination, induced cognitive dissonance, et cetera), remain threats to one’s self-governance 
on any model of autonomous agency. Moreover, when we recognize certain influences to either 
undermine or to otherwise be impediments to genuine self-governance, we need only ensure that 
they be classified as such, and amend our model of autonomy to include a condition (or 
conditions) that guard against their intrusion upon our understanding of the concept
43—and this 
is precisely what Dworkin does. The additional condition that is required to inoculate our 
hierarchical model of autonomy from these specific influences, according to Dworkin, is one that 
he labels “procedural independence”. 
According to an early formulation, Dworkin suggests that understanding procedural 
independence “…involves distinguishing those ways of influencing people’s reflective and 
critical faculties which subvert them from those which promote and improve them” (1981, p. 
61). Here we see that procedural independence is concerned with securing the freedom of an 
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 Indeed, as Christman suggests, “A full specification of what it means to be self-directed, in a manner that 
captures what it means to be autonomous, simply will include the sorts of factors (or the conditions for such factors) 
that must be absent for such self-direction to occur” (1988, p. 110). 
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agent’s second-order functioning from various factors that impinge upon or disrupt it. Later, in a 
book length treatment of autonomy, Dworkin would add: “It involves distinguishing those 
influences such as hypnotic suggestion, manipulation, coercive persuasion, subliminal influence, 
and so forth, and doing so in a non ad hoc fashion” (1988, p. 18). The requirement of procedural 
independence, then, designates a class of influential factors that are generally known to 
undermine autonomous agency and to which the agent must not be subjected or else she will lack 
autonomy. Clearly, procedural independence picks out a negative state of affairs—that is to say, 
an agent can only exercise her autonomy in absence of such subversive influences. To state it 
differently, her ability to be self-governing depends upon a freedom from these types of 
encroachment upon her preferences and ability to reflect on first-order desires and motives.  
Some might be concerned, however, that things like normal educational practices may in 
some cases fall into the above class of prohibitions
44
 and that this would be a particularly 
unwelcome consequence of adopting the condition of procedural independence since one of the 
primary aims of regular education is to promote the development of autonomous citizens. One of 
the worries here is that even where the aim of educators is to develop a capacity for autonomy in 
young students, it may nevertheless be inevitable that they at some early point impart ideas, 
practices, and skills to these students in a way that mirrors almost identically what most would 
consider more insidious forms of indoctrination
45—and this betrays a serious inconsistency 
between educational goals and educational practices.  
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 For a ‘responsiveness to reasons’ based disarming of this kind of worry see: Cuypers & Haji (2006). 
45
 For example, educators might compel young learners to adopt certain beliefs about, say, the desirability of 
critical reflection upon reasons and motives before the students are capable of forming any well thought out or 
reflective assessment of such a belief for themselves. And such comportment—i.e. getting others to adopt beliefs 
before they can assess them for themselves—is in keeping with the behaviours of those who would seek to 
indoctrinate.   
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As far as one is concerned specifically with the idea of procedural independence, however, 
there appears to be a way of distinguishing the kind of pedagogy aimed at developing 
autonomous agents from that aimed at indoctrination, and of keeping the former style of 
pedagogy off the prohibited influences list while keeping the latter on it. The main point to 
recognize here is that what renders genuine indoctrination an item on the list of factors from 
which the autonomous agent must be free is that it undermines the agent’s second-order 
functioning. It does this in part by instilling preferences in ways that are not obvious to the 
manipulated agent. Often, such preference inculcation is coupled with an admonition against 
being critical of these very preferences. It is because the people in these circumstances fail to 
recognize the ways in which they have had their preferences manipulated along with their 
(implanted) strong reluctance to question and reflect upon such preferences that they often 
remain helpless victims of these powerfully controlling factors.  
With respect to the kinds of educational practices aimed at developing autonomous agents, 
on the other hand, while they may rely upon inculcating certain beliefs, this is done in the service 
of promoting the kind of reflectiveness and critical mindedness that will eventually enable the 
students to independently assess for themselves their own motives, reasons, and (most 
importantly) their second-order preferences. It provides to these students the tools that, once 
developed, will allow them to then review and evaluate the very means of their acquiring such 
abilities. Moreover, they are not in any way hindered from rejecting aspects—or even entire 
models—of the thoughts proposed to them before they were able to reflectively consider or 
evaluate them for themselves. And this is because, unlike with cases of indoctrination, educating 
for autonomy does not include any admonitions against self-critical reflection (it does quite the 
opposite actually). Instead, it provides students with the skill set and ability to re-consider any 
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portion or aspect of their lives and development. As such, educating for autonomy, it turns out, is 
thoroughly consistent with the goals of autonomous agency. 
One of the things that becomes clear from the treatment of the worry handled above, is that 
Dworkin’s characterization of the notion of procedural independence can help to classify 
influences that might at first glance appear to be either difficult to categorize or, that may seem 
to require potentially counter-intuitive classifications. The way to distinguish between those 
items that fall on the list—i.e. the list of influences from which the autonomous agent must be 
free—from those that might look like potential list members is straightforward: If the kind of 
influence in question is of the type that undermines, lessens, impedes, or subverts an agent’s 
second-order functioning, it belongs on the list; whereas, if it supports, encourages, promotes, or 
otherwise empowers this kind of functioning, it does not belong on the list.  
For the remainder of this dissertation, Dworkin’s amendment to the hierarchical account of 
autonomy (i.e. the condition of procedural independence) will be treated as an additional and 
necessary condition of autonomous agency. Where it is not explicitly mentioned in the context of 
other components of autonomy, the reader is invited to treat it as a tacit rider that will ultimately 
be appended to the final account.     
As previously mentioned, the hierarchical model has enjoyed a wide influence. One 
philosopher who has attempted to reconstruct an elaborate account of autonomous agency—one 
that preserves in large part the spirit of the hierarchical model advanced by both Dworkin and 
especially Frankfurt—is Michael Bratman. In his account, Bratman calls for the inclusion of an 
agent’s temporally extended practices of planning and behavioural guidance by self-established 
policies. His model of autonomous agency is also one of the most inviting with respect to 
questions concerning the role of conscious unity in the guidance and motivation of agential 
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action over time, since his is the first of such models to devote significant resources to spelling-
out just what all is involved in a temporally extended view of autonomy. The following section 
will examine Bratman’s planning theory of intentional human action and what it has to say about 
autonomous agency. 
  
 
1.2.3 Agency and Time: Bratman’s Account of Autonomous Agency  
 
According to Bratman (2000), there are three key elements that are central to the story of 
autonomous human agency: 1- that we are reflective; 2- that we make plans and use other related 
mental devices and strategies; and 3- that we conceive of our power of agency as taking place 
across extended periods of time. With respect to the first of these components (i.e. our reflective 
capacity), Bratman takes a broadly Frankfurtian approach. That is to say, he characterizes our 
reflective capacity in terms of the hierarchical structure of higher-order conative engagement 
with lower-order desires; thus, to this extent, his view mirrors the position described in section 
1.2.1. However, he is keen to note that this account of reflectiveness is not without its 
problems
46—for example, how the agent should come to ‘identify’ with or endorse a desire 
regardless of the particular level at which the desire is to be located. That is to say, as was 
pointed out in section 1.2.1, it remains unclear why we should accept that the definitive power of 
agency is to be taken as always located at this higher level.
47
 Nevertheless, Bratman’s only 
amendment to the view at this stage is designating weak and strong forms of reflectiveness—the 
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 One such problem, Bratman notes, is the difficulty inherent in reconciling agent causal explanations with our 
standard event causal understanding of the world. This problem will not be taken up here. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, however, it will be assumed that a compatibilist view of autonomous agency is a viable option.  
47
 For some worries about under appreciating first-order desires and their behavioural cues see Friedman’s 
(1986) “Autonomy and the Split-Level Self”. 
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former denoting the capacity to have higher-order attitudes towards first-order desires, and the 
latter denoting the capacity of the agent to ‘take a stand’48 with respect to a particular first-order 
desire.  
The second core aspect of autonomous agency, for Bratman, involves our use of both plans 
and policies to shape and guide our behaviour. As planning agents, Bratman suggests, our 
behaviour is more complex than simply acting from moment to moment in a way unconnected 
with our previously established goals and aims or their future fulfillment. Rather, he claims, we 
often act in response to various complex and hierarchically framed forward-looking plans.
49
 
Moreover, these plans are ostensibly responsible for integrating and ensuring the harmonious 
unfolding and functioning of our actions and activities over extended periods. That is not to say 
that one may not revise earlier plans in light of relevant new information that may come into 
one’s possession—surely, this is an essential caveat of the view—but, says Bratman, “Prior plans 
have…a certain stability: there is, normally, a rational pressure not to reconsider and/or abandon 
a prior plan” (2000, p. 26).50 That is to say, the instrumental reasoning standardly involved in the 
formation of plans serves not only to chart out the course of future behaviours but it also acts as a 
(defeasible) constraint upon reconsiderations of the initial objectives as formulated. 
Whereas a plan typically involves a specific, if partial, program for guiding one’s 
behaviour with respect to some end in view, policies, on the other hand, embody a more general 
type of commitment according to Bratman. For him, a policy concerns one’s conformity to a set 
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 By his use of this phrase I presume Bratman is referring to the kind of agential identification characteristic of 
Frankfurtian second-order volitions.  
49
 Many of these plans, according to Bratman, are only partial and need not be overarching ‘life’ plans. For 
example, they may involve a not entirely filled out plan to vacation in Cuba over the winter, rather than a dedicated 
life-shaping goal of becoming say, a politician (although, presumably, weightier life shaping plans are not to be 
excluded from this model).  
50
 This pressure, according to Bratman, is due to the perceived need for means-end coherence incurred by the 
instrumental reason employed in the formation of the very plans in question. For greater detail, see his (1981), 
“Intention and Means-End Reasoning”. 
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of behavioural guidelines about what to do given a certain situation that is likely (or has the 
potential) to be repeatedly encountered. For example, one may have a policy of always asking 
one’s coworkers whether they had a pleasant weekend upon seeing them at work on Mondays, or 
of always checking the tire pressure before going on a lengthy road trip. When the role of 
policies and planning in our action is given due regard, Bratman believes, we extend our 
understanding of autonomous agency beyond a basic ‘belief and desire’ psychological rendering. 
Indeed, although these manners of structuring one’s behaviour may be generally treated as kinds 
of pro attitudes, there remains a sense in which they are unlike regular desires. What 
distinguishes our intentional plans and policies from the ebb and flow of our everyday desires, 
according to Bratman, is that, beyond their motivational roles, “they are subject to distinctive 
rational norms of consistency, coherence, and stability” (2000, p. 27).51 As mentioned, it is not 
that the reasons involved in establishing such norms cannot be challenged or defeated, but only 
that there is some resistance to such changes in light of the globally instrumental role played by 
these plans and policies.  
It might appear that the two components of Bratman’s view addressed so far are separate 
and unrelated aspects of how we express our autonomy; after all, one (our reflectiveness) picks 
out our ability to consider our immediate desires and whether or not we want any one of them to 
be effective, and the other (our planfulness) serves to orient our long-term behaviours. But one 
commonality between the two is that each element partakes of a hierarchical structuring
52
: the 
first, by way of a graded scale of desires; and the second, in terms of ends over the means that 
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 For a potential challenge to this distinction see Alfred Mele’s discussion of occurrent and standing desires in 
his “Motivation and Agency” (2003, p. 30-33). There, standing desires appear to capture something of the stability 
that Bratman attributes solely to plans and policies. However, Mele does go on to claim that, “Having no explicit 
representational content, standing desires are not explicit attitudes. Rather, they are dispositions to have explicit 
attitudes of a certain kind” (p. 32)—and, if we consider standing desires to be mere dispositions rather than attitudes, 
it appears, Bratman’s distinction may withstand the potential worry.    
52
 That is, so long as one thinks of such a model in terms of the hierarchical imagery provided by the original 
account.  
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they instantiate. Nevertheless, despite this shared structural feature, it seems, there may be some 
people who do not take part in both kinds of mental activity. For example, it would appear that 
one could be a nonreflective individual and yet still carry out plans (this seems consistent with 
Frankfurt’s construal of the wanton). However, for Bratman, the opposite does not hold—that is, 
one cannot be a ‘strongly’ reflective agent about a particular and immediate set of desires 
without at least viewing oneself as persisting to some degree into the future, and planning to 
remain on the side one has taken. This brings us to the question of our conception of our agentic 
power as something that is distributed across time. 
The third component in Bratman’s triad of core features of autonomous agency has to do 
with our understanding of ourselves as temporally persisting. When we engage in drawn out 
activities—e.g. plan a wedding—we conceive of ourselves as the same agent throughout the 
entire process.
53
 That is to say, for each subtask that we may be engaged in performing, from 
setting appointments with various photographers, to selecting the floral arrangements or booking 
the honeymoon suite, we take ourselves to be one and the same agent all along—that is, as one 
who has embarked upon the project, has completed certain component objectives, and who 
expects to carry out several more before all is said and done. Of course, one may divvy up one’s 
actions to correspond to the various subtasks as occurring at a particular time (Bratman calls this 
a ‘time-slice’ view of agency), but the majority of sane people do not normally think of 
themselves and their actions and involvement with the world in this way.
54
 This is why emotions 
like pride, shame, and vengefulness (among others) make sense to us and form a coherent part of 
our understanding of the world and our place in it. We feel pride or shame for having 
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 Barring, of course, instances where those processes are interrupted by catastrophic life-changing or character 
shattering events (e.g. being forced by territorial wars to flee one’s home and social milieu, or unexpectedly 
suffering a head trauma that leaves one noticeably brain damaged).  
54
 Indeed, even our ability to appreciate music betrays a sense in which a fluid temporal persistence 
characterizes our experience of ourselves over time. 
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accomplished or failed to have accomplished some previously set task, project, or goal. And we 
feel vengeful because we view the agent (i.e. one’s self) who was harmed in the past as identical 
with the one who presently feels pain.  
When we come to appreciate the kind of coordinated temporal distribution of our thoughts, 
actions, and self-conceptions in this way, according to Bratman, we arrive at an important truth; 
namely, that our agency is, in a very full sense
55
, a temporally extended phenomenon. To frame 
this notion of the temporal extension characteristic of our form of agency, Bratman draws upon a 
modern take on a broadly Lockean view. This Lockean view is grounded in the interconnected 
psychological ties between one’s self and one’s memories, one’s future oriented intentions and 
their fulfillment, and the continuities between one’s desires and their kin. With respect to the 
psychological ties formed by way of the agent’s future oriented intentional activity, Bratman 
posits that it is a kind of active monitoring and regulation by the agent of her motivations that 
ensures that such ties exist. The danger with such a view is that it seems to push the agent back 
one step from the kinds of actions that are supposed to constitute her agency.
56
 In order to 
address this concern, Bratman claims, “we will want to appeal to states and attitudes whose 
primary roles include the support of connections and continuities, which, on a broadly Lockean 
view, help constitute the identity of the agent over time” (2000, p. 31). This affords Bratman the 
license to accord agential authority to such attitudes, since, if we take these attitudes to support 
the functioning of relevant desires, we can plausibly claim that the agent endorses them. But this 
leaves us with the question of just what attitudes might play the kind of supporting role needed. 
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 By this I mean to convey a kind of deep persistence not captured by simple one-off actions.  
56
 The worry here is that we are left with the idea of a little person inside the head watching and controlling 
from behind the scenes, separate from the cognitive processes taking place. This is problematic because Bratman’s 
objective is to develop a naturalistic, and “nonhomuncular” view of autonomous agency. 
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To answer this question, Bratman suggests, we need to take another look at our planfulness and 
policies. 
First, a brief digression: so far, it might appear that Bratman’s account has done little to 
distinguish autonomous agency from a merely purposive theory of human action since there has 
been sparse mention of anything distinctly characteristic of autonomy (that is, beyond the higher 
order reflective capacity already provided by Frankfurt). But, contrary to this possible 
appearance, his view is very much concerned with a ‘stronger’ account of agency—one centered 
upon temporally extended self-governance—and we may therefore rightly claim that his is a 
view about autonomous agency.
57
 It is, in particular, the notion of the self-governing policy that 
makes it clear that Bratman’s view concerns autonomy. 
Our planfulness and policies, as mentioned, are constitutive of the kinds of psychological 
interconnections and continuities that characterize our agency over time. And it is in part their 
very role to induce a certain stable integration and harmonious unfolding of relevant intentions 
and behaviours by way of the connections just noted. Moreover, if we combine this view of our 
planning and policies with the kind of weak reflection (i.e. higher-order desires and attitudes) 
mentioned earlier, we allow a new understanding to surface; namely, that some of our policies 
may in fact be higher-order policies. Indeed, we may reflectively come to form, for example, a 
policy to be more helpful to those who seem to be in need, or to try to be a more compassionate 
or conscientious person.
58
 What distinguishes these types of higher-order policies from the 
ordinary policies one may have is that they entail the reflective desire that such policies be 
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 The core difference between the Frankfurtian and the Bratmanian approaches to the topic being that the 
former takes the seat of autonomous agency to be located at a higher order, while in the latter, the autonomous agent 
is taken to be grounded in Lockean psychological ties.   
58
 Notice that these kinds of policies are more general in character than ordinary policies. 
37 
 
effective in governing one’s actions.59 Bratman labels these ‘self-governing policies’. And it is 
this self-governance, in the form of self-established behaviour guiding and temporally extended 
policies that may provide an answer to the problem of agential endorsement (or ‘strong’ 
reflection) according to Bratman.
60
 Indeed, he suggests, “the agent’s reflective endorsement or 
rejection of a desire can be to a significant extent constituted by ways in which her self-
governing policies are committed to treating that desire over time” (2000, p. 34). In other words, 
Bratman proposes that the agent be identified with her self-governing policies—that is, where 
these self-governing policies operate to support or impede the relevant functioning of a desire, 
we may likewise say that the agent herself has either endorsed or rejected the desire in 
question.
61
  
Of course, the looming problem with respect to any strictly hierarchically structured 
rendering of autonomy is the possibility of psychological dissociation or estrangement from 
higher-order desires or, in this case, policies. This is rooted in the same regress problem that was 
mentioned at the end of section 1.2.1. Bratman’s strategy here, for addressing the problem, draws 
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 One’s ordinary policies may be shaped, for example, by following a command, or by conditioning or 
imitation (none of which necessarily implies reflective acceptance). However, for Bratman, in order for a policy to 
be considered “higher-order” it must be reflectively desired by the agent. On this picture, it is not that the policy 
itself has a hierarchical structure, but rather, that it is considered from the hierarchical perspective as the object of a 
reflective desire. Moreover, the examples of higher-order policies that Bratman provides appear to be less concerned 
with the role of recurrent situational triggers than regular policies.    
60
 This is the point at which Bratman’s view perhaps most significantly departs from the earlier Frankfurtian 
model. Although Bratman does this in order to avoid the regress problem, it seems to make things worse for his 
proposal. For one thing, like the externalist responsiveness to ‘reasons’ and ‘reasoning’ based approaches did before, 
this move seems to shift the focus away from the immediate power of the agent to a potentially distant instruction 
bearing and behaviour constraining cognitive element (i.e. the specialized type of policy he identifies). For another, 
as I will argue, it appears that the agent may dissociate herself from or disavow such a cognitive element similar to 
how she may ascend to a higher order of reflection on Frankfurt’s original model. And if this is right, then the 
problem of agential endorsement still looms for Bratman. There will be more on this point in the pages to come.    
61
 Bratman goes on to elaborate that one of the key ways in which self-governing policies operate to engage 
various desires is via governing the extent to which such desires are taken “as providing a justifying reason in 
motivationally efficacious practical reasoning” (2000, p. 39). For concerns about a circularity within this view, and 
his response, see his (2002) “Hierarchy, Circularity, and Double Reduction”. This component of Bratman’s view 
will not be given further attention here, in part because of its strongly rationalistic bent. 
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upon Frankfurt’s notion of satisfaction.62 However, satisfaction, he insists, is insufficient to 
handle the problem when framed solely in terms of hierarchical desires.
63
 What is needed, he 
proposes, is a view of satisfaction that is connected in the appropriate ways to the temporally 
extended nature of our agency—that is, “to satisfaction with a self-governing policy” (2000, p. 
34). He cautions, however, that such satisfaction must be understood to be flexible enough to 
allow some conflict or even violation of the policies in question, and yet firm enough to resist 
certain kinds of conflicts. What the proposed policy satisfaction ought to resist, for Bratman, is 
conflicts with other self-governing policies wherein one policy is challenged by another.
64
 
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that this move will be able to block the worry raised above.
65
  
The hierarchical theories first advance by Dworkin and Frankfurt, and more recently 
extended by Bratman, have received much critical attention. As noted, the most widespread 
objection to models of autonomy that rely upon hierarchically structured relationships between 
desires has to do with agential endorsement or identification. In short, the objection concerns the 
apparent open-endedness of such desire based hierarchies. That is to say, on these types of 
models, although an agent might appear to settle upon some second-order desire as ‘the one’ 
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 According to Frankfurt (1992), ‘satisfaction’ with one’s higher-order desires is what blocks the infinite 
regress problem for his view. This satisfaction is characterized in part as an “…absence of restlessness or resistance” 
(1992, p. 12). He argues: “To be satisfied with something does not require that a person have any particular belief 
about it, nor any particular feeling or attitude or intention” (1992, p. 13). And this is important since, if satisfaction 
did require some kind of separate cognitive element, then the agent might become dissatisfied with that element as 
well, and dissatisfaction here would reintroduce the infinite regress. This is why Frankfurt claims that, “Satisfaction 
is a state of the entire psychic system—a state constituted just by the absence of any tendency or inclination to alter 
its condition” (1992, p. 13). Because satisfaction is given this negative characterization—that is, one of a lack of 
both resistance to or restlessness about one’s second-order desires—questions about one’s potential to be dissatisfied 
with one’s complete state of being satisfied are seen not to make sense. And therefore, worries about an infinite 
regress are prevented from re-emerging.      
63
 Bratman argues in his (1996) “Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason,” that Frankfurt style 
‘satisfaction’ with one’s higher-order desires is indistinguishable from one’s having yet to decide one way or 
another about whether to challenge such desires, and so it does not appear to be enough to anchor the agent’s 
endorsement of or identification with them. According to Bratman, what is required, then, is something stronger 
than the negative construal of satisfaction as “the mere absence of motivation to “change things”” (1996, p. 7).   
64
 There appears to be a parallel here with Susan Hurley’s view of unified consciousness as something that 
cannot support mutually inconsistent contents. See her (1998), “Consciousness in Action”.  
65
 For more on this point, we will return to Bratman’s view and a potentially serious problem for it (and for any 
account of autonomy) in section 1.4.  
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with which she identifies or endorses, there doesn’t appear to be any principled reason why the 
agent shouldn’t (or at least couldn’t) continue to ascend to ever higher orders of reflective 
assessment. The threat incurred by such a potentially infinite regress of reflective desire 
evaluation is that it seems to show that there is no stable or consistent level at which the agent’s 
endorsement is to be reached, and thus, the mere fact that an agent might act from a higher-order 
desire does not alone seem to be enough to ensure that the agent therefore acts autonomously.  
In the next section, two responses to the regress problem will be provided. The first draws 
upon an aspect of both Frankfurt’s and Dworkin’s responses to the issue that directs attention to 
the practical constraints on typical instances of autonomous agency. The second reply involves 
reconsidering the conceptual framework by which we understand those models of autonomy that 
have been described in hierarchical terms.       
 
 
1.3 Putting an End to the Regress Problem 
 
As noted in the previous section, what is commonly known as “the regress problem” has 
proven to be a serious stumbling block for theorists committed to developing hierarchical 
accounts of autonomous agency. The following excerpt from Christman (1991) provides some 
perspective on the problem: 
 
Any account…that presupposes that the desires that move an agent are ‘accepted’ by her 
will invite an infinite regress of desires in the explanation of this acceptance. For either a 
desire descended to the agent without her awareness or approval…, or the agent was able to 
judge whether or not this desire was acceptable. If the latter is the case (as must be on 
hierarchical ‘approval’ models), then the judgment about the desire will have to be based on 
(other) desires of the agent. Then the question arises about these new desires and their being 
approved or not by the agent, from which flows the infinite regress of desires. (p. 8) 
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Now, to be fair to theorists who adopt a hierarchical approach to understanding autonomy, it is 
not obvious that the forming of an endorsement of a second-order desire always or necessarily 
entails reasoned “judgments” about such endorsements66; especially not judgments that need to 
be shaped by the agent’s other desires.67 It could simply be the case that these kinds of 
endorsements are secured as a result of the desires in question being congruent with, for 
example, the agent’s sense of self—or at least with their not offending or disturbing one’s self-
conception.
68
 It may therefore be advisable to abandon Christman’s particular construal of the 
problem and instead focus upon a more widespread take on it. 
The common understanding of the regress charge against hierarchical accounts of 
autonomy can be advanced rather straightforwardly, it seems, by posing a simple question; 
namely, as Thalberg puts it, “Why not go on to third-story or higher desires and volitions?” 
(1978, p. 219). Indeed, for many theorists, setting the seat of autonomous agency at the level of 
the second-order appears both arbitrary and unjustifiable. Skeptics of this approach to 
understanding autonomy, it seems, are not compelled to accept that there are any good or 
principled reasons for an agent to halt her continued ascent to ever higher levels of reflective 
desiring. And for them, the absence of such a compelling reason makes specifying the conditions 
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 Indeed, as Frankfurt suggests, “…the conformity of a person’s will to his higher-order volitions may be far 
more thoughtless and spontaneous than this…[it may occur] without any explicit forethought and without any need 
for energetic self control” (1971, p. 22).  
67
 Such a rendering of the problem might speak more to Christman’s favoured personal history based solution 
to it than it does to the common take on it.   
68
 Frankfurt’s notion of satisfaction provides another possible alternative to the suggestion that there needs be 
an element of cognitive judgment directed at one’s identifications or endorsements. This is not to say that the agent 
must be completely unaware of why she is comfortable endorsing a particular desire, but rather, it is only to say that 
deliberate acts of judgment about her endorsements are not necessarily required. Indeed, as Frankfurt claims, “…the 
essential non-occurrence [of satisfaction with one’s endorsements] is neither deliberately contrived nor wantonly 
unselfconscious. It develops and prevails as an unmanaged consequence of the person’s appreciation of his psychic 
condition” (1992, p. 13-14). Therefore, contrary to what Christman suggests, neither do one’s second-order desires 
“descend” to one without awareness, nor does it require a cognitive act of judgment about one’s endorsements of 
them on Frankfurt’s account.      
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of autonomy, as primarily involving second-order desires and volitions, tantamount to trying to 
hit a moving target by always aiming in the exact same location. On some occasions, where an 
agent, upon reaching a second-order volition, in fact does abandon any further reflective 
consideration of her desiring and willing, the view may appear to have made a direct hit. That is, 
it might seem to explain all that there is to explain about the agent’s autonomous actions. 
However, in other instances, wherein, for example, an agent’s nagging doubts about her resolve 
to set out towards accomplishing some goal keep her second-guessing her endorsements and 
keep her climbing to ever higher-orders of reflection, there the weakness of the model is made 
apparent. This weakness is an inability to specify with any consistency both at what level the 
power of the agent is located and, why it should be located at any particular level.
69
  
With respect to the first worry (i.e. the apparent inability of hierarchical accounts to specify 
a consistent locus of agential power), one response would be to suggest, along with Aristotle, 
that “we must not expect more precision than the subject matter admits” (Nicomachean Ethics, 
book 1, chap. 3). That is to say, that we should not expect that the power of autonomous agency 
always resides at a conceptually neat and tidy single level of reflection (viz. the second-order). 
Autonomous agents are complex and multifaceted creatures whose ability to reflectively 
consider their desires and volitions allows for considerable flexibility (i.e. indeterminateness) 
with respect to the level of reflection at which they may finally refrain from considering things 
any further. Therefore, in some instances, one’s endorsements may very well be made at even 
higher-orders of reflective desiring than is the norm.
70
 Nevertheless, and this is to address the 
second worry identified above, it may simply be the case that agents typically make the kinds of 
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 In other words, it is a question of what grants a given level of reflection its special status.  
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 Both Dworkin and Frankfurt accept this to be the case. 
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endorsements that are taken to be the hallmark of autonomous agency at the second-order of 
reflection. This take on the matter is consistent with the views of both Frankfurt and Dworkin.  
Although there may not appear to be any established limit to one’s ever higher level 
desiring on hierarchical models, for both Frankfurt and Dworkin, there does appear to be what 
might be called ‘practical constraints’ upon just how high an agent is typically inclined to 
reflectively ascend. Indeed, Frankfurt claims that, although “there is no theoretical limit to the 
length of the series of desires of higher and higher orders;…common sense and, perhaps, a 
saving fatigue prevents an individual from obsessively refusing to identify himself with any of 
his desires until he forms a desire of the next higher order” (1971, p. 21). Here, “common sense” 
and a “saving fatigue” may render apparent to an individual that continued ascension to ever 
higher orders of reflection upon her desires, at a certain point, loses its relevance. In other words, 
the continual second-guessing of one’s endorsements or commitments eventually begins to look 
not so much like climbing to ever higher orders of engaged reflection, as it does merely 
vacillation with respect to the commitments one is considering making at lower-orders of 
reflection
71
; whereas, to form a genuine endorsement of a second-order (or higher) desire just is 
to put a stop to uncertainty and vacillation and stand by one’s commitments.  
Similarly to Frankfurt, Dworkin admits that an agent’s reflections upon her desires may 
surpass those of the second-order, and he also believes that people are nevertheless inhibited 
from taking this ability to extremes. For instance, he claims, “it appears that for some agents, and 
some motivations, there is higher-order reflection [i.e. higher than the normal level]…[however,] 
as a matter of contingent fact human beings either do not, or perhaps cannot, carry on such 
iteration at great length” (1988, p. 19). And this is just to say that generally speaking (at least for 
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 That is to say that, at a certain point, an agent may come to recognize that continuing to a higher-order of 
reflection is likely only to take her one step further away from settling the matter at hand; a matter that begins with 
first-order desires and her relationship to them. 
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human beings according to Dworkin) people tend to be conservative with respect to the number 
of orders of reflection that they will ascend to in forming their endorsements. And this, it seems, 
should not come as a surprise since, practically speaking, there are limits to the benefits of 
continuing to engage in reflections of a higher-order.
72
 Dworkin’s suggestion that people may 
not be capable of continuing in this activity to any great length might indicate something like the 
inhibitory fatigue that Frankfurt mentions, or perhaps some other cognitive barrier to abstracting 
too far from their initial concerns for action.
73
  
In addition to those personal reflection limiting factors mentioned above (i.e. fatigue, a 
diminishing sense of relevance, and disinterest), it would seem that, frequently, the demands of 
everyday life also institute practical constraints that inhibit excessive reflective tendencies. 
Often, in various social and other settings, a person’s actions are subject to various constraints of 
expediency. If a friend asks one to go see a movie and one remains paralyzed by some obsessive 
compulsion to continue to reflect further at every point at which it seems a committed response is 
within reach (i.e. at every previous order of reflection), one will not likely have that friend for 
very long. Even admitting that one cannot make up one’s mind is a better response to the social 
demands in this instance than the entirely socially awkward behaviour of remaining silently
74
 
locked in an endless chain of ever higher-order reflection upon the matter. 
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 That is to say that, at a certain point, perhaps around the fourth or fifth order of desire let us suppose, the 
value of the difference between the levels of desire begins to wane for the agent and it might not make any 
difference to her whether her final endorsement is settled at the level of the fourth or fifth order. Moreover, where 
this difference remains most pronounced, it seems, is between desires of the first and second order since, it is there 
that the difference in character of the desires is most clear: first-order desires concern one’s potential actions in the 
world; whereas second-order desires concern only desires of the first order (i.e. desires of a different character than 
they are themselves). Beyond the first two levels of desires, however, every further level takes for its object a 
reflective desire of the same character.  
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 We might here imagine, for example, a general disinterest in continuing the activity eventually setting in—
perhaps a disinterest brought about by the monotony of the cognitive exercise.      
74
 Of course, one could vocalize each step in this process but that would hardly render the behaviour any less 
uncomfortable. 
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It seems then, that there is good reason to think that practical constraints, in the form of 
personal ability or interest and social demands for timeliness, set the tone for the degree to which 
an agent may typically engage in the kind of reflective activity that is characteristic of 
hierarchical models of autonomy. In any event, with respect to the standard degrees of reflective 
activity, empirical research can help to determine the cognitive norms of agents. And it seems 
reasonable to think that these norms, if empirically ascertained, would likely end up being on the 
conservative side as Frankfurt and Dworkin suppose.  
Nevertheless, skeptics could maintain that the above talk of practical constraints 
notwithstanding, advocates of hierarchical views have failed to directly address either of the 
theoretical challenges that were advanced on their own terms. That is to say that, to point to what 
typically occurs with agents is not exactly to answer the questions about what stops their 
reflective ascension—or rather, why it should stop—and why the level at which they do stop is 
in some sense special.
75
 Skeptics of such accounts might maintain that to answer these 
challenges head-on will require more than a mere listing of pragmatic constraints. And this may 
well be so, but, advocates of hierarchical accounts might be left with another option here—an 
option that could save them from having to address these challenges at all. 
One way for advocates of a hierarchical approach to autonomy to dispense with the regress 
based challenges of the skeptic is to show that they were ill-conceived from the very beginning, 
and that when an adequate understanding of the proposed model is had, such challenges are seen 
to be misguided and to no longer apply. To demonstrate the error of these challenges will involve 
(as was mentioned at the end of section 1.2.3) taking another look at the conceptual framework 
used to explain hierarchical models of autonomy. If it can be shown that the regress based 
objections of skeptics derive from a faulty apprehension of the conceptual framework being used 
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 In other words, what renders such a level of endorsement the seat of the power of one’s autonomy? 
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then it might also be shown that such challenges fail to amount to real problems for these types 
of models.  
When undertaking to examine the models of autonomy that have been classically described 
in hierarchical terms, what ought to be noted from the very outset is that the construal of 
autonomous agency as relying upon a hierarchically composed desire structure is essentially a 
heuristic strategy.
76
 It is to speak metaphorically about the mental lives of agents in a manner 
that is useful for keeping clear the various distinctions and conceptual issues that arise when 
considering, for example, the differences between the types of desires that one has and one’s 
relation to those desires in the production of intentional action. Talk of various “orders” of 
reflective desiring can, in the end, be dispensed with at no apparent cost to the substantive claims 
made by the theory. Gary Watson, it seems, was onto something when he stated that “since 
second-order volitions are themselves simply desires, to add them to the context of conflict is 
just to increase the number of contenders; it is not to give a special place to any of those in 
contention” (1975, p. 119). And this is why (as mentioned in section 1.1), I contend, it is better to 
think of what have traditionally been thought of as hierarchical theories of autonomy not in terms 
of the structural layering of “orders” or “levels” of desires, but rather, in terms of coherence 
instead. But, before getting into this alternative conceptual schema, more needs to be said about 
the dangers of treating the original hierarchal perspective literally.  
The ease with which the metaphors of “higher-orders” and “lower-orders” of desires fit 
into our conceptual schemas, it seems, has helped to render them rather inconspicuous, and has 
enabled them, for the most part, to evade a certain kind of critical recognition; namely, a 
recognition of the fact that they are nothing more than mere metaphors. And this is what appears 
to be lost on skeptics who make infinite regress based charges against hierarchical models of 
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 Credit for this insight is due to my supervisor for this dissertation, Dr. Susan Dimock. 
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autonomy. It seems that they have been seduced, perhaps by the facility with which such mental 
imagery fits into the overall rendering of agentic power on these models, to treat such 
hierarchical concepts in a literal manner, or to treat them as essential components of these 
views.
77
 Moreover, by failing to treat such notions as what they in fact are (i.e. mere heuristic 
tools) they end up reifying the hierarchical structure of these types of accounts of autonomy. And 
once the hierarchical structuring itself is given this kind of (unmerited) footing, questions and 
problems which derive from that structure are allowed a way to take hold.
78
 But, where the 
understanding is clear that the collection of hierarchical concepts deployed to describe 
autonomous agency is a mere aid to learning or way of facilitating our understanding of complex 
cases, such questions and problems should not arise. That is to say, there are no questions about, 
for instance, at what “level” or “order” of reflection that a principled reason to stop reflecting 
further should appear, nor is there any question about the “special significance” of any particular 
order of reflection once these “orders” are recognized to be nothing more than a manner of 
speaking about the relations between certain desires had by agents. And once we abandon this 
particular way of conceiving of the mechanics of autonomous agency, we can begin to see how a 
re-thinking of such a model along the lines of a coherence among certain of an individual’s 
desires can provide us with a more apt rendering of what is actually taking place within the agent 
as well as provide us with an account that isn’t vulnerable to regress based challenges. 
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 Granted, the terminology of hierarchy is ubiquitous within the literature and it is not commonly made 
explicit by theorists in this area that these concepts can be treated as purely metaphorical. Some advocates of 
hierarchical approaches to autonomy may even disagree with me on this point. Nevertheless, it seems clear to me 
that such a collection of concepts is inessential to the view, especially if one is concerned only with providing a 
functional account of autonomous agency (as is my goal here) and not one that is forced to make any metaphysical 
commitments.   
78
 That includes problems about, for instance, on Friedman’s account, the “autonomy-conferring status” (1986, 
p. 23) of reflective desiring, as well as the “ontological status” (p. 28-9) of the psychological process of 
identification. On a coherence view, as will become clear in the paragraphs to follow, there need be no special 
ontological status for any of the psychological processes taking place within the agent, nor does there need to be any 
special relationship of conferral between some part of the agent that is presumed to be already autonomous and 
some other part believed not to be.    
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To make the change from a model of autonomy that concentrates upon a hierarchical view 
of desires and volitions to one that centers upon the notion of coherence does not require any real 
restructuring of the model. All that is required is that the earlier descriptions and the hierarchy 
laden language that was made use of be replaced by language that emphasizes the coherence 
between one’s different desires instead of the difference in ranking between them. An additional 
benefit of doing so is that it seems to provide a more accurate portrayal of autonomy since it is 
not the differences between psychological parts of the desiring agent that reveals her power of 
self-governance, but rather, it is that parts of an agent’s mental life may unite cohesively to form 
a triumphant expression of her own will that reveals this power.  
To begin to make this terminological shift, it seems natural to employ the term “raw 
desires” to stand in for what used to be called “first-order desires” or “lower-order desires” since 
the notion of a raw desire still captures something of the unrefined or immediate nature of the 
kinds of desires that one has about states of affairs or potential courses of action. Whereas, with 
respect to what were previously known as “second-order desires” or “higher-order desires,” it 
would appear that we need not introduce any new terms since the notion of a “reflective desire” 
is already widely used in the literature to denote the kind of desires that are concerned with raw 
or other desires; therefore, in this case, we need simply abandon the talk of second- or higher-
order desiring and instead continue to employ the notion of reflective desiring in their place. And 
the same goes for “second-order volitions,” these may now simply be understood as “reflective 
volitions.”79 
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 Alternatively, one may here be tempted to use Bratman’s classification of weak-reflectiveness and strong-
reflectiveness (the former to stand in for reflective desiring and the latter in place of reflective volitions); so long, 
that is, as one is careful not to reintroduce any of the hierarchical language used by Bratman in the characterization 
of these terms.  
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Importantly, on this new way of conceiving of things, these newly transposed terms do not 
signify any sort of implicit hierarchical ranking or ordering of desires; rather, they merely speak 
to the experiential character of the types of desires that they are.
80
 Moreover, on a coherence 
view, nothing about the psychological processes taking place within, for example, the wanton or 
the willful agents (as mentioned in section 1.2.1) changes.
81
 That is to say, just as before, the 
unwilling addict experiences a deep tension between two competing desires (i.e. the desire for 
the drug and the opposing desire to resist taking it) only this time, these desires are understood to 
be raw desires since they concern in a straightforward way the courses of action that are open to 
the agent. And what is now understood to define the unwilling addict is that he forms a reflective 
desire to resist taking the drug. Just as before, he may, in the end, succumb to the pull of the 
addiction. But there remains a sense in which, though the desires that move him are certainly his, 
he may still regard the forces which result in his taking the drug as not his own; that is, since 
they are not a function of the coherent and unified structure of his willfulness and reflective and 
raw desiring. Instead, what results in his succumbing to the drug represents an outsider to that 
coherent and crystallized psychological unity—it is a rogue impulse.82 Moreover, the wanton, as 
before, will also contain conflicting raw desires to either take the drug or not to; yet, as before, 
he is not concerned about the outcome of this conflict. He remains indifferent to these aspects of 
his mental life. For him, there are no reflective desires or volitions, only the pull of raw desires 
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 The difference in character of the kinds of desires is a result of their different objects. Raw desires have as 
their objects actions or states of affairs that can be brought about through action, whereas reflective desires have as 
their objects either raw desires or other reflective desires.   
81
 In fact, there are no psychological differences at all between the entire class of earlier hierarchical 
descriptions and the newly developed coherence view of those cases. All that changes, with respect to these 
examples, is our way of conceptualizing that mental activity and the emphasis that is given to structural coherence 
instead of hierarchical structure. 
82
 One might alternatively say that such an agent is divided against himself, or that the lack of coherence 
between his actions on the one hand, and his reflective desires on the other, betray the fact that he is not operating in 
complete control of his own behaviours. 
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of various strengths. And his indifference towards which raw desires in the end move him to act 
means that he is simply not interested in his autonomy.  
Recall that an important part of what it means to invest oneself in the outcome of conflicts 
between one’s raw desires is that one forms a reflective volition in favour of a particular one of 
them. On the previous understanding of the model, Frankfurt suggested that what we are now 
calling reflective volition entailed an identification between the agent and what we now refer to 
as one of her raw desires. And that this espousal of and identification with a certain desire meant 
that there was a corresponding withdrawal from those desires that were in opposition to it. 
Indeed, these two notions of identification and withdrawal were seen to be paramount to a proper 
understanding of Frankfurt’s characterization of the structure of human willing.  
From the point of view of coherence, the notions of identification and withdrawal may 
continue to be a part of the story of autonomous agency but, they will need to be characterized in 
a different light. For instance, the notion of identification should no longer appear to be 
mysterious, as Thalberg (1978, p. 220) noted, nor should it refer to some additional 
psychological activity on the part of the agent, as Frankfurt (1992) warns, but rather, on the 
coherence view that I am suggesting, the identification of the agent with one of her raw desires is 
simply a property of the coherence between her reflective volition, and reflective and raw 
desires. For these psychological components to cohere just is for her to be identified with the one 
of her raw desires that is a part of that coherent unity as opposed to some other raw desire for 
which this coherence does not obtain. On this view, there is simply nothing more to consider 
when seeking to understand what it is that makes it the case that an agent feels or in fact is 
identified with one of her raw desires. It would make no sense to think, on the contrary, that she 
would instead identify with a stand-alone raw desire that lies in opposition to and is excluded 
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from her greater psychological unity since, to identify with a raw desire is simply to coherently 
reflectively desire and will it. And although this new way of thinking of the agent’s identifying 
with some raw desire might make her withdrawal from the other conflicting raw desire seem to 
be more of a passive affair, the fact that a particular raw desire is left as a stand-alone desire is 
enough to show that the agent’s focus is clearly elsewhere.  
Now that the new terminological conventions have been outlined for what should, from 
this point onwards, be referred to as a coherence approach to autonomy, we can return to the 
hierarchy based objections to the previous way of describing things to see whether or not such 
objections continue to pose any problems on the revised approach. The first hierarchy based 
objection had to do with the apparent limitlessness with which an agent could continue to engage 
in reflective desiring of ever higher “orders” in the absence of (what seemed to be) any 
principled reason to stop. The second part of the objection, had to do with the special, essentially 
“already autonomous status” of the level of desiring at which the agent would reflectively climb 
no higher (regardless of what level that turned out to be).  
To address these charges from the new coherence view of autonomous agency, we may 
start by pointing out that there is no reference to “orders” of reflective desiring on this way of 
seeing things; instead, there are merely reflective desires, and although these may be numerous 
(including the possibility of many of which that will have other reflective desires as their 
objects), there is no notion of rank-ordering between them, nor is there any special status 
accorded a reflective desire that is not itself reflectively considered (i.e. what would have been 
the “highest-order” desire, and the seat of one’s autonomy on the former view). On this new 
coherence view, one’s power to be autonomous does not rest with one’s last, unconsidered 
reflective desire (nor the “order” or “level” at which that desire was formerly thought to be 
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situated); instead, the power of the autonomous agent is seen to be a function of the coherence 
between one’s reflective volition and those reflective desires (regardless of how many of these 
there are) and some effective raw desire. That is to say that, the above stated coherence is what 
constitutes the agent’s particular power to be self-governing. Once it is recognized that not only 
does the new understanding not admit of any rank-ordering between desires but that it also does 
not treat the final unconsidered reflective desire as the seat of the power of autonomy, it becomes 
clear that the old and persistent objections to what was originally thought of as a hierarchical 
approach are no longer troubling on the new view (i.e. since questions about reflective desire 
ascension and status are seen to no longer apply). Nevertheless, the benefit of considering the 
points pressed by these objections is that we have arrived at a revised account that appears to be 
a more adequate candidate view than its predecessor. 
But even equipped with this new, more adequate understanding of autonomy, it seems we 
are still not entirely in the clear, for the kind of psychological dissociation that was implicit in the 
first aspect of the regress challenge—a dissociation suggested by the agent’s ability to always 
withdraw and become one step removed from a former identification of hers—may continue, it 
would seem, to cause problems for even a coherence rendering of things since, such a potential 
for dissociation threatens to undermine the very stability of that coherence.    
 In the next section, we return to Bratman’s temporally extended account of autonomous 
agency in order to reveal in just what way such a form of psychological dissociation may 
continue to be a problem even after we adopt the new coherence centered way of conceiving of 
the formerly hierarchical model. 
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1.4 Another Problem for Autonomous Agency 
 
One of the positive contributions of Bratman’s account to a theory of autonomy is that it 
draws our attention to the importance of the temporally extended nature of our autonomous 
agency. It does this primarily by way of explicating the character of the psychological 
connections that underlie those autonomous actions that take place across extended periods of 
time. Importantly, part of what defines the character of those temporally extended psychological 
connections is a form of coherence between various psychological components; namely, the 
agent’s connection to her memories, her future oriented intentions and an awareness of their 
fulfillment, and the continuities between her plans, policies, and desires. The coherence between 
these elements can be seen to complement the other more temporally localized sort of 
psychological coherence mentioned in the previous section. Indeed, if we combined these two 
aspects of psychological coherence in the right way
83
, the resulting temporally extended 
coherence view, it would appear, may provide us with the most robust and promising account of 
autonomous agency developed so far. Nevertheless, this kind of view may still face some 
problems.  
One of the core concerns that I have with what is original in Bratman’s account has to do 
with an element that it treats as a central component of autonomous agency; namely, the self-
governing policy. My worry is inspired by some recent empirical work in psychology
84—work 
summarized in an important paper by John Bargh & Tanya Chartrand entitled “The Unbearable 
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 That is, in a way that refrains from reintroducing hierarchical notions and that therefore, is not required to 
make accommodations to the challenges of infinite regress. In other words, what we would be considering here is 
not just the Bratmanian model of autonomy revamped with the new coherence terminology but, in addition, we 
would be abandoning the idea that satisfaction with a self-governing policy is required to block those regress 
charges.  
84
 Insofar as Bratman wants to develop a naturalistic and ‘nonhomuncular’ view of autonomous agency, it 
would appear that his view needs to be responsive and answerable to the empirically derived worries I raise in this 
section.  
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Automaticity of Being”. In the article, Bargh & Chartrand draw attention to the research on skill 
acquisition that is “focused on intentional, goal-directed processes that [become] more efficient 
over time and practice until they [can] operate without conscious guidance” (1999, p. 463). 
Drawing upon empirical evidence, Bargh & Chartrand construe the gradual automatization of 
such goal-directed processes as helpful in disburdening an individual’s “limited conscious 
attentional capacity” (p. 464).85 The development of the automatic functioning of such goal-
directed processes, according to Bargh & Chartrand, is conditioned by the “frequent and 
consistent pairing of internal responses with external events” (p. 468). The story they provide is 
one in which the individual (or agent for our concerns) must first afford a significant amount of 
conscious attention in order to attain the behaviour relevant to the goal he or she has established; 
but as the behaviour is repeated the ties between it and the goal become reinforced in a way that, 
little by little, take less and less conscious effort, until eventually, the agent’s conscious attention 
is no longer required and “drops out”.86  
The concern that such research elicits for the Bratmanian view, in part, has to do with the 
similarity of self-governing policies to the ultimately automated goal-directed processes 
empirically identified. Indeed, as one’s self-governing policies become more entrenched, and 
more consistently result in the desired behaviours that they serve to implement, the more they 
too, it appears, may become unconscious and automatic processes.
87
 In such instances, we may 
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 Bratman acknowledges this limited conscious capacity but does not identify the associated worry it involves 
for our self-governing polices—a worry I develop in the following paragraph. See his, “Intention and Personal 
Policies” (1989, p. 452). 
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 This phenomenon is often experienced by individuals when learning to play musical instruments. At first 
they must focus intently upon how they are manipulating their instrument in order to carry the tune, but over time, 
the music playing becomes automatic and the individual can play even while blindfolded or when attending to 
various other things like her audience or the sound of her own voice while singing along. 
87
 It is important here to note that the ‘dropping out’ of conscious attention that concerns me is different from 
the issue of estrangement that Bratman addresses. The former involves an abandonment of conscious attention due 
to habitualization, while the latter is concerned with a withdrawal of agential endorsement. Thus, the agent may be 
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resist identifying the behaviours so induced as autonomous or as the result of autonomous 
agency, since the agent seems to no longer be actively involved in her own behaviours. For 
example, one may have the self-governing policy of always coming to the aid of others who 
appear to be in distress. But there is a danger in such a policy’s becoming automatic. Let’s say 
that one sees an individual being mugged and, due to this automated policy, yells at the mugger 
to leave his victim alone (let us here presume that such a policy became automated through 
having repeatedly defended ones classmates from the schoolyard verbal assaults of other children 
in childhood). The danger is not only that the mugger may now turn his aggression toward our 
helpful agent (a danger that may seriously threaten the agent’s safety) but also that, due to the 
automatic issuing of this seemingly impulsive behaviour, our agent was not able to accord 
sufficient attention to the situation to revise his policy in favor of, for example, the more cautious 
and safer behaviour of calling the police.
88
 And I don’t think that the example just provided picks 
out an isolated occurrence. Rather, I agree with Bratman that we do often operate based on self-
governing policies, but because many of these may come to be activated automatically—and 
because such an automated activation of behaviour seems capable of obtaining even in the 
absence of the kind of coherently unified psychological economy outlined in the latter part of 
section 1.3—I hesitate to call the behaviours they issue examples of autonomous agency. Of 
course, the policy may have been consciously and reflectively self-established, but insofar as the 
desires it facilitates result in behaviours that were not previously consciously attended to (i.e. in 
close temporal proximity to the issuing of the behaviours in question), I think it problematic to 
                                                                                                                                                             
unconscious of the policy that guides her behaviour and yet not estranged from it—the worry here is that, if the 
effective policy is unconscious, she may not endorse it either. 
88
 Bratman, it appears, does have an answer to such a worry. For instance, he suggests, “in an emergency 
situation I do not reconsider or abandon my policy, I only block its application to the particular case” (1989, p. 
456)—but this assumes that the effectiveness of the policy in question, is forever within the purview of the agent’s 
reflective conscious attention. And not only is this assumption (in light of the empirical evidence) unwarranted, it 
also appears to threaten a vicious circularity (i.e. the agent’s approval here resurfaces as something distinct from the 
self-governing policy that is supposed to be constitutive of the agent’s endorsement of a desire).   
55 
 
attribute their origination to the agent’s autonomous action rather than simply a non-autonomous 
behavioural script. 
This brings us to the question of the nature of conscious involvement with a temporally 
extended view of autonomous agency. What seems clear is that it is not only the psychological 
ties that Bratman describes that are relevant to our understanding of autonomy. In addition, it is 
the subtle occurrent features of the psychological states involved in, and taking place across 
these connections that matter; and these warrant a more thorough treatment. One way of 
developing a more detailed understanding of what is required for a robust and adequate theory of 
personal autonomy—that is, in terms of an agent’s conscious involvement in her ongoing 
autonomous actions—is to examine those instances wherein an agent’s conscious involvement in 
her actions is either fragmented or altogether absent. Once we are clear on just what appears to 
be missing for one’s agency to count as autonomous in such cases, we will then be better situated 
to account for what is positively needed to bolster our account of autonomy. In the following 
chapter, we will examine the empirical research on automaticity, along with several everyday 
examples of instances of apparently purposive behaviours that are nevertheless produced in this 
automatic fashion. After developing a more thorough understanding of just what automaticity is 
and why it is a problem for a temporally extended view of autonomous agency (or for any view 
autonomous agency for that matter), we will be better situated to recognize some of the positive 
requirements of an adequate theory of autonomy. 
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Chapter 2 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the three most common approaches to understanding 
personal autonomy. I then gave some reasons to think that what I (along with Buss) call a 
coherentist account is most well suited to developing an adequate view of autonomy. However, it 
was noticed that such accounts, having been traditionally framed in terms of hierarchical models 
of desiring and willing, were left open to certain regress based challenges that appeared to 
seriously undermine these sorts of approaches. After addressing the regress based objections to a 
coherentist model of autonomy—primarily by way of showing that the traditional hierarchical 
structuring of such approaches is inessential and heuristic—I drew attention to a different 
problem that would appear to be of concern to any theory of autonomy.
89
 That problem was 
raised in the context of a challenge to Bratman’s proposed temporally extended view of 
autonomous agency—a view that treats self-governing policies (specifically those with which 
one is satisfied) as grounding the agent’s autonomous actions. In short, the worry was that 
instances of automaticity might reveal a further and under-recognized sense in which an agent 
can become alienated from her actions.  
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 It is important to note, however, that the problem that I will be developing in this chapter is of concern to the 
different theoretical approaches to autonomy for different reasons. For the ‘responsiveness to reasons’ and the 
‘responsiveness to reasoning’ based approaches, it reveals that these theories lack the resources to distinguish 
instances of automaticity from normal instances of autonomous behaviour since there is nothing about the way that 
such sequences of behaviours are formed or come about that contrasts with what these views have to say about 
normal autonomous functioning. Moreover, neither of these views appears concerned with the agent’s attention at 
the moment of action, so long as the stated action can in some way be traced back to the reasons available for it or 
the process of reasoning that underlies it, regardless of when such reasons or reasoning took place, even if those 
thought processes were temporally significantly removed from the issuance of the behaviours in question. With 
respect to coherentist approaches, it reveals a further sense in which an agent can become alienated from her own 
actions.   
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In this chapter, I will clarify the notion of automaticity, examine some relevant current 
empirical research on the topic, and develop several examples to highlight why these types of 
automatic behaviours amount to a problem for autonomy that deserves greater attention.   
 
2.1 A First Pass at Automaticity 
 
Earlier (in section 1.2.3), I drew upon Bargh and Chartrand’s (1999) summary of the 
empirical research devoted to what is widely known in psychology as automaticity. In that 
section, I described automaticity as a sort of behavioural script that may become operative 
without the conscious awareness—or at least without the occurrent conscious intention—of the 
behaving agent. It was also suggested that such automatic forms of apparently purposive 
behaviours were often the result of the frequent and consistent coupling of an environmental or 
situational trigger of a certain character (i.e. an external event type)
90
 along with a standardly 
employed intention and performance of a particular sort of action.
91
 With respect to the 
automation of various complex and skillful actions, the typical process involved in achieving a 
degree of mastery was seen to begin with the agent devoting significant attentional resources to 
acquiring the said skill. Indeed, in order to master such skills, the agent would at first commonly 
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 Indeed, Bargh claims that, “All automaticity is conditional; it is dependent on the occurrence of some 
specific set of circumstances” (1989, p. 7). 
91
 It is important to note that, from this point forward, I will not be treating the phrases ‘sequences of 
behaviours’ or ‘series of behaviours’ as equivalent to the notion of an ‘action’. Actions are the kinds of things that 
are performed by agents on my view—they require the occurrent conscious intention of an agent in order to be what 
they are. Similarly, autonomous actions are the kinds of things that are performed by agents that are autonomous for 
at least a given period of time. A series or sequence of behaviours, on the other hand, can be performed by non-
autonomous (in the personal sense) systems that are devoid of any subjective sort of intentionality. For instance, a 
robot puppy children’s toy can walk, sit, bark, and wag its tail but it would be a stretch to treat this behaviour as the 
intentional output of an agent as normally conceived. The reason for this terminological distinction is to differentiate 
certain of the constituents of automaticity (these will be called series or sequences of behaviours) from those of 
presumably standard and autonomous forms of agency (these will be called actions or autonomous actions 
respectively).        
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be required to devote a significant amount of practice time to the skillful action to be learned
92—
and this would include intense cognitive focus and bodily effort in order to both recognize and 
correct performance errors as well as to simply entrain the appropriate and desired series of 
behavioural responses. However, as the agent’s ability to execute the skillful activity gradually 
improved, it was recognized that the intense concentration and effort devoted to acquiring the 
new skill at the outset would also gradually become more relaxed. That is to say that, as an 
agent’s ability to perform a sequence of complex or skillful behaviours improved over time, the 
degree of cognitive effort and attention to the details of the performance of the action in question 
would correspondingly decrease. Moreover, after having achieved a certain degree of mastery 
over the set of desired performance behaviours, a remarkable result of the repetition required 
throughout the entrainment period was seen to obtain. The result was that one may then display 
the ability to perform the said sequence of behaviours devoid of conscious oversight or 
initiation—that is to say, automatically.  
Although rather remarkable, perhaps the above characterization of how we acquire the 
ability to perform various complex behaviours automatically isn’t all that surprising. After all, 
most of us may recall the various stages of learning and skillfulness that we each had to pass 
through in order to become competent automobile drivers as well as the attentional freedom that 
accompanies the comfort and confidence accrued over several years of successful driving. But, 
the initial phases of learning how to drive a car can be highly demanding on one’s attention to 
detail and they are often experienced as quite stressful by many. Indeed, beyond requiring a sort 
of hyper-vigilant awareness or attention to one’s surroundings when in the early stages of being 
behind the wheel of an automobile, one is also likely to be rather nervous initially about the 
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 As Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, and Aarts claim, “…for goal implementation to become automatized one needs 
to practice the selection and execution of the means in the goal-relevant situation” (2007, p. 104).  
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potential consequences of making mistakes while driving; perhaps most worrisome is the thought 
that an error could lead to the serious injury (or death) of another driver and his or her 
passengers, or pedestrians, or one’s self. In addition to the risk of injury, one may also fear the 
possibility of damaging the family (or one’s own) car, or someone else’s property and the 
personal liability that might result from causing such damage. 
Following the initial practice stage, one might remember the intense nervousness and the 
pressure of expectation that one felt when taking the licensing road test.  In my own case, I recall 
being very alert to my environment, to the details of what I was doing, and to my memory of the 
training that I underwent prior to taking the road test. I remained attentive to the instructions 
given to me, observant of the road signs and driving behaviour of the people sharing the road 
with me, and consciously vigilant with respect to keeping my focus directed at the present and 
relevant details of my surroundings (including my own actions). And, remembering my training, 
I was sure to make it obvious that I checked the mirrors as frequently as it was stated that I 
should in the pages of the driver’s manual. What has been described in the above example 
corresponds to and captures something of the high demands on attention during the initial 
learning period of the acquisition of most any new skill.  
Despite the initially high demands on attention, however, several months after being 
awarded my license to drive an automobile, I gradually became a more comfortable and 
confident driver, and I found that some of my attention was freed up for things like enjoying the 
music on the radio, or carrying on a conversation while driving (these were things that struck me 
as terribly distracting during the early learning period, and such distractions were likely to 
provoke certain procedural errors on my part). This gradual transition away from tenseness and 
hyper-alertness to a state of comfort and confidence in my own ability corresponds to the 
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relaxing of the attentional effort typical of the gradual automation of behaviour mentioned 
previously. However, what may be most worrisome for many drivers is when that state of 
conscious relaxation becomes so complete that it ends up leading to episodes of full-blown 
automaticity. Indeed, frightening as it can be for us to realize, most of us who have been driving 
for say, more than a year, can recall a time when we had reached a stop sign with no clear idea of 
how we navigated the previous several blocks of roadway because our conscious attention was 
directed elsewhere. What these latter types of experiences reveal to us is that we can carry out 
very complex and dynamic sequences of behaviours without consciously attending to what it is 
that we are in fact doing.
93
 This view is supported by Bargh, who claims that: “Once 
activated,…automated skills can interact with the environment in a sophisticated way, taking in 
information relevant to the goal’s purposes, and directing appropriate responses based on that 
information, without the need for conscious involvement in those responses” (1997, p. 29). 
When we become skilled enough, we can allow these sorts of deeply entrained but nevertheless 
subconscious behavioural scripts or guidelines to take over and free-up our ostensibly limited 
conscious attention span for other things. Though it may be rather sobering to find one’s self 
‘coming to’ (i.e. coming back to a sense of awareness of what one is presently doing) at a stop 
sign after having navigated the previous several blocks absent of conscious attention to one’s 
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 And this includes behaviours that are mediated by the changes registered by subconscious perceptions within 
a changing environment (such as the changing landscape and signage that accompany driving from one point to 
another). Indeed, according to Glaser & Kihlstrom, “…the results of research provide clear evidence…of what 
might be called contrast effects under conditions where controlled [i.e. conscious] processing is precluded, thus 
suggesting an automatic correction process [italics added]” (2005, p. 176). The authors further suggest that “the 
evidence for automatic correction calls into question prevailing conceptions of unconscious processes as passive and 
reactive…” (2005, p. 176). Behaviours that issue automatically may not only turn out to be automatically moderated 
by subconscious perceptions of relevant environmental changes but by the goal that is the terminus of the automated 
sequence of behaviours as well. And it can be this goal or end which provides the purposive structure to the 
automated sequence of behaviours that is responsible for shaping the ‘automatic correction process’ cited above. 
This would mean that instances of automatic behaviours are not always defined in terms of rigidly proscribed 
scripts, but rather, that behavioural adjustments may sometimes also be made both automatically and on the fly.    
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behaviours, what such moments reveal to us is just how commonplace and uncontrolled 
instances of automaticity are.  
As a first pass at providing an account of automaticity, then, we ought to take note of the 
following characteristics mentioned above: 1- Instances of automaticity are made up of 
sequences of behaviours that an individual performs without direct conscious oversight or 
initiation
94
; 2- Instances of automaticity may betray a purposive structuring but they are 
nevertheless typically unsupported by the occurrent or active attention of the agent
95
; 3- 
Complex forms of automatic behaviour typically require an entrainment period that includes a 
frequent and consistent pairing of an environmental or external event (or part thereof) with a 
particular internal response; 4- Given a sufficient entrainment period, one’s behavioural 
responses to familiar situations or certain sorts of environmental triggers can issue independent 
of conscious intention
96
; 5- Instances of automaticity often have the effect of freeing up one’s 
active conscious attentional capacity for other things. As we progress through the relevant 
aspects of the research focused on automaticity, as well as several examples of automatic 
behaviours issuing in various everyday human activities in the remainder of this chapter, we may 
need to refine our understanding of these component characteristics somewhat. However, for the 
time being, we may take the above mentioned characteristics to be central to those aspects of 
automaticity that are of concern to an adequate theory of autonomy.  
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 Strictly speaking, one may consciously initiate a sequence of behaviours that, after having been started, one’s 
conscious attention then recedes from (see: Bargh, 1997). However, many of our automatic behaviours are also 
initiated unconsciously. Indeed, Bargh suggests that research leads us to conclude that “...behavioral and cognitive 
goals can be directly activated by the environment without conscious choice or awareness of the activation” (1997, 
p. 47).  
95
 Instances of automaticity often issue without the support of the agent’s occurrent intention as well. 
96
 As Bargh (2005) notes, “...evidence demonstrate(s) that action tendencies can be activated and triggered 
independently and in the absence of the individual’s conscious choice or awareness of those causal triggers” (p. 38). 
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Before exploring the notion of automaticity any further, however, I will first take a 
moment to distinguish it from the related concept of automatism—a term of art that is standardly 
deployed in the field of law. 
 
2.2 Automaticity and Automatism 
 
Now that we have an appreciation of some of the central aspects of the sorts of behaviours 
typically classified by psychologists as instances of automaticity, we would do well to get clear 
on how these differ from, as well as potentially overlap with, those sorts of behaviours that fall 
under the label of ‘automatism’ within legal contexts.  
As noted, the word ‘automatism’ is a legal term of art that has its application within the 
Canadian criminal justice system. In strict legal terms, automatism may be either insane or non-
insane, the former denoting a mental disorder, while the latter simply confirms the absence of a 
conscious, voluntary act. The effect of a successful defence of automatism is the absolute 
exculpation, or acquittal, of a criminal defendant from legal guilt. The portion of Canada’s 
Criminal Code that is of relevance here is Section 16 which deals with the defense of mental 
disorder.
97
 In subsection (1) of section 16, it is stated that: “No person is criminally responsible 
for an act committed or an omission made while suffering from a mental disorder that rendered 
the person incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act or omission or of knowing 
that it was wrong.” Although the notion of automatism is not explicitly codified within the above 
statement, it has made its way into criminal jurisprudence (or case law) as a consideration 
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 Interestingly, as Kalant (1996) notes: “The term automatism does not appear in either the ICD-10 
(International Classification of Diseases, 10
th
 edition, World Health Organization) or the DSM-IV (Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual, 4
th
 edition, American Psychiatric Association)” (p. 634), although it does appear in medical 
journals and text books. Nevertheless, Healy (2000) claims that, “The initial presumption that automatism results 
from mental disorder is far removed from medical understanding of the subject” (p. 87). 
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relevant to section 16.
98
 Because of the emergence and importance of the notion of automatism 
as a consideration relevant to section 16 in the case law, in 1993 a review of section 16 was 
proposed by way of a White Paper which aimed to establish the verdict of not criminally 
responsible due to automatism. In this proposal, automatism was defined as “a state of 
unconsciousness that renders a person incapable of consciously controlling their behaviour while 
in that state.”99 Nevertheless, the review committee determined (with governmental 
endorsement) that both the definition of automatism and its legal application be left to the 
courts.
100
  
Clearly, the above definition of automatism bears some resemblance to a certain 
characteristic of automaticity that was identified in the previous section; namely, in terms of the 
lack of conscious control or oversight with respect to some behaviour. But before we draw our 
attention to the similarities between these related notions, let us first enumerate several of the 
commonly proposed sources of automatism that have been advanced in the courts and in legal 
theorising. This list includes: 1- Concussion or severe physical blow to the head; 2- 
Hypoglycaemia
101
; 3- Somnambulism; 4- Hypnotism; 5- Psychological blow; and 6- High blood 
alcohol level.
102
    
The sort of automatism that results from the first item on the list (i.e. ‘concussion’ or 
‘severe physical blow to the head’), is typically treated as an instance of non-insane automatism 
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 As mentioned above, the automatism defense can be advanced along two different lines; namely, insane 
automatism and non-insane (or sane) automatism. It should also be noted that these categories are typically treated 
as being mutually exclusive (see: Healy, 2000, p. 95-96).The former is counted as part of the standard defense of 
mental disorder, while the latter, if successful, according to Brudner, “…means that the accused has not acted, that 
his bodily movements were not expressions of a mind or will; hence it leads to an absolute acquittal” (2000, p. 67). 
The reason that it leads to an acquittal in such an instance is that it amounts to a lack of voluntariness on the part of 
the accused and that component of voluntariness is required by law for a conviction. 
99
 See: http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/md-tm/defin.html 
100
 Notwithstanding, the notion of automatism and its legal application continues to be a contentious issue, as it 
has been for the past several decades. Indeed, its application and varied interpretation in case law has been sharply 
criticised along various different lines. See for example, Healy (2000); Brudner (2000); Kalant (1996). 
101
 See: Holland (1982-1983, p. 112-113).   
102
 See: Kalant (1996, p. 632-633). 
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since the effects of suffering a severe blow to the head are not normally classified as indicative 
of a mental disorder, but rather, they are treated as the aftermath of an external event that is not 
typically expected to afflict an individual in a chronic manner. Next, automatism resulting from 
hypoglycaemia has also been treated as being of the non-insane sort
103
, since, although diabetes 
is a disease, it is not commonly treated as a “disease of the mind”. The cause of automatism 
known as somnambulism (or sleep-walking in common parlance), on the other hand, may be 
considered to be a disease of the mind (if its occurrence is in fact caused by an underlying mental 
disorder), and may therefore fit best under the heading of insane automatism.
104
 With respect to 
automatism resulting from hypnosis, it would appear that—insofar as we accept behaviours 
performed while under hypnosis into the category of automatism—such behaviours would fall 
under the non-insane heading since they too represent the consequences of a particular external 
event upon the individual (viz. the event of being hypnotized), and would thus not be expected to 
amount to a chronic mental condition either. When it comes to the claim of automatism being the 
result of a psychological blow (i.e. severe psychological shock or trauma), the issue is hotly 
contested. Indeed, Healy claims that: “…much controversy has surrounded the question whether 
a severe psychological blow could also be a cause of non-insane automatism” (2000, p. 90). 
Nevertheless, where a psychological blow has been accepted as a possible cause of automatism, 
it has not been considered to be a standing mental disorder
105—and thus, psychological blow 
automatism has been categorized as being of the non-insane sort. Lastly, in cases where it has 
been suggested that a high blood alcohol level may result in automatism
106
, it is again considered 
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 See: Holland (1982, p. 113). 
104
 However, Holland (1982-1983, p. 113-114) notes that, so far, cases of somnambulism have tended to result 
in acquittals.  
105
 And this is because the sort of psychological trauma in question is presumed to be preceded by an 
infrequently encountered and unexpected event. 
106
 This is also a highly contested issue. For greater detail, see Dimock (2011); and Kalant (1996). 
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to be of the non-insane type since what is responsible for the state of automatism is brought on 
by an external cause (viz. the alcohol that is ingested) rather than an internal mental disorder.
107
  
Without straying too far into the intricacies of law, it is worth noting that even though the 
majority of the above listed causes of automatism are reasonably treated as leading to those of 
the non-insane type, the default legal interpretation of the automatism defense favours treating it 
as a mental disorder. The reason that there exists a bias towards classifying instances of 
automatism as being of the insane sort is that the criteria that must be met in order to show that 
an instance of automatism is of the non-insane sort are exceedingly difficult if not impossible to 
satisfy. Indeed, according to Healy (2000, p. 97): 
 
At all events, it is clear that the viability of non-insane automatism will be nil unless the judge 
decides, as a matter of law, that the average sane person would react to the events in issue by a 
dissociation of mind and body as expressed in involuntary physical behaviour. The effect of this will 
be to eliminate the defence of non-insane automatism because it is a standard that cannot be met...To 
demand that the average sane person would react to the events in issue in a specified way is to 
preclude, by law, the possibility that this accused person actually did react...by a dissociation of mind 
and body, even if the average sane person may not have done so.   
 
The complexities of how to legally classify differently produced instances of automatism aside, 
the above quotation mentions one of the ways in which automatism is understood in the courts—
namely, as a dissociation of mind and body.
108
 According to Kalant, “Dissociation is defined as a 
disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity, and perception 
of the environment” (1996, p. 636).109 Moreover, he suggests that the condition of dissociation of 
mind from body means that consciousness is kept separate from things like the emotions, 
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 Granted, one may argue that alcoholism may be considered ‘a mental disorder’ but the alcohol itself must be 
ingested in order to produce the alleged automatism. 
108
 Kalant (1996) points out that automatism is also sometimes interpreted to mean “blackout” but he argues 
persuasively that its being understood in this way “is a serious error of concept” (p. 640). 
109
 He also points out that the category of “dissociative disorders” is listed in both the ICD-10 and the DSM-IV, 
and that this category includes this things like “dissociative amnesia, dissociative fugue...multiple personality 
disorder, depersonalisation, etc” (1996, p. 637).   
66 
 
behaviour, and judgement that a person normally has in response to a given situation, and that 
“the person is not capable of exercising conscious control over behaviour” (1996, p. 637) while 
in such a condition. Clearly, this characterization of the dissociation undergone by the individual 
during an episode of automatism bears a great resemblance to that conscious disconnect 
identified in the earlier outline of automaticity. Perhaps the only truly salient difference in the 
above construal of automatism, as Kalant puts it, is that under this understanding of dissociation 
the individual lacks the capacity to intervene and control his or her own behaviour; whereas, 
with respect to what has so far been said about automaticity, there has been no pronouncements 
about whether or not an individual always entirely lacks the ability to intervene and take control 
of the automatic behaviours that he or she engages in.    
Now that we have considered the sorts of things that are treated as capable of leading to a 
state of automatism, as well as the two standard categories of automatism (insane and non-
insane), along with some idea of just what the notion of automatism is commonly taken to imply 
(i.e. a dissociative state that renders an individual incapable of consciously controlling his or her 
behaviour), we may fruitfully compare and contrast the legal notion of automatism with the 
psychological notion of automaticity outlined earlier.  
Beginning with the ways in which our understanding of automaticity may be seen to differ 
from the understanding of automatism, we may first notice that, whereas instances of 
automaticity were taken to commonly require a period of entrainment, this does not appear to be 
the case with respect to automatism. Indeed, I have found no mention of any necessary 
entrainment period for the behaviours produced by an episode of automatism in the law or legal 
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theorizing.
110
 And this makes sense, given that several of the listed sources of automatism appear 
to preclude any process of entrainment.
111
   
Another difference between automaticity and automatism would appear to be that, while 
instances of the former are not typically considered to be indicative of any mental disorder, there 
exists a strong presumption of mental disorder with respect to instances of the later. In other 
words, the kinds of automatic behaviours that people engage in under the label of automaticity 
are widely taken to befall the population at large and they generally fail to constitute a genuine 
mental disorder or chronic cognitive impairment; whereas, as was mentioned earlier, instances of 
automatism are standardly associated with the mental disorder provisions of section 16 of the 
criminal code, and there remains a strong pressure to treat even instances of non-insane 
automatism as symptomatic of mental disorder.  
Yet another difference has to do with how each notion is interpreted or understood. For 
instance, when it comes to automaticity, the prevailing understanding is that conscious oversight 
of a given set of one’s behaviours is absent but the upshot of this absence is that one’s conscious 
attention is then liberated to focus upon other things, and this freeing up of attention can be both 
beneficial to the person and adaptive since it enables a person to operate in different and distinct 
ways simultaneously (thus broadening the scope of what an individual is capable of doing at a 
given time). On the other hand, automatism has been characterized as a sort of dissociation of 
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 However, Cooper (1994) reports that, in one case, an expert witness (a psychiatrist) suggested that “...a 
driver could be in a trance-like state induced by the repetitive stimuli experienced on long journeys on straight, 
featureless motorways” (p. 162). But, this same expert also maintained that such an individual would not be 
completely unaware of his or her surroundings. More importantly, the expert’s comments did not suggest that 
repeatedly encountered stimuli (along with a standardly employed response) are required for automatism to occur.  
111
 For instance, attempting to condition one’s self to behave in a certain (criminal) way after repeatedly and 
voluntarily receiving a severe blow to the head is plainly absurd. In fact, the only possible exception to this that I am 
aware of is that professional boxer’s are encouraged to ‘clinch’ upon being dazed from a severe blow to the head, 
but clinching with someone (which amounts to nothing more violent than hugging) is not normally considered 
criminal behaviour. Also, the automatic behaviours that are a result of somnambulism are not susceptible to 
entrainment (as far as I am aware). And it would appear that the same goes for psychological blow automatism since 
a severe psychological blow is not normally the sort of thing that can be reproduced on demand.   
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mind from bodily behaviour such that the individual, while in a state of automatism, is utterly 
incapable of controlling his or her emotions, judgements, and (most importantly) behaviours; and 
it is often treated as producing a state of complete unconsciousness or ‘blackout’ throughout its 
operation. Moreover, it is also typically regarded as responsible for the production of violent, 
dangerous, and destructive behaviours—which is, of course, why it is of concern to the courts. 
Turning our attention to the ways in which the notions of automaticity and automatism are 
similar, we find that there exists a significant degree of conceptual overlap between the two. 
First, both instances of automaticity and automatism may occur involuntarily
112
 (i.e. against 
one’s desires or better judgment). Also, both of these notions imply a lack of conscious control 
over one’s behavioural output as well as over one’s assessment of the environmental factors that 
might serve to moderate those behaviours. Finally, both instances of automaticity and 
automatism may (and typically do) occur in the absence of any occurrent intention by the 
individual. In other words, not only is the behaviour in both cases automatic, but the initiation of 
such sequences of behaviour occurs automatically as well.  
While the above comparison of automaticity and automatism renders it clear that these 
notions share certain core features (and that, therefore, work on automaticity and autonomy
113
 
may be relevant to the law and to legal theorizing), it has also been made clear that these two 
similar concepts are currently treated in very different ways by their respective disciplines or 
domains of application (i.e. psychology and the law), and thus, they ought to be kept separate in 
our understanding as we move forward in examining the concept of automaticity.  
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 However, as was previously mentioned with respect to automaticity, one may voluntarily initiate a given 
behavioural sequence from which one later diverts one’s conscious oversight and control (thus leaving the 
behavioural pattern to run to completion automatically after that point).  
113
 Alan Brudner has already begun analysing the relation between automatism and autonomy and how our 
understanding of these notions might inform legal policy. See his (2000) “insane automatism” in references. 
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Now that we have distinguished the notion of automaticity from the notion of automatism, 
in the next section, we will return to exclusively dealing with our understanding of automaticity 
in order to develop a more detailed and comprehensive grasp of how it has been studied and 
what exactly it entails. 
 
 
2.3 An Overview of Automaticity 
 
Although research on automatic mental processes dates back to the early days of 
experimental psychology
114
, it was not until the late 1970’s, following a paper by Shiffrin & 
Schneider entitled “Controlled and automatic human information processing” appeared in the 
journal Psychological Review that the modern boom of interest and research on automaticity 
began. Since the paper by Shiffrin & Schneider, each passing decade has witnessed a steady and 
significant growth in the number of research projects aimed at developing our understanding of 
automaticity and its impact on both the cognitive and social lives of human beings. According to 
Bargh, “Its renaissance can be traced to the introduction of a theoretical distinction between 
‘automatic’ and ‘conscious’ or ‘controlled’ processes...” (1989, p. 3). Originally, automatic 
cognitive processes and behaviours were characterized as being uncontrolled (i.e. occurring 
outside of the purview of conscious awareness), unintentional or involuntary, and efficient (i.e. 
not placing a strain on an individual’s presumed normally limited cognitive processing 
bandwidth). On the other hand, processes were considered to be conscious or controlled when 
they exhibited the opposing characteristics; namely, when they were intentional or voluntary, 
required conscious attention, and exacted a toll on active cognitive processing. Furthermore, 
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 See: James (1890); Jastrow (1906). 
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according to Chen, Fitzsimons, and Andersen, “Early definitions of automaticity imposed strict, 
all-or-none criteria for a process to be deemed automatic” (2007, p. 135). So, during the early 
days of research on automaticity, in principle, a behavioural phenomenon that operated outside 
of the conscious awareness of the individual, was efficient and uncontrolled, but was 
nevertheless intentional would fail to count as an instance of automaticity under this strict 
view.
115
  
Although the mentioned characterizations of and distinction between automatic and 
controlled processes helped to establish the general scope of research on automaticity, it has also 
led to some confusion and misinterpretation among researchers. Indeed, Bargh suggests, for 
instance, that, “...discussing one’s findings of great efficiency of a process in terms of its 
automaticity led others to infer (reasonably, given the all-or-none assumption) that the process 
also was unintentional and uncontrollable” (1994, p. 3). In other words, the rigidity with which 
researchers held to the initial distinction between automatic and controlled processes as always 
encompassing each of their respective component features was seen to obfuscate matters and led 
to unwarranted conclusions where specific research projects were aimed only at one or a few of 
the component characteristics of automaticity. 
In more recent years, however, it has become clear that the initial construal of automaticity 
is out-of-touch with what has been revealed empirically through research. Indeed, Bargh more 
recently claimed that, “...mental processes at the level of complexity studied by social 
psychologists are not exclusively automatic or exclusively controlled, but are in fact 
combinations of the features of each” (1994, p. 3). And this makes sense when we consider the 
fact that, in order to study particular aspects of automatic behaviour and cognition, researchers 
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 Consider the notion of driving automatically. Normally, one’s choice to drive somewhere is deliberate or 
intentional even if the behaviour of driving itself can take on an otherwise automatic profile at some point along the 
way (i.e. while engaged in the activity of driving). 
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have often relied upon methodologies which required that certain of the other components that 
were initially grouped together under the heading of automaticity be rejected. And in some 
studies, not only was it the case that one or more of these components were rejected, but that 
their opposing counterparts (originally conceived as belonging to the conscious or controlled 
category) were seen to play a crucial role in the phenomenon examined.
116
 Additionally, it ought 
to be noted that while some research projects are aimed squarely at one or more component 
features of automaticity, they may nevertheless remain completely mute with respect to one or 
more of the other characteristic features.
117
  
In an attempt to get beyond the overly restrictive and unrealistic views on automaticity that 
gripped researchers at the beginning of the renewal of interest in its study only a few decades 
ago, Bargh has opted for a different classificatory model. According to him, one important way 
in which to understand the research on automaticity is to inquire into the conditions of its 
occurrence. And this is because, as he says, “All automaticity is conditional; it is dependent on 
the occurrence of some specific set of circumstances” (Bargh, 1989, p. 7). Given that there are 
different background conditions that are required to produce different sorts of automatic 
cognition or behaviour, Bargh suggests that our classifications be set up in terms of these 
differences. In general, he finds that there are three primary categories under which instances of 
automaticity may be classified when they are considered in this way; these are: 1- preconscious; 
2- postconscious; and 3- goal-dependent. Nevertheless, because our concerns extend beyond 
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 Indeed, Bargh (1994, p. 3) mentions, for instance, that even with respect to the prototypic experiments on 
automatic cognitive processes carried out by Stroop (1935), it was necessary that a subject direct focal attention to 
the target in order to produce the automatic effect (more about Stroop effects to follow in section 2.3.3). 
117
 For the time being, we will bracket any concerns that this might raise for our initial characterization of 
automaticity provided at the outset of this chapter (in section 2.1). Later on, in section 2.3.3, when we are equipped 
with a more detailed understanding of the types of research on the different aspects of automaticity, we will see that 
framing our understanding of automaticity in different ways (as may be required to answer different empirical 
questions) does not pose a threat to our initial construal since, for example, though the element of efficiency might 
be studied in isolation, there nevertheless remain many examples wherein the majority of the features of 
automaticity identified in section 2.1 are required to produce the behaviours in question.  
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merely identifying and understanding the requisite conditions for the production of various sorts 
of automaticity, for our purposes, we may narrow down these categories to only two. First, we 
may treat both Bargh’s preconscious and postconscious categories as falling under what I will 
call the ‘percept-judgement’ category; and second, we may treat Bargh’s goal-dependent 
category as falling under our ‘behavioural’ category.118  
 
  
2.3.1 Percept-Judgment Automaticity 
 
Beginning with what Bargh labels the preconscious sort of automaticity, he claims, “A 
preconscious automatic process requires only that the person notice the presence of the triggering 
stimulus in the environment” (1994, p. 4). And this ‘noticing’ of the triggering stimulus can 
happen either at the level of a conscious perception or at the level of a subconscious (sometimes 
called ‘subliminal’119) sensory input. Moreover, the processes that are initiated in this way can 
happen independently of any goal or intention on the part of the individual. Indeed, according to 
Chen et al., “…these processes occur immediately upon registering the stimulus, and they are 
completed before perceivers grasp, if they ever do, that such a process has occurred” (2007, p. 
135). So, with respect to the early core component features of automaticity mentioned above, 
preconscious automatic processes are in accord with the requirements of being efficient and 
unintentional or involuntary, but they remain ambiguous with respect to whether or not the 
                                                 
118
 While it is true that all instances of automaticity are evinced only insofar as they are observable in 
behaviour, depending upon the sort of automatic functioning studied, the research has typically placed greater 
emphasis upon either the perceptual and judgmental component or that of behaviour. In any event, what is most 
pertinent to our investigation is automatic behaviour, and so, that is what we will be primarily concerned with in the 
following.   
119
 However, Bargh warns that, “...preconscious is not synonymous with subliminal, although subliminal 
processes are certainly a subset of preconscious ones” (1994, p. 4). 
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individual is consciously aware of the triggering stimulus—in some cases the individual may be 
consciously aware of the stimulus, in other cases conscious awareness is not needed for the effect 
to occur. Nevertheless, in either case (i.e. conscious of the stimulus or not), the individual 
typically does not control the cognitive or behavioural effect of the registered stimulus.  
What remains to be said, however, is just what types of processes are begun in this sort of 
direct and entirely non-deliberative manner. According to Bargh, the list of automatic cognitive 
processes that may be initiated preconsciously includes “interpretations, evaluations, and 
categorizations” (1994, p. 4)—which, for our purposes, may be generally understood as kinds of 
judgments (hence, these processes are reasonably subsumed under the ‘percept-judgment’ label). 
Examples of these processes include studies on attitude activation, attention responses to 
negative stimuli, physiological reactions, and frequently available trait construct effects upon 
social perception.
120
  
The next category that Bargh identifies is what he calls postconscious automaticity. He 
suggests that the sorts of effects that are produced by instances of postconscious automaticity 
mirror those that are produced by preconscious automaticity, and that the main feature that 
distinguishes the one from the other is that postconscious automaticity depends upon recent 
conscious attentional processing whereas preconscious automaticity does not (1994, p. 5)
121
. 
Despite this difference, Bargh claims “Postconscious effects are functionally the same as 
preconscious ones, except that they are temporary…” (1994, p. 5). In other words, both of these 
sources are capable of initiating similarly automatic cognitive processes, however, in one 
instance (viz. the postconscious one) the effect is a result of an individual having activated a 
given conscious cognitive process in close temporal proximity to the observed effect, and its 
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 See Bargh, (1994, p. 4-5; 1989, p. 11-14) for a list of the relevant studies. 
121
 Studies of how priming effects impact impression formation stand as prototype examples of postconscious 
automaticity.  We will consider an exemplar of these sorts of studies later in this chapter (in section 2.3.3).  
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resulting automatic influence upon an individual’s subsequent judgments tends to be of a 
transitory or fleeting nature.  
 
 
2.3.2 Behavioural Automaticity 
 
The last category that Bargh distinguishes is goal-dependent automaticity. He claims that 
this “…class of automatic phenomena only occurs with the person’s consent and intent” (1994, 
p. 6).
122
 To illustrate, Bargh (1992) provides the example of a character named Otto. In short, 
Otto is portrayed as driving around in a new town and upon rounding an abrupt turn, he catches a 
glimpse of a stop sign and his foot automatically stomps on the brake pedal just in time to save 
him from traversing into the oncoming traffic of a busy intersection. At a later date, Otto goes for 
a walk along this very same roadway and rounds the same corner. This time, however, Otto’s leg 
does not kick out automatically upon registering the stop sign since his behaviour is not 
constrained by the same operational goal (i.e. this time he is not driving and thus kicking out as if 
to apply a pedal brake would be entirely useless and incoherent). In the first place (i.e. when Otto 
was driving), his automatically stomping on the brake can be construed as being in accord with 
or following from his operational goal since he intended to safely drive around in a new locale in 
order to familiarize himself with his new surroundings. And it seems clear that this over-arching 
intentional goal was in some way responsible for the specific and appropriate automatic 
                                                 
122
 However, in a 1989 article (see references), he does distinguish between unintended and intended goal-
dependent automaticity, wherein he claims that, “Unintended goal-dependent automatic effects have as a necessary 
precondition the instantiation of specific processing contexts, but they are unintended consequences of those 
intentional thought processes” (1989, p. 20). In other words, the requisite ‘intent’ is not directly concerned with the 
automatically actuated behaviour; rather, it has to do with the background operational goal that makes sense of the 
automatic behaviour. Expressed differently, the agent does not possess the occurrent conscious intention to bring 
about the automatic behaviour that is produced but only the over-arching behavioural aim which then shapes and 
constrains the automatic behaviour that takes place.     
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behavioural response (viz. immediately stomping on the brake pedal) to the abruptly encountered 
stimulus. Experimental examples of automatic behaviour that fall under the goal-dependent 
heading for Bargh are drawn from research on things like behaviour-to-trait judgments, self and 
other trait concepts, implicit learning, incubational processing, and action slips.
123
  
Though it is clear that some of the experimental examples that Bargh provides of goal-
dependent automaticity continue to be more emphatically related to forms of judgment and other 
cognitive processes, it is also the case that this category of automaticity is most closely 
connected to our concern with personal and autonomous agency—since, the category includes 
examples concerned not only with cognitive processing goals but with behavioural goals as well 
(and this is why I have opted to use the label ‘behavioural automaticity’ for such cases). This 
category is also the one that lines up most directly with our earlier construal of automaticity (and 
its status as a potential threat to autonomy) provided at the outset of this chapter. Thus, we may 
consider the kind and the characteristics of the sort of automaticity described in section 2.1 as 
falling under the heading of behavioural automaticity and fleshing out this category.  
In order to increase our understanding of the different ways in which automaticity has been 
studied, and to connect the distinctions made above with some of the empirical research that has 
been done, in the next section, we will consider some of the key types of studies aimed at 
elucidating various aspects of automaticity.        
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 See Bargh, (1994, p. 6; 1989, p, 19-28). The research on action slips will be examined in greater detail in 
section 2.4. 
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2.3.3 Examples of Automaticity in the Lab 
 
One of the most well known series of experiments to have revealed what Bargh terms 
preconscious automaticity is the study executed by J. R. Stroop in the mid-nineteen thirties.
124
 
Stroop’s research took its lead from earlier work on interference effects upon habitual cognitive 
processes as well as research focused upon differential processing and verbal report times for 
identifying colour stimuli vs. colour names.
125
 In essence, Stroop’s project combined what was 
gleaned from this earlier research into a single study (consisting of three related experiments) 
that would seek to establish what sorts of interference effects might arise in verbal report tasks 
that consisted of non-paired colour names and ink colours. In the first experiment, participants 
were presented with a list of colour words that were printed in an ink colour that did not match 
the target words (for instance, the word ‘blue’ may be written in red ink and vice versa, the word 
‘green’ might be written in purple ink, et cetera). The participants were then asked to read the 
colour word as quickly as they could (and the total time that it took them to do so was contrasted 
with the time it took for them to read the same list printed entirely in black ink). In a second trial, 
participants were asked to state the colour of the ink as quickly as they could despite the colour 
of the ink being different from the colour identified by the list word (and this was compared with 
the participants’ time in reporting the colours of a similar list that consisted of solid coloured 
squares instead of letters).
126
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 Indeed, the sorts of effects identified in his findings have since come to be known as “Stroop effects”.  
125
 See Stroop (1935, p. 643-647). 
126
 The third experiment in this series aimed to determine whether or not any noted effects would change due to 
practice. See Stroop (1935), for greater detail with respect to the experimental protocol and findings.  
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According to Stroop (1935):  
 
The increase in time for reacting to words caused by the presence of conflicting color 
stimuli is taken as the measure of the interference of color stimuli upon reading 
words…[whereas]… (t)he increase in time for reacting to colors caused by the presence of 
conflicting word stimuli is taken as a measure of the interference of word stimuli upon 
naming colours. (p. 647)   
 
This experimental design enabled Stroop to compare the interference effects of each sort of 
stimuli upon the other while using the same list pairs of stimuli across experiments. Interestingly, 
the interference produced by the differing colour stimuli were not found to be reliable (adding 
only 2.3 seconds to the reading time for a hundred colour word list). However, it took 
participants on average 47 seconds longer to correctly report the printed ink colours of the one 
hundred word list when those words identified conflicting colours. Because the interference 
caused by the colour stimuli was negligible while the interference produced by the word stimuli 
was highly noteworthy, Stroop concluded that, “…the associations that have been formed 
between the word stimuli and the reading response are evidently more effective than those that 
have been formed between the colour stimuli and the naming response” (1935, p. 659-660). 
What this means with respect to automatic cognitive processes is that the mere presence of a 
conflicting word stimulus was seen to automatically interfere with an individual’s response time 
in identifying the ink colour of the printed word. These findings fit into Bargh’s category of 
preconscious automaticity since what is required is only that a person notice the environmental 
stimulus—in this case a word with a conflicting colour designation from the colour of the ink in 
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which it is printed—in order to produce a given cognitive/behavioural effect (in this case, a 
cognitive interference that led to delayed verbal report).
127
  
Another sort of experiment commonly used to study automatic processes has to do with 
what are known as ‘priming effects’. Studies that rely on priming methodology produce effects 
that fall under Bargh’s category of post-conscious automaticity mentioned earlier—and this is 
because they require “…conscious experience or thought in the same stimulus domain as the 
automatic process…” (Bargh, 1992, p. 190) prior to the initiation of said automatic process. In 
these sorts of experiments, participants are surreptitiously ‘primed’ by exposure to information 
aimed at activating a given cognitive representation in one task prior to engaging in another task 
that they are instructed is unrelated to the first but that is, unbeknownst to the participants, 
designed to elicit measurable automatic processes that are related to the primed information. 
What typically follows is that the primed participants show a significant bias in favour of the 
primed representation in the later task versus a control group. For instance, in a study by Skelton 
and Strohmetz (1990), participants in an experimental group were primed with a word task 
aimed at identifying health related words prior to being given the Pennebaker Inventory of 
Limbic Languidness (PILL), a 54 item checklist for a variety of physical symptoms. The results 
of this study confirmed the hypothesis that participants primed with the health related word 
activation reported a much higher number of symptoms on the PILL questionnaire then subjects 
in the control group.
128
 In another study, Mark, Sinclair, and Wellens (1991) revealed that 
participants who were first given the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)—a self-report measure 
                                                 
127
 It is important to note here, as Bargh does, that “…the subject does not intend and cannot control the 
interference caused by the meaning of the stimulus word…[yet]…(t)his [automatic] interference effect…does not 
occur without the devotion of spatial attention to the word’s location” (1992, p183). And because it requires a 
certain degree of focused attention in order for the effect to be produced, the Stroop effect stands as an example of 
an automated cognitive process that does not fit into the original and rigid “all-or-nothing” definition of what is 
required for automaticity. 
128
 See the Skelton and Strohmetz (1990) study listed in references for greater detail. 
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of depression—later reported either a more negative mood assessment (if they were already part 
of the more depressed group) or alternatively a more positive mood assessment (if they were part 
of the group of nondepressed participants), when contrasted with similarly divided control 
groups.
129
 Again, what these results show is that merely being primed (in this case by the 
negative content of the BDI) was sufficient to significantly affect a participant’s mood-state self-
assessment when compared to controls. Moreover, because the participants in these studies were 
kept ignorant about the experimental aims, it is presumed that participants were not aware of the 
automatic influence of the primed information upon their later judgments.  
The last type of experiment that I will mention in this section falls under Bargh’s category 
of goal-dependent automaticity. What sets this category apart from the previous two for Bargh 
and Chartrand is that “much, if not most, of our responses to the environment in the form of 
judgments, decisions and behaviour are determined not solely by the information available in 
that environment but rather by how it relates to whatever goal we are pursuing” (1999, p. 468). 
What this means is that if we are in the process of trying to reach some end or desired state of 
affairs, our automatic behaviours and evaluations may continue to be responsive to 
environmental triggers and changes but they will also be constrained by what is prescribed by 
those very objectives. In this sense, as with the post-conscious category, a certain degree of 
intentionality or conscious processing is required in order to produce the automatic behaviour.
130
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 See the Mark, Sinclair, and Wellens (1991) study listed in references. 
130
 But this view simplifies things somewhat. Goal-directed forms of automaticity are not all the same; some 
are intentional in the sense that one must first consciously initiate the pursuit of some end before consciousness can 
withdraw thus allowing automatic processes to take over and see the selected behavioural goal through to its 
completion, whereas others may be constituted by habitual behaviour patterns that are straightforwardly provoked 
by some familiar environmental feature. And, insofar as those habitual behaviours were at some previous point in 
time consciously formed, one might still opt to call them ‘intentional’ but there is a clear difference between these 
two forms of automaticity. See Bargh (1989, p. 19-29) for more information about the various forms of goal-
directed automaticity.      
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In a relatively straightforward experiment, Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000) set out to 
determine whether the activation of a habitual travel destination goal would also activate an 
automatic travel mode selection. They maintain that, “…habits are automatic goal-directed 
behaviours that are mentally represented…as strong associations between goals (e.g. going to the 
supermarket) and actions (e.g. using a bike)” (2000, p.76).131 Thus, they hypothesized that the 
activation of a habitual travel destination goal would in fact automatically prompt a habitual 
travel mode selection (be it to walk, or take a bike, train, or bus) and that, consistent with prior 
research on automaticity, it would be difficult to suppress the automated habitual travel mode 
selection. They began by conducting a pilot study of thirty Dutch university students living in the 
city center of Nijmegen. These students were given a list of 50 travel destinations and asked 
which mode of transportation they would usually take to get to each of the destinations. This 
provided data about the top five routes these students most commonly and frequently travelled 
by bicycle (e.g. a student dance club called the Swing, the university, the sports center, et cetera) 
and which, with respect to their selected travel mode, would presumably be the most difficult to 
suppress. They also determined the top five locations that were external to the city and for which 
students would typically take the train but that remained destinations that students would not 
frequently visit (thus these locations represented nonhabitual destinations).  
With the above mentioned data from the pilot study in hand, Aarts and Dijksterhuis 
performed a study with fifty-six undergraduate students from the University of Nijmegen as 
participants. Their study followed a 2x2x2 design: (typical travel mode: permitted vs. not 
                                                 
131
 It is important to note along with Wood and Neal, however, that “Habits typically are the residue of past 
goal pursuit; they arise when people repeatedly use a particular behavioral means in particular contexts to pursue 
their goals. However, once acquired, habits are performed without mediation of a goal to achieve a particular 
outcome or a goal to respond” (2007, p. 844). In other words, although goals may shape habits in the early stages of 
their formation, once a certain sort of behaviour becomes habitual, it no longer requires the presence of an occurrent 
intentional goal to become active. To put it differently, Wood and Neal state that “...habits may be goal directed [i.e. 
structured by earlier goals]...even though they are not goal dependent [or contingent upon the occurrent activation of 
a goal]” (2007, p. 847). More on habits later in section 2.5.   
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permitted); (cognitive load: yes vs. no); and (habit: yes (bicycle) vs. no (train)) (2000, p. 77). The 
participants would take part in the study by computer and were separated into different cubicles. 
They were told that the study was about travel behaviour and they would be questioned about 
their typical travel modes in relation to a list of destinations both inside the city center and 
outside of it. One of the experimental manipulations involved had to do with the typical mode of 
travel: half of the participants were instructed to state which mode of travel they would typically 
use to arrive at the given destination (this was the typical travel mode permitted group), while the 
other half were instructed not to state their typical mode of transport but instead to select another 
mode (this was the typical travel mode not permitted group). The next experimental 
manipulation had to do with cognitive load. Half of the participants were given the task in the 
context of a secondary and cognitive resource depleting prior task. This secondary task involved 
summing two digits that would appear at either end of the travel destination word prior to 
mentioning the travel mode (e.g. 6 sports center 9). These participants were part of the ‘cognitive 
load’ condition whereas those not burdened by this additional task were part of the ‘no cognitive 
load’ condition. Moreover, all of the participants had just three seconds to respond to each trial 
destination word and, if they failed to answer within the allotted time frame, a tone would sound 
and the next target word would appear on the screen.  
In short, what Aarts and Dijksterhuis found was that where participants were not permitted 
to respond with the typical mode of transport and were also under cognitive load, they provided 
the bicycle response (to the previously established top five bicycle destination pairs) at a 
significantly higher rate than those participants that were not permitted to respond with the 
typical mode of transport but that were not under the cognitive load condition.
132
 According to 
Aarts and Dijksterhuis, “In general, these failures to suppress corroborate the notion that the 
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 See Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000) for more detail. 
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bicycle responses are automatically triggered by travel goals” (2000, p. 79). In other words, the 
automatic selection of the habitual travel mode ‘bicycle’ to commonly and frequently paired 
travel destinations appear to be constrained by the activation of the destination goal. These travel 
mode selections not only appear to be constrained by the habitual pairing of travel destination 
and travel mode but they also appear to be automatically activated by the given travel destination 
goal. Thus, the findings mentioned above exemplify Bargh’s goal-dependent category of 
automaticity.     
The experiments outlined above are by no means a complete representation of the 
empirical research on automaticity. Indeed, they represent a mere snapshot of some of the work 
that is available on the subject. However, each selected experiment, I think, reveals something of 
the different ways in which an instance of automatic thought or behaviour can be brought about 
and expressed. Moreover, while I have tried to follow Bargh’s classificatory lead in order to 
make clear the defining features of various forms of automaticity, it remains the case that, 
depending upon one’s experimental objectives, one may characterize automaticity in a number of 
different ways—so long, that is, as it concerns at least some feature of the originally outlined 
construct. That is to say, depending upon one’s research goals, one may operationally define 
automaticity along a number of different lines. Additionally, there is the problem that, in some 
cases, a preconscious situational trigger may be what sets off an instance of goal-dependent (or 
behavioural) automaticity. So there is a sense in which Bargh’s (and my own) categories may 
collapse; that is to say, an instance of automaticity may be constituted by central features from 
more than one of the proposed categories. In other words, there may exist hybrid forms of 
automatic behaviour—that are, for instance, both preconscious and goal-dependent—out in the 
world, even if examples of them have not yet been documented in the lab. Nevertheless, Bargh’s 
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three mentioned categories, as well as my own two more general classifications, do enable us to 
recognize some of the central and defining features of some of the primary kinds of automaticity, 
and they also serve as a worthwhile framework from which to approach the experimental 
literature in order to differentiate between the experimental aims of researchers. Moreover, an 
appreciation of what is characteristic to those examples that fall under the category of 
behavioural automaticity allows us to sharpen our focus upon matters that are directly relevant to 
our concerns with personal autonomy.    
As was previously mentioned, I am primarily concerned with goal-dependent or goal-
directed forms of automaticity as these are expressed in behaviour but this does not mean that 
instances of automaticity that fall under what I call the percept-judgment category are of no 
concern to a theory of autonomy. Rather, I think that even automatic percept-judgments are a 
threat to personal autonomy. However, I maintain that the sorts of automatic processes that are 
initiated in that kind of way alone (i.e. entirely outside of the person’s awareness of their causal 
influence upon behaviour) fall under our procedural independence condition outlined in section 
1.2.2, and thus are unambiguously to be stricken from counting in any way as expressions of a 
person’s autonomy. What concerns me instead are instances of behavioural automaticity that do 
appear to embody some degree of intentional structuring (even if the intentionality in question is 
temporally remote from the issuance of the behaviour) since these cases are not so obviously 
handled by the procedural independence condition.  
One aspect of behavioural automaticity that helps to shed some light on just why we might 
not want to treat even goal-dependent forms of automaticity as amounting to genuine expressions 
of autonomy can be found in what are referred to as ‘action slips’ or ‘actions not as planned’ in 
the literature. In the next section, I will explain just what action slips are, as well as list some of 
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the various ways in which they can manifest. Later, I will provide some examples where both 
action slips and other forms of behavioural automaticity would reasonably lead us to conclude 
that automatized behaviours should not count as expressions of an individual’s autonomy.    
  
 
2.4 Actions Not as Planned 
  
By now the notion of a ‘slip of the tongue’ (often referred to as a ‘Freudian slip’) is more 
or less commonplace. The phrase refers to the accidental, erroneous, or absent-minded 
vocalisation of a word or statement that a speaker intended to keep private or at least did not 
intend to say out loud, and which frequently results in the speaker feeling embarrassed or 
ashamed. Freud thought that these slips of the tongue betrayed some unconscious need or desire 
on the part of the speaker but a simpler account might treat them as merely the innocuous or at 
least unintended results of strong—i.e. frequently and recently activated—thought associations 
or habitual elements of mind that have come to occur together automatically.
133
 As common as 
the notion of a slip of the tongue is, there is a related behavioural notion that would appear to be 
much less widely recognized. Indeed, the notion of a slip of action, it seems, is far less 
widespread than the notion of a slip of the tongue; and this would appear to be the case despite 
the fact that people often claim that they “didn’t mean” to act as they did (following an action 
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 Recall the experiment conducted by Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000), wherein participants under cognitive 
load were often unable to give a response other than ‘bicycle’ as the mode of transport to five locations most 
commonly and frequently travelled to by bicycle even when they were instructed not to respond with their most 
typical mode of transportation to these locations. These participants may not have conceived of their responses as 
slips of the tongue, but they nevertheless appeared to automatically draw upon a habitual association between 
destination and mode of transport when under the added pressure of cognitive load. Likewise, people often 
experience slips of the tongue when under the nervous pressure to impress another person and the mindful attention 
to what not to say, it would seem, could plausibly act as a priming like cognitive rehearsal that may end up 
strengthening whatever associations in thought and speech one is trying to avoid rather than keeping one from 
saying whatever it is that one wishes to refrain from saying.      
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slip) similarly to how, following a slip of the tongue, they might claim that they “didn’t mean” to 
say what they had just said.  
Given the similarity of the typical types of reactions produced by these two phenomena 
(i.e. once the speaker or actor becomes cognizant of the unintentional slip) we might reasonably 
consider each sort of occurrence to be an expression of the more general phenomenon of 
automaticity. In addition to the shared sorts of reactions that such occurrences evoke, each notion 
is also similarly defined. Indeed, action slips may be characterized as referring to the accidental, 
erroneous, or absent-minded behavioural sequences that an individual performs in the absence of 
the occurrent intention to do so. And, just as with slips of the tongue, an action slip can leave an 
individual feeling embarrassed, ashamed, or simply regretting that the action slip occurred. 
In an important 1979 paper entitled: “Actions Not as Planned: The Price of 
Automatization” which aimed at elucidating the sorts of behaviours that may fall under the 
heading of ‘slips of action’, the psychologist James Reason contrasted actions not as planned 
with actions that in fact do successfully carry out a plan. Reason recognized that although an 
individual may sometimes fail to reach a particular goal that he or she has selected, it is not 
always the case that such failures are the result of an error to behave according to a plan on the 
part of the individual. Indeed, sometimes, unforeseen or unforeseeable interferences may thwart 
one’s attainment to a given end, and in these cases the interfering elements may be seen as 
responsible for the individual’s missing the mark rather than some behavioural shortcoming on 
the part of the individual. On the other hand, not all actions that result in the attainment of a 
given goal ought to be considered non-errors either. For instance, as Reason suggests that, “...in 
the case of the golfer whose misdirected ball is deflected into the hole by a passing bird” (1979, 
p. 152), the successful achievement of the end aimed at is more accurately described as a matter 
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of luck, or accident, than a successfully carried-out plan—since, a bird’s being in just the right 
spot at just the right time to deflect an otherwise wayward ball is not the sort of thing that one 
can confidently include in one’s planning. When it comes to how one might fail to meet a goal, 
Reason maintains that this can happen in one of two ways: first, when one behaves according to 
a plan but the plan was insufficient to reach the goal; and second, when the plan is sufficient but 
one’s behaviour fails to conform to the plan. It is the second of these ways of failing to reach a 
goal that is central to the notion of action slips or actions not as planned.  
In order to determine just how frequently action slips occur, and to obtain a broader 
understanding of the ways in which individuals commit action slips, Reason performed a two 
week long diary study whereby participants were instructed to provide a continuous daily record 
over the course of the study that would chronicle their “...unintended or absent-minded actions, 
and...[their] ‘accidental behaviour’ in general” (1979, p. 153).134 Thirty five participants took 
part in this study (twenty three women and twelve men), and the average was just over twelve 
action slips per participant over the course of study. The sheer variety of the reported instances 
led Reason to develop a number of classifications in order to begin to identify some of the 
common features of the reported incidents in the hopes of isolating their causes; and it is to these 
classifications and their features that we turn to next. 
To begin with, Reason grouped the reported incidents under several general headings, the 
first of which being “discrimination failures” (concerning objects in one’s environment). These 
included perceptual confusions resulting from object similarity (e.g. putting shaving cream on 
one’s toothbrush instead of tooth paste because both tubes have a similar appearance); next were 
functional confusions ostensibly due to objects sharing a similar function (e.g. a sunbathing 
participant intended to head outdoors with a pair of sunglasses and to leave the suntan lotion 
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87 
 
indoors but instead left the sunglasses indoors and took the lotion outside); followed by spatial 
confusions that resulted from objects being close to one another (e.g. grabbing a fork from the 
utensil drawer to butter bread instead of the intended butter knife); and finally, temporal 
confusions which resulted in unsuitable actions traceable to misperceptions of time (e.g. putting 
on one’s work clothes upon getting up and heading out the door before realizing that it is Sunday 
and that one does not work on Sundays).   
The next general category was “program assembly failures” (which concern the operation 
of behavioural programs). The first item listed under this category was what Reason called 
behavioural spoonerisms—which were essentially reversals of behavioural programs (e.g. 
attempting to drink from a bottle before taking the lid off)
135
; next were active program 
confusions (e.g. putting the dirty dishes in the fridge and the leftovers in the sink after preparing 
a meal); another was confusions between current and stored programs (e.g. looking for a 
calculator when one’s new phone has one built in and is readily accessible). 
Another important category identified by Reason was what he called “test failures”. Test 
failures had to do with errors that occurred at various ‘checkpoints’ in the progress of a given 
behaviour sequence. The first of these was labeled stop-rule overshoots wherein a participant 
would continue past some initial intended end point (e.g. going out to pick-up the news paper to 
read with one’s morning coffee but then proceeding to put it immediately in the recycling bin 
once inside); next was stop-rule undershoots wherein an individual stops a behaviour sequence 
prior to reaching the aimed at end point (e.g. stepping into the bath prior to entirely disrobing); 
followed by branching errors wherein multiple different goals are begun by the same early 
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 In one of the more humorous diary entries in this study, a participant reported that: “When I leave for work 
in the morning I am in the habit of throwing two dog biscuits to my pet corgi and then putting on my earrings at the 
hall mirror. One morning I threw the earrings to the dog and found myself trying to attach a dog biscuit to my ear” 
(1979, p. 155).  
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behavioural sequence but one’s behaviour diverts somewhere along the way to an inappropriate 
alternate goal (e.g. intending to drive to one location to find oneself in route to another); and 
finally, multiple side-tracking whereby one deviates from one’s goal and undertakes various 
other minor tasks. 
The final two major categories listed by Reason are “sub-routine failures” and “storage 
failures”. Sub-routine failures include insertions (i.e. adding unwanted or unnecessary 
behaviours to a sequence); omissions (i.e. leaving requisite actions out of a behaviour sequence); 
and misordering (where one performs the appropriate behaviours to accomplish the goal but does 
not perform them in the correct order). Storage failures, on the other hand, include forgetting 
previous behaviours (this can result in one losing one’s place in a behavioural sequence); 
forgetting discrete items (e.g. planning to pick-up bread, milk, eggs and butter from the grocery 
store but heading home without the butter); reverting to earlier plans (e.g. intending to go rent a 
movie before remembering that one’s movie player is broken and then heading out to pick-up a 
movie anyhow); and last, forgetting the substance of the plan (e.g. heading into the kitchen and 
forgetting what it was that brought you there).  
As evidenced by Reason’s study, there are clearly many ways in which one’s behaviour 
can fail to follow a plan. But the mere compiling and categorization of such accounts does not 
yet tell us why these sorts of action slips tend to occur. To answer that question, Reason provides 
three notions that he thinks help to explain how it is that action slips come about. The first notion 
has to do with the ‘mode of control’ of a given set of behaviours. He argues that as we learn and 
develop various motor skills we initially rely upon what he refers to as a “closed-loop” mode of 
control—a mode of control that is characterized by a heavy reliance upon visual and 
proprioceptive feedback, conscious attention, and which places a significant demand upon one’s 
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apparently limited conscious processing capacity in order to control one’s moment to moment 
behavioural output. Whereas, in the “open-loop” mode of control, Reason claims that, “…motor 
output is governed by “motor programs” or pre-arranged instruction sequences, that run off 
independently of feedback information” (1979, p. 158) and which free-up central (i.e. conscious) 
processing.
136
 It is important to note here that, similarly to Bargh’s current view on the potential 
for a more complex interplay of different uncontrolled and controlled elements in the production 
of various forms of automaticity, Reason maintains that it is most likely the case that any given 
series of behaviours, skilled or not yet skilled, will involve elements of both closed-loop and 
open-loop modes of control at different times. Thus, Reason’s view appears to be in line with the 
more recent thought on automaticity rather than the sort of all-or-nothing traditional view.    
The next important component to play a role in explaining action slips for Reason is the 
notion of ‘critical decision points’. One thing that is essential to acting according to a plan, for 
Reason, is that at various key points in a planned series of behaviours the individual is able to 
successfully resort to the closed-loop mode of control when required. Some of the examples of 
the ‘test failure’ kinds of action slips help to make this clear—for instance, the individual who 
stepped into the tub before entirely disrobing would have benefitted by closed-loop control prior 
to stepping into the tub since, this sort of control could have made apparent the need to finish 
undressing first. Likewise, the individual who went outside to pick up the morning paper to read 
with breakfast would have been well served by closed-loop control prior to tossing the paper into 
the recycle bin. Again, in this case, the closed-loop mode of control could have rendered it 
apparent that the paper had not yet been read. The problem here is that when certain types of 
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what was said in section 2.1 about the role of automaticity in relation to skill acquisition and practice. 
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action slips occur, they appear to be the result of a failure to initiate closed-loop control at certain 
points where that form of control is essential to successfully carrying out a plan. 
The final important feature to recognize, according to Reason, is the ‘strength’ of the motor 
program. According to Reason “One of the most consistent findings of the diary study was that 
when actions deviate from current intentions they tend not to take the form of isolated and novel 
fragments of behaviour, but of well-practiced and functionally intact behavioural sequences” 
(1979, p. 160). So what appears to be happening during certain sorts of action slips, suggests 
Reason, is that, if a closed-loop mode of control is not successfully activated at one of the critical 
decision points, then some sort of conditioned motor program takes over and keeps the 
individual actively behaving, even though the behaviour that such a motor program supports 
does not accord with the more recent goals or plans of the individual. Moreover, it appears to be 
the case that it is the frequency and recency with which a given motor program has been 
activated that determines which behavioural sequence obtains during an action slip.
137
 Also 
worth noting is that this ostensible motor program take-over of behaviour is most prominent, 
according to Reason, when “the central processor is occupied with some parallel mental activity” 
(1979, p. 160) as we saw was the case in the Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000) study.  
With the exception of the identification of the critical decision points that appear to require 
a closed-loop mode of control (i.e. conscious awareness and intervention) in order to sustain a 
series of behaviours initially aimed at achieving a particular goal, nothing that Reason says about 
the features of action slips should sound unfamiliar. And this is because action slips are primary 
examples of behavioural automaticity, so it makes sense that what has the potential to lead to 
action slips is consistent with what has so far been said about the production of behavioural 
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 Again, the importance of the frequency and recency of a given set of behaviours to the production of action 
slips should sound familiar since both of these elements have already been identified as central determinants of 
automated behaviours. 
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automaticity in general (i.e. in terms of the lack of conscious control and the frequent and recent 
pairing of event type or goal and standard behavioural response). But before going on to 
elaborate as to why it is that I think that we ought to not treat instances of behavioural 
automaticity as even remotely representative of an individual’s autonomy, I would first like to 
say something about the component feature of automaticity that is characterized by the frequent, 
consistent, and recent pairing of an event type or goal and a common behavioural response and 
how these features relate to what are generally thought of as habits.  
 
 
2.5 Habit 
 
Quite clearly, what has been said so far in this chapter about what is involved in learning a 
new skill or conditioning one’s self to behave in a certain way by frequently, consistently, and 
recently performing a particular behavioural response to a given set of circumstances or 
performance goals is deeply consistent with how habits are formed. Indeed, the similarities 
between what goes in to producing both automatic and habitual responses can lead researchers to 
conflate the two notions or assume that because a particular behavioural response is habitual that 
it must also be automatic. For instance, in their study mentioned in section 2.3.3, Aarts and 
Dijksterhuis make this assumption when they provide their operational definition of habit (2000, 
p.76). However, their experimental design and findings tend to support the notion that the habits 
that they were examining were in fact automatic (because of the degree to which participants 
failed to suppress the habitual responses).
138
 Nevertheless, one ought to be careful when making 
such assumptions since a particular set of behaviours might conform to a habitual set and yet not 
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be automatic. For example, one might have a habit of going for a morning run along a particular 
pathway but over time one may grow bored enough with the routine to actively consider a 
different trajectory on a given morning. Upon reflection, one might nevertheless decide that 
one’s habitual route remains either the safest, or the most pleasant, or in some other way the 
more preferable route in contrast to the other perceived route options; and thus, one might 
consciously decide to stick to the routine despite one’s being bored with that particular course. In 
such a case, the morning run behaviour is consistent with a prior habit but it is nevertheless not 
automatic since the individual consciously selected to behave in conformity with that habit. 
Nevertheless, the possibility remains that on some later day the individual may fail to 
consciously consider which route to run and unreflectively allow an unconsidered habit to 
automatically dictate which course will be taken. 
In addition to the danger of conflating the notion of habit with the notion of automaticity, 
there is another familiar issue to keep in mind. Like the notion of automaticity (as well as that of 
autonomy), the notion of habit has meant different things to different researchers. And like the 
concept of automaticity, one may operationally define habit in a number of different ways.
139
 
Indeed, according to a study by Clark et al. (2007), there are at least nine dimensions (some with 
a certain degree of overlap) along which habit has been studied; these include the following: 1- 
habit as tic; 2- habit as conditioned responses; 3- habit as addiction; 4- habit as routine; 5- habit 
as character, et cetera (p. 9S). Therefore, again, when examining the notion of habit in relation to 
the notion of automaticity, one ought to remain careful and clear about the particular 
understanding of habit with which one is working. For our purposes, the “habit as conditioned 
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responses”140 and “habit as routine”141 categories described by Clark et al. are the most relevant 
to the development and understanding of automaticity with which we are dealing. However, the 
general features of being “...relatively unconscious, nonreflective, and repeatable” (2007, p. 15S) 
identified by Clark et al. as being of the “core essence of habit” are also important to us.  
Analogously to what has already been said about automatic behaviours in general, Clark et 
al. see habits as being advantageous to an organism since habits enable an individual to 
“...conserve energy by circumventing the need to allocate resources continually when the 
organism confronts similar situations over the course of time” (2007, p. 15S). Other benefits of 
habit according to Clark et al. include the elimination of the need for decision making and a 
greater speed of action or response time. However, they do recognize that habits have a negative 
aspect as well which is evidenced by things like alcohol and drug addiction that are born of 
habitual substance use and that end in either or both physiological and psychological dependency 
(p. 18S). Nevertheless, Clark et al. maintain that habits are overall more beneficial and adaptive 
than they are harmful. 
Although the notion of habit has been characterized in a number of different and not 
always entirely compatible ways, we may nevertheless attempt to provide a definition of habit 
that captures as best we can those elements that speak to our understanding of and concern with 
automaticity. The following definition provided by Wood and Neal (2007) is well suited to such 
an end: 
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 This view of habit is derived from the early behaviourist model which relies upon the repetitive pairing of 
stimulus and response. 
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 This view of habit focuses on an individual’s complex behavioural activity in the world. According to Clark 
et al., “Routines involve ordering, sequencing, and combining several simple activities to create order in one’s life” 
(2007, p 12S). In other words, habitual routines concern a larger series of interrelated activities than do basic one off 
habitual behaviours.  
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Habits are learned dispositions to repeat past responses. They are triggered by features of 
the context that have covaried frequently with past performance, including performance 
locations, preceding actions in a sequence, and particular people. (p. 843)           
 
To this list of contextual features I would add that it is not only context locations that may trigger 
habitual (and automatic) behaviours but even single or multiple separate objects within a given 
environment—or one or more aspects of a given situation—that may do so. Also, it is not just the 
presence of particular people that might engender a habitual behaviour, but even simple 
statements or suggestions (made by someone present or communicated electronically or by other 
means) which may produce a habitual response (as was evidenced in the Aarts and Dijksterhuis 
study described in section 2.3.3). One’s own ostensibly unprovoked thoughts might also 
indirectly lead to the initiation of some habitual behaviour—and by ‘indirectly’ I mean that the 
thought might be responsible for causing the habitual (and automatic) behaviour in the absence 
of any conscious intention to behave in the resultant habitual manner. To borrow from James, for 
instance, one may think about changing into one’s dinner clothes upon returning home from 
work and unintentionally end up climbing into bed after disrobing since to do so is consistent 
with the prior habit of getting into bed upon disrobing in the evening (1890, p. 139). In this sort 
of case, the resultant behaviour of getting into bed appears to be both automatic (i.e. since it is 
unintentional and involuntary) and in conformity with an existing habit. 
Habitual and automatic behaviours share another deep similarity which has to do with the 
relationship that each has with goals and their attainment. Indeed, as Wood and Neal (2007) 
recognize, “Habits are the residue of past goal pursuit; they arise when people repeatedly use a 
particular behavioural means in particular contexts to pursue their goals” (p. 844). However, they 
argue that once habits are formed, they no longer require the oversight of consciously adopted 
goals in order to produce the behaviour needed to reach a particular end. And this mirrors what 
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has already been said about the sort of withdrawal of conscious attention which leads to 
automaticity and that can follow upon having learned a new skill through repetitious practice. To 
learn a new skill or to develop a new habit one must, at the outset, often consciously be 
concerned with achieving a particular goal; this goal may then lead to a frequently repeated 
behavioural response selection (i.e. with respect to developing a habit), or to effortfully 
practicing at performing specific behaviours in specific circumstances or at specific times or 
places (i.e. with respect to developing a skill). But, upon achieving a certain degree of 
competence, fluency, or conditioning, one need not rely upon those early goals to produce the 
specific behaviours any further. However, despite the eventual unnecessariness of these original 
goals, there remains a sense in which the behaviours—either automatic, or habitual, or both 
simultaneously—are nevertheless constrained by the particular shape that they took in response 
to those early goals. Thus, as Wood and Neal recognize, “...given that habits typically originate 
in goal pursuit, habit performance often inadvertently promotes goal-consistent outcomes” 
(2007, p. 847).
142
 It is not that this “goal-consistency” picks out an actively endorsed objective to 
which one’s habitual behaviour conforms, but rather, it is merely that one’s habitual behaviours 
bear the mark (so to speak) of some previous goal. This state of affairs leads Wood and Neal to 
claim that “…habits may be goal directed…even though they are not goal dependent” (2007, p. 
847). In other words, habits—insofar as they exemplify automatic behaviours—may not require 
an occurrent and consciously considered or held goal to give them shape but they may 
nevertheless betray the structural features of being responses to prior goals; that is to say, they 
may display a certain telos.  
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 There is, however, one important difference to be drawn between habits and automaticity 
according to Wood and Neal. For them, habits fail to display variability whereas certain goal-
dependent forms of automaticity appear capable of adaptively adjusting to changes in the 
environment that are relevant to goal-pursuit. Along with Bargh and Barndollar (1996, p. 461), 
they see goal-dependant forms of automaticity as operating in terms of a tacit “strategy” for 
adaptively dealing with a changing environment. Thus, there is a stronger, more active sense in 
which instances of this particular form of automaticity are shaped by goals (even though this 
strategic guidance may issue unconsciously).  
 Another important point about the interface of habits, automaticity, and goals is that both 
habits and behavioural forms of automaticity tend to develop incrementally over extended 
periods of time—using one’s bicycle to go the grocery store twice in a row does not yet make 
that behaviour a habitual or behaviourally automatic one.
143
 And this gradual developmental 
process is important, according to Wood and Neal, “…because it insulates habit dispositions 
against short-term changes in behaviour that occur as people flexibly pursue their goals” (2007, 
p. 850).
144
 What this means is that habits and non-goal-dependent forms of behavioural 
automaticity tend to be resistant to the occasional departure from the norm. In other words, some 
unusual environmental feature might once in a while require a change in one’s normal or 
habitual behavioural output in order to reach a given end—but if and as soon as that feature is no 
longer present, one can expect one’s behaviour to return to the standard response. Strictly goal-
dependent forms of automaticity, on the other hand, tend to be more flexible and less static than 
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 However, presumably, it would be easier to identify the precise moment at which a behaviour becomes 
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this detail is of little importance to us. I would imagine that if, after observing an individual responding the same 
way to a given trigger several times and with only minimal if any behavioural variation in between, most would 
agree that what is being observed is habitual behaviour.  
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this because they are mediated by and responsive to the more dynamic features of the 
environment. In other words, with respect to goal-dependent forms of behavioural automaticity, 
there exists a sort of reciprocal interplay between a changing environment and automatic 
behaviours which, despite being automatic, show signs of relevant situational adaptivity. The 
down-side to the greater stability of habit and non-goal-dependent forms of automaticity is that 
they may at times conflict with one’s active goals, as is often the case with action slips. 
Now that we understand some of the ways in which habits and automatic behaviours may both 
differ as well as overlap, in the next section, we will return to the notion of action slips and why 
they fail to amount to instances of autonomous behaviour. We will then consider some other 
important examples of automaticity in various everyday settings in order to get a sense of just 
how deeply automaticity can undermine one’s autonomy 
 
 
2.6 Automaticity, Dissociation and Autonomy 
 
In section 2.4 we saw that action slips formed a prototypical class of automatic behaviours. 
Moreover, for many sorts of action slips (most notably those of the ‘test failure’ variety), it was 
recognized that what led to the behavioural errors was a failure of conscious control to intercede 
at what Reason called “critical decision points”. Indeed, Reason maintained that to successfully 
carry out a plan often requires that one be able to consciously recognize and take control of one’s 
behaviour at various important junctions. But the problem, with respect to behavioural 
automaticity, is that it is characterised by a conscious dissociation from the very (automatic) 
behaviour at issue (even when that behaviour is goal-dependent). So, if the automatic 
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behavioural process is operating efficiently (i.e. independently of conscious oversight), there is 
no good reason to suspect one’s conscious attention will be at the beck and call of this process; 
be it at critical decision points or not. Moreover, as we saw in the Stroop experiment examined 
earlier, in terms of the percept-judgment category of automaticity, one’s conscious attention may 
remain in proximity to aspects of the automated percept-judgment and verbal behaviour and still 
be impotent to override the automatic process. In fact, in the case of the Stroop experiment, a 
restricted range of attention limited to a particular focal region was seen to be required for the 
automated processing effect to occur. But regardless of that closeness and involvement of 
conscious attention in the production of the automatic processing delay, participants were 
nevertheless powerless to overcome that delay.  
Returning to the example of the action slip involving an individual who failed to entirely 
disrobe before stepping into the tub, we might claim, along with Reason, that in order to 
successfully carry out the plan to take a bath, the individual would have been well served by an 
awareness of the fact that he or she had not yet entirely disrobed. Such an awareness could have 
provided the opportunity to finish undressing before entering the tub, which would have been in 
line with the individual’s plan—whereas, getting one’s undergarments wet was, let us stipulate, 
not part of the original plan. If we look at this example through the sort of lens that was provided 
near the end of the first chapter (in section 1.3), we might suppose that the individual had a raw 
desire to take a bath and let us assume that, at the outset at least, the individual also possessed the 
reflective desire and volition that the raw desire be effective. In other words, the agent coherently 
and—insofar as the terminologically revised traditional view is concerned—autonomously 
willed to take a bath. Now part of the standard procedure for taking a bath involves entirely 
disrobing prior to stepping into the tub, this procedure may be considered habitual and it is 
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certainly the sort of behaviour that most people would engage in with enough frequency and 
consistency for the behaviour to become automatic. Thus, assuming that the participant’s 
stepping into the tub prior to entirely disrobing was an instance of absent-minded automaticity 
(as the participant reported), we may begin to consider just how the automated behaviour differs 
from what we might otherwise treat as autonomous behaviour. As stated, at least at the outset the 
individual had autonomously (we are assuming) willed to take a bath. However, somewhere 
between the admittedly short amount of time that it took for the individual to autonomously will 
to take a bath and the behaviour of stepping into the tub, the individual became somehow 
dissociated from his or her own bodily activity to the point of failing to recognize that he or she 
had not yet fully undressed. As a result of this failure of recognition and error on the part of the 
automated behavioural program, the individual ended up with wet undergarments—which was 
entirely unintended. Clearly, there are two sorts of problems to be identified here. The first issue 
is that the automated behavioural program made a mistake but this point is a minor one
145
 and it 
is subordinate to our concern with the next issue. Indeed, of greater importance is that feature of 
automaticity that is far more universal; namely, the dissociation which it implies. This 
dissociation appears as an invisible barrier of sorts keeping the conscious and reflective 
consideration of the individual from playing a role in the production of either some or all of his 
or her own behaviours for a certain amount of time. The behaviours that an individual may 
display during these dissociated instances of automaticity might not always conflict with or 
diverge from the individual’s reason or will, but they often do, and the dissociation itself is 
symptomatic of a sort of incoherence between an individual’s deliberate or willed intention and 
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automaticity. 
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his or her own behaviour that I will argue renders personal autonomy impossible in those 
moments.    
The same issues arise in the example of the individual who went outside to pick up the 
morning paper to read with breakfast and ended up immediately (and automatically) tossing it 
into the recycle bin. Again, in this case, it was a dissociation of conscious awareness from bodily 
behaviour that allowed the unintended error of placing the paper into the recycle bin—without 
recognizing that the paper had not yet been read—to occur. Of course, rather mundane examples 
like these—although they demonstrate what is problematic with treating automatic behaviour as 
potentially expressing autonomy—may arouse little concern for revision. Indeed, one might 
think that they are simply too insignificant with respect to our usual uses of the notion of 
autonomy to warrant any major theoretical overhaul since, for instance, they don’t appear to be 
of any great moral concern to the individuals in question nor to any others for that matter. But 
with very little by way of imagination, I propose, one may discover real-world examples of some 
of the more pertinent and impactful dangers of automaticity. And it is an encounter with these 
dangers that in part serve to motivate this project. In the next section, we will consider how the 
dissociation of conscious oversight from a class of one’s behaviours that is endemic to 
automaticity, as well as the errors that such dissociation may sanction, can lead to rather 
dramatic and unintended results—results which I suggest urge us not merely to take notice, but 
which require us to revise our model of autonomy.   
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2.7 Automaticity as a Problem for Autonomy 
 
 Beyond the sorts of ‘inconveniences’ that automaticity may be responsible for when 
considered as a rather inconsequential by-product of our daily routines and habits, there exists a 
number of examples of automatic behaviours that may serve to render much more apparent the 
real dangers of automaticity as it may impact the health, safety, or wellbeing of one’s self and 
others. In section 1.4 of the previous chapter, I provided the example of an individual who 
automatically yelled at a mugger to leave his victim alone rather than taking pause to consciously 
reflect about what might be the most prudent option for response (with respect to both his or her 
own safety as well as that of the victim). The example was one in which a general personal 
policy to stand-up for distressed others who were under verbal or physical attack had been 
adopted at a young age. Over the years, however, this policy eventually became automatic and 
would result in the immediate issuance of either verbal and/or physical defence of these 
distressed others. The danger, it was identified, lay in the fact that the automatic and immediate 
reaction in this type of setting drastically impaired the individual’s ability to assess the situation 
and to determine the safest course of action. Perhaps the mugger might have been paranoid and 
concealing a gun, and drawing attention to the mugger might have resulted in some kind of 
overblown retaliation like having him open fire upon the would be defender. Like the earlier 
example of the individual who intentionally planned to take a bath but ended up getting into the 
tub prior to completely disrobing, the sort of policy in play here may have been initially adopted 
from an entirely coherent and autonomous stand-point.
146
 Nevertheless, later on down the road, 
after the behaviours that the policy supports had become automatic, that originally coherent and 
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model until I propose further revisions. 
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autonomous mindset then became entirely superfluous and was no longer required for the 
issuance of the said behaviours. So, again, in this example, what we are talking about is a kind of 
dissociation or incoherence between an individual’s conscious oversight of his or her behaviours 
and those very behaviours themselves. The obvious worry here being that without such 
conscious oversight and control of one’s behaviour, one may ‘act’ in a way that would fail to 
conform to one’s occurrent will had one been consciously aware of what it was that one was 
doing. In other words, despite the fact that many instances of automaticity may be historically 
connected to and in some way shaped by past practice, plans, or policies, the dissociation that 
such states entail cautions us against assuming that such behaviours are the natural or intended 
consequences of a presently autonomous mind. But let us examine several other examples in 
order to paint a clearer picture of just how dangerous this sort of conscious disconnect from 
one’s behaviour can be and just how poor a candidate automaticity is for representing one’s 
autonomous volition.  
The domain of sports and athletic training may bear the most obvious connection to the 
sorts of activities and practices that are known to lead to automatic behaviours; that is, in terms 
of the repetitive and consistent pairing of situation and specified behavioural response that is 
typical of athletic practice. Indeed it can take years of effortful practice and deliberately focused 
corrections to achieve a degree of expertise in many, if not most, athletic disciplines.
147
 And 
along with that frequent and consistent pairing of event type and situational response, as we have 
seen, the repeatedly practiced movements can eventually become so second nature that one’s 
conscious attention can be focused elsewhere and yet those previously practiced movements may 
still be executed with flawless precision. In fact, in some instances, it would seem, conscious 
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attention can get in the way of successful bodily movement in sports—especially when it may 
slow an athlete’s reaction time in circumstances where a faster reaction time than one’s opponent 
is critical.  
Despite the potential benefits of acting automatically in certain athletic contexts, there 
remains a sense in which automated behaviours may also lead to negative and unintended 
consequences. Take for example an aspiring college basketball player who has spent years 
honing her skill at performing the layup.
148
 Let us imagine that in the middle of a game she 
acquires the ball and automatically performs the layup that she had practiced countless times 
previously. Her conscious attention, however, is elsewhere (say, fretting about her poor 
performance on a recent test that might lower her GPA and get her eliminated from the team). 
Operating (as she is) automatically for this series of movements she unintentionally strikes an 
opposing player with her elbow as she jumps to complete the layup causing that player to suffer 
a broken nose. Now, we may add a number of other details to fill in the picture here; we might 
say, for instance, that she is the star player of the team and that being ejected from the game for 
such a move would be disastrous and surely cost her team the game. We might also add that she 
was neither angry nor vengeful, nor playing with deliberate aggression when the illegal elbow 
occurred. And because she was not consciously attending to her behaviours as they were 
unfolding, she both did not recognize the proximity of the opposing player in her way nor could 
she have stopped the blow from happening.  
In this example, our star player might have entered into the game entirely of her own 
volition—she may have done so with the goal of playing to the best of her ability and she may 
have even intended, at the start of the game, to perform the layup as she had practiced it should 
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 A basic layup in basketball standardly refers to making a drive with the ball when close to the net and then 
jumping and releasing the ball in such a way as to make it deflect from the backboard and go through the net earning 
two points for one’s team. 
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the opportunity arise. However, because she was consciously dissociated from her behaviours 
during the course of events that led to the injury of the opposing player, I don’t believe that we 
are entitled to claim that she intentionally or deliberately injured the other player.
149
 Her 
awareness, while performing the layup, was disconnected from her bodily movements in such a 
way as to render those movements divorced from anything like a presently autonomous will. The 
incident of the illegal elbow wasn’t merely an example of a lack of coherence between some 
active raw desire and a supporting reflective volition; it issued in the complete absence of any 
occurrent conscious desire—either raw or reflective—to injure the opposing player (or even to 
perform the layup for that matter). Moreover, knowing that such behaviour would get her ejected 
from the game and likely cost her team the win, we can safely assume that, had she been 
mindfully aware of her own movements and surroundings, she would have done whatever would 
have been necessary to avoid injuring the other player while performing the layup. So not only 
was her behaviour in this instance not autonomous, but it actually runs counter to what she 
would have willed and done if only she were consciously attending to what she was doing 
instead of being consciously preoccupied with something other than her unfolding bodily 
movements.
150
    
Of course, one might attempt to argue that had the illegal elbow not happened, then there 
wouldn’t have been any question about whether or not the layup was part of a series of 
                                                 
149
 Remember, we are stipulating that she performed the layup automatically so there is no question about 
whether or not she was ‘really’ dissociated from her bodily movements. And although one might refer to the elbow 
as accidental it was not the case that she merely saw that she was about to connect with the opposing player and 
simply failed to react quickly enough to avoid it. Rather, she was utterly oblivious to the movements of her body and 
her immediate environment in those moments. 
150
 It is not the mere fact that an unforeseen and unintended accident occurred as a result of her automatic 
behaviour that signals to us to treat this case as a non-autonomous one. Rather, the accidental character of this type 
of example merely serves to highlight the psychological dissociation which impeded the agent’s personal control of 
her behaviour in this instance. It is not the fact that an accident took place, but rather, it is the lack of control entailed 
by the dissociation that stands in stark contrast to the self-governance implied by autonomy. Accidents alone are not 
very important to us since they befall those who are acting autonomously as well. They are of relevance to us here 
only insofar as they are the potential consequences of dissociated, automatic behaviour.   
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autonomous actions performed by the agent, since we might characterize her behaviour as 
following from her goal to play the game to the best of her ability. Thus, one might maintain 
that, in at least some cases, instances of automaticity should be taken to count as component 
pieces of one’s autonomous behaviour. And, given that one endorses the responsiveness to 
reasons or responsiveness to reasoning models of autonomy outlined in section 1.1, this 
perspective might appear sensible.
151
 However, in my view, when automatic behaviours end up 
working out in one’s favour, it is not the case that they are then to be treated as examples or 
expressions of one’s autonomous volition. Rather, it is more a matter of happenstance in such 
cases that one’s behaviours turn out to be consistent with one’s earlier desires or intentions than 
it is a case of actively self-governed action.
152
 Just as the direction of the wind may at times 
conform to the sailor’s desire that it blow eastward so that he may reach his goal of arriving at 
shore before sundown, so too might one’s automatic behaviours at times turn out to be consistent 
with one’s overarching plans or objectives. But this bit of fortuity does not amount to the 
personal control by an agent of her behaviours. She may be the author of her movements in the 
extremely limited sense that it is her body that is implicated in the automatic behaviour that has 
taken place. But, she may deny having behaved with any intention and resist taking 
responsibility for the movements of her body while it was operating automatically because those 
bodily movements were not actively under her control. The problem with treating automatic 
behaviours as exemplifying one’s autonomy—when such behaviours turn out to be in line with 
one’s present objectives—because they permit a consistent narrative outline of what one is 
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 On these views her automatic behaviour may be characterized as falling in line with her reasons for playing 
the game to the best of her ability or her motives to play to the best of her ability given her other beliefs and desires.  
152
 We know that some automatic behaviours are conditioned by goals that were actively held at some prior 
point in time, so the trajectory of such behaviours may not be entirely a matter of chance. However, that such 
automatic behaviours conform to one’s current objectives would appear to be far more uncertain since one’s current 
objectives might significantly depart from one’s previous commitments or goals.   
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doing, is that it masks the psychological disconnect from one’s own behaviour and provides an 
overly simplistic view of human agency and action. Indeed, from this over-simplified perspective 
there appears to be little reason not to count breathing or one’s heartbeat as autonomously self-
governed as well, so long as one maintains the general goal of living.
153
 Recall that in section 1.1 
I claimed that the notion of self-governance should be taken to mean the acknowledged personal 
authorship and control, by the agent, of the actions he or she commits. As stated above, our star 
player in this example may disavow personal authorship of her automatic behaviours apart from 
that her body was involved in performing them. Also, it must be acknowledged that she was not 
in control of her bodily movements since she was, in those moments, entirely psychologically 
dissociated from them. Thus, a more careful examination reveals that her behaviours were not 
self-governed during the course of the incident even though they might have been conditioned by 
her at some earlier time.
154
 
Next, let us examine a different setting: the industrial workplace. Modern day factories 
have become highly automated. They make use of individual machines to do in minutes what 
would have once required numerous human workers hours and sometimes days or more to 
accomplish. Often, factories will have several of these types of machines form part of a line 
whereupon, at each step, a number of different and separate aspects of production, assembly, and 
testing will take place. Although these machines may be highly efficient, there are often certain 
aspects of the production, assembly, and testing process that require human dexterity and input at 
various points. Having grown up in an industrial city and worked in a number of factories, I have 
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 Of course, given a certain degree of focused attention, one may come to regulate either one’s breathing or 
heart-rate or both simultaneously but, for the most part, we will continue to breathe and our hearts will continue to 
pump to circulate our blood regardless of whether or not we are at all conscious of these bodily processes; so to 
consider these processes to be autonomously self-governed is on par with maintaining the absurdity that mitosis or 
any other physiological process that takes place below the threshold of personal awareness is nevertheless self-
governed merely because they are happenings that take place within one’s body. 
154
 Keep in mind also that those previously conditioned behaviours were merely aimed at the successful 
execution of an athletic maneuver with absolutely no intention to injure opposing players. 
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direct experience with these sorts of factory floors. I can also say with confidence and authority 
that line work (as it is commonly referred to), is an extremely repetitive, monotonous, and boring 
activity. In some cases, a worker will be required to perform the same series of simple 
movements more than a thousand times in a single eight hour shift alone. Needless to say, this 
kind of repetition can rapidly lead to one performing the requisite movements automatically. In 
fact, in this kind of scenario, allowing automaticity to take over may provide one’s only form of 
escape from the mind numbing tedium of repeating the same simple movements over and over 
again. It is perhaps no real wonder then that many refer to labouring on the assembly line as 
“mindless work”.  
Consider the following example: Tom is a line worker in a factory that produces plastic gas 
tanks. He has worked in the same position for over a year and his ability to perform the 
behavioural tasks that befall his position have long since become capable of issuing entirely 
automatically. His job is to connect the gas tanks that come his way on a conveyor belt to an air 
injecting hose and several plugs before submerging the tank in water, pressing a button to fill the 
tank with air, and then looking or listening for bubbles. If there are any bubbles in the water, the 
tank must be removed from the line and sent to be recycled, and if there are no bubbles, then the 
tank is removed from the hose and plugs and sent along a conveyor belt to the next station in the 
line. Now, let us imagine that on a given day, Tom is at work on the line, performing his usual 
duties for his employer. A gas tank comes down the line, he fits it with the hose and plugs, 
submerges it, presses the button to fill it with air, and then sends it along to the next station. Let’s 
say that he does this several dozen times throughout the course of his shift. Every now and again, 
the sound of bubbles signals him to remove the tank and set it aside for recycling. Now let us 
suppose that Tom has settled into the day’s routine enough that he becomes dissociated from his 
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bodily movements and automaticity takes over for his otherwise conscious oversight and control. 
Perhaps his mind wanders to the topic of where he will take his next vacation and he begins to 
imagine different tropical destinations in his mind’s eye. He might become so engrossed in this 
fantasy that his consciousness becomes completely focused upon his visualizations of the sorts of 
experiences that he might enjoy while in these different locations. All the while, however, he 
unconsciously (i.e. automatically) sorts the gas tanks with a regular degree of accuracy. As the 
next gas tank makes its way to Tom, he automatically mounts it to the hose and the plugs, 
submerges it, and presses the button like before. However, this time, there is a problem with the 
air that is fed into the gas tank. It turns out that the devise that usually governs the amount of air 
that is injected into the tank is worn out and fails to restrict the air-flow. As a result, upon 
pressing the button, the gas tank is filled with more air pressure than it can withstand and it 
expands before exploding, sending shrapnel flying in all directions, and injuring Tom and several 
nearby workers.  
Like in the previous example, Tom may have come to work entirely of his own volition. 
He may have decided to put in his usual eight hours instead of taking the day off because he is 
saving to go on a vacation. In other words, his behaviours may be shaped by a goal and 
motivated by certain reasons, and these reasons may correspond to certain values that he holds 
(e.g. the importance of leisure to a contented life).
155
 So there is a sense in which his behaviour is 
in line with one or more of his overarching goals. However, like I stated in the previous example, 
because he was consciously dissociated from his behaviours during the course of events that lead 
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 One might likewise describe his behaviours as flowing from the coherence between one or more of his raw 
desires (e.g. to earn a daily wage, to save for a vacation, to be a good employee, et cetera) and a reflective desire and 
volition that such raw desires lead him all the way to performing the tasks that are required by his position. In other 
words, even on the traditional coherence model, we might initially treat his behaviours as amounting to instances of 
autonomous action. But, as we will see, each of the traditional approaches to characterizing autonomous agency fails 
to capture precisely why we should not consider his automatic behaviour to be autonomous; namely, because his 
psychological dissociation from his behaviours precludes their being self-governed. 
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to the gas tank’s exploding and injuring himself and his co-workers, I don’t believe that we are 
justified in claiming that his behaviour moments before the incident was under his autonomous 
control. His awareness, while attaching the hose and plugs to the tank as well as while pushing 
the button was disconnected from his bodily movements in such a manner as to render those 
movements divorced from any sort of presently self-governing will. Instead, his bodily 
movements appear to have been the result of a conditioned behavioural script that merely played 
itself out in the absence of any conscious oversight. Had he been consciously attending to what 
he was doing, he would have stood a greater chance of noticing that the tank was expanding 
more than usual and he could have stopped pressing the button to halt any more air from being 
sent into the tank.
156
 The gas tank’s exploding and injuring Tom and his coworkers wasn’t 
merely an unintended accidental consequence of his performing the tasks that he was trained to 
perform. Rather, it resulted from Tom’s being dissociated from his own behaviours and 
environment to such an extent that he not only failed to recognize the problem and act to prevent 
it from getting any worse, but also that he could not have recognized nor reacted to what was 
unfolding before him while in that state. If one is not even aware of the movements of one’s 
body and what is happening within one’s immediate environment, it is hard to imagine in what 
sense one could be legitimately thought to exert any sort of active control over them.  
The final example that we will consider has to do with martial arts and self-defense. For 
individuals that train in most any of the traditional martial arts, there are a series of basic 
defensive movements and offensive strikes as well as more elaborate sequences of such moves 
called kata (or “forms”). These basic techniques and forms are practiced with great diligence, 
repetition and guidance from either high-ranking black-belts or the instructor him or herself 
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 It goes without saying that he would, under normal circumstances, never desire or will to allow the gas tank 
to explode.   
110 
 
(often called the sensei). Commonly, one will not be eligible to advance to a higher belt grade 
until one has performed several specific maneuvers or forms with expert skill; which often 
requires repeating these moves in practice hundreds of times beforehand over the course of 
several months. In fact, I recall the master of the martial arts style that I was trained in once 
saying that one will not have mastered a movement until one has performed it ten thousand 
times. As we already know, this kind of repetition can lead to such movements being performed 
automatically; and, with respect to self-defense, reaching the point where one’s movements 
become automatic is in fact one of the primary goals. Indeed, many of the types of scenarios in 
which self-defense of this sort is most useful involves sudden and unexpected dangers which can 
surprise, shock, stun, or bewilder the victim of a threat of aggressive violence. And, when in 
such states, it becomes much more difficult to think clearly about what is one’s most prudent 
move to make in order to safely escape from harm. Thus, when caught in such situations, it can 
be an important benefit to be able to rely upon one’s conditioned self-defense training to 
automatically handle the threat—despite one’s being caught off guard and being mentally 
unprepared and unready to engage with an attacker—and enable one to escape. 
The example of automaticity as conditioned by martial arts training that I will be 
considering is drawn from my own experience at a time when I was a young brown belt team 
sport competitor who travelled and competed in Southern Ontario and the neighboring Tri-State 
area of the United States. The Karate school that I was a part of had two teams, the “A” team and 
“B” team (of which I was a part) that would travel around to various karate tournaments to 
compete against other teams from other schools for the top place in a point fighting system. Each 
team had several members of different ages and ranks that would compete against teams with 
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similarly ranked opponents and the team with the most points at the end of a match would move 
one to the next round in the hopes of reaching first place.  
The team of which I was a part generally performed somewhat worse than the “A” ranked 
team from my school. As the “A” ranked team went up against one of the best teams at a 
particular tournament, I saw my training partner (another top ranked brown belt) get physically 
dominated by his opponent from the other team (he was outscored by a significant margin and 
was left with a bruised ego and a beat-up body). Later on in the tournament, it was the turn for 
my team to face the team that significantly out-performed our “A” ranked team, and I knew that I 
would have to face an opponent who just dominated a training partner of mine who would 
usually out-perform me in training. I was very nervous and afraid, but an amazing thing 
happened as soon as my bout began: I remember bowing to my opponent prior to our match and 
then, my field of vision narrowed to a small circle and I could barely tell what was going on in 
that limited window. I’m not sure if it was a result of the fear, or nervousness, or what exactly, 
but for the first and only time I experienced what is known as ‘tunnel vision’. In this state, my 
conscious awareness was reduced to this small circle of staggered visual impressions surrounded 
by complete blackness and all of my other senses were completely blotted out. The few images 
that appeared to me in this small window were presented similarly to images in a photo-album 
and I felt no sense of connection to what I was seeing. At the time, I’m not sure the images made 
much sense to me at all. In any event, the match came to an end, and I came back to a normal 
state of consciousness and found out that I had somehow won the match by a significant margin. 
I had to ask the people who watched the match exactly what moves I performed since I had 
absolutely no memory of any part of the bout other than being stuck in that tunnel vision state. It 
turned out that one of the spectators had captured the match on a video camera and played the 
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match back for me on the view screen. Upon watching it on the camera I was amazed not only to 
see what exactly I had done to score so well (since I had absolutely no recollection of any of my 
bodily movements while in the bizarre dissociated tunnel vision state), but also the precision 
with which I performed the moves that I had learned in training. To this day, it remains one of 
the more remarkable experiences that I have had. I would, however, later discover that the 
experience is not all that uncommon to people involved in combat sports or real-life combat 
scenarios and that it is likely the result of high levels of adrenaline production.  
One difference between this example and the previous two is that there was no real error or 
accident involved in this case. I entered into the match with the intention of performing to the 
best of my ability against an opponent that I was next to certain would out-perform me, and my 
resulting victory was nothing that I would reject as undesired or unintended by me. However, 
there is simply no escaping the fact that from my point of view, as the match was unfolding, I 
was mostly unaware of what was going on (save for perhaps a few unclear images which held no 
meaning to me at the time), and I had no sense of control over my body nor knowledge about 
what it was doing as it was doing it. It may sound rather hard to believe or understand for 
someone who has not undergone a similar experience but, I chose to use this example in part to 
highlight the fact there exists more than one way in which the dissociation that can occur while 
one’s body operates automatically can come about. My body could have done a number of 
different things while I was in that state: it could have stood frozen with fear, it could have fled, 
it could have behaved in a purely defensive manner, et cetera. Either way, my conscious will had 
nothing to say in the matter once I became dissociated. From that state, I felt utterly no control or 
connection to my body and thus I cannot consider my behaviours while in that state to have been 
self-governed or autonomous. My behaviours throughout the match were obviously conditioned 
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by my prior training and conscious goals to reach the best of my ability but, as those behaviours 
became manifest in that instance, I had no oversight nor could I consciously make any regulatory 
adjustments to the movements of my body. Therefore, I think that we are forced to conclude that 
my behaviour was simply not self-governed throughout the course of my being in that particular 
dissociated state. 
Now that we see why it is that automaticity is a problem for autonomy, we may begin to 
consider how and by what means we might be able to buffer the notion of autonomy from this 
type of threat. As we came to see in this chapter, one of the most important things to recognize 
about automaticity is that the dissociation that it entails is partially characterized by either an 
inability or a failure to attend to one’s automatic behaviours. In the relevant literature, attention 
is often used to contradistinguish automaticity.
157
 To put it colloquially, they are often seen as 
two sides of the same coin. It seems crucial, then, that we develop a better understanding of 
attention and how it may counteract those instances of dissociated abstraction of which we are 
now familiar. Thus, in the next chapter, we will examine the progressive development and 
refinement of some of the research upon, and theorizing about, attention and its role in human 
mental processing in order to get a better idea of just what function attention might be able to 
serve in sustaining autonomy. 
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 As we saw in section 2.3 it was used to distinguish controlled from uncontrolled or automatic processes. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Every one knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and 
vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of 
thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies 
withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others, and is a condition 
which has a real opposite in the confused, dazed, scatter-brained state… 
 
-William James 
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I presented and considered some of the empirical research on the 
phenomenon of automaticity. I also compared and contrasted automaticity with related 
phenomena like automatism and habit. In the final section of the chapter, I provided several 
everyday—but nevertheless, weighty—examples of the potential dangers of automaticity and 
suggested that in light of the dissociation of conscious oversight from one’s behaviour that is the 
hallmark of automaticity, we ought not to treat any such automated series of behaviours as 
expressive of an individual’s autonomy. In other words, I advocated the position that instances of 
automaticity ought to be included in that class of phenomena that are generally taken to 
undermine a person’s autonomy by subverting the sort of self-governance that is essential to 
genuinely autonomous actions. At the end of section 2.7, I made the claim that what turns out to 
be lacking in cases of automaticity is, in part, any sort of conscious attention to one’s behaviours 
as they are unfolding.
158
 To put it another way, behavioural automaticity is characterised, in large 
part, by a failure of active attention to what it is precisely that one is doing. And this relationship 
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 And this is consistent with Reason’s (1979) recognition (mentioned in section 2.4) that action slips appear 
to be the result of a failure to consciously attend to one’s behaviours—or, to use Reason’s terminology: a failure to 
use a ‘closed-loop’ mode of control—at what he considered to be ‘critical decision points’ in the carrying out of an 
action-plan.   
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between attention (or rather, a lack thereof) and automaticity is prevalent in the literature. 
Indeed, attention is often treated as the contrary of automaticity in empirical studies. Thus, 
studies which take automaticity for their object typically turn out to have something to say about 
attention as well. This is why attention and automaticity are often treated as two sides of the 
same coin. 
Because attention is commonly opposed to automaticity, and automaticity has been 
identified as a genuine threat to personal autonomy, it will be important to consider some of the 
core research and theorizing on attention in order to identify whether or not it may provide 
important leads with respect to how we may insulate a robust theory of autonomy from the threat 
of automaticity. Empirical research and theorizing on attention is also important to the project 
undertaken in this dissertation in the sense that the relationship between raw desires and 
reflective desires, identified in the first chapter, appears to consist (at least in part) of attention. 
That is to say, what characterizes the link between these two types of desires is that, when they 
cohere, their connection seems to involve (and perhaps even requires) a kind of conscious and 
reflective attention to one’s raw desires. And attention research may help to provide a better 
understanding of that relation as well.         
Unfortunately, not all researchers have been entirely clear about precisely what they mean 
when they engage in attention research. Indeed, in some of the theorizing and experimental 
studies, there is an unacknowledged tendency by researchers to reduce attention to mere 
selection. And where this is the case, it can become ambiguous and difficult to determine 
whether researchers are examining forms of attention that are necessarily conscious, or if they 
are instead concerning themselves only with selective cognitive processes that may occur below 
the threshold of conscious awareness. A third issue is that subconscious selection processes can 
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be responsible for delivering some contents to the attention of conscious awareness while 
ensuring that other contents are never consciously acknowledged, and researchers may study 
both of these related elements without being entirely clear or consistent about exactly where the 
line is drawn with respect to that distinction. Indeed, this sort of confound was recognized by 
Schneider, Dumais & Shiffrin (1984) when they suggested that, “…attention itself can be 
automatized [as observed in the] (orienting response)” (p. 20-21).159 These sorts of ambiguity 
problems are important to keep in mind when examining the literature. It is especially important 
for us to be certain of the details here since, in some cases, mere processes of cognitive selection 
may resemble something closer to automated cognitive operations than they do instances of 
deliberately conscious attending and recognition.
160
  
Another issue within the literature that bears mentioning is that the field of attention 
research has yet to settle upon a single accepted theoretical model from which to understand the 
phenomenon of attention. Therefore, despite the claim made by James (1890) in the excerpt at 
the beginning of this chapter that “every one knows what attention is,” an informed reading of 
the current state of the field reveals that there isn’t anything like a broad consensus among 
researchers about how best to understand or make sense of attention in general terms. For this 
reason, it will be important to first consider some of the dominant and recent models of attention 
in what follows—both in order to clarify the ways in which attention has been and continues to 
be studied, as well as to determine whether or not any particular approach is more well suited 
than the others to help reinforce a theory of autonomy against the worries generated by 
automaticity—before transitioning to other important aspects of attention and related notions.  
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 The orienting response relies on automatic processes which serve to direct the conscious attention of an 
individual in the absence of any deliberate intent. 
160
 Recall that, as we saw in section 2.1, there is evidence that automatic human behaviours can also be shaped 
by automatic and environmentally responsive correction processes. And where automated processes can make 
corrections and adjustments, they must certainly be able to make selections as well.  
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There are more theories of attention than space will allow me to adequately consider in this 
chapter but, in the following section, I will present some of the more influential theories to have 
shaped the field in recent decades as well as a promising candidate theory that has the potential 
to reshape the field in the decades to come.  
 
 
3.1 Theories of Attention 
 
3.1.1 A Preliminary: Divided Attention and Dual-Task Research 
 
 Much of the empirical research that underlies the various theoretical positions that will be 
covered in the following sections draws upon the dual-task experimental paradigm and the 
measurable interference that such procedures may produce on dedicated attention by virtue of 
dividing it between different goals. For this reason, it is worthwhile to briefly consider both the 
notion of divided attention and the characteristic features of the sorts of dual-task experimental 
research methods typically employed prior to dealing with the various theoretical views in order 
to better understand how the core data was derived as well as how it helped to shape theorizing. 
 One of the earliest experimental protocols to reveal that attention may not be as 
straightforward a phenomenon as it is commonly taken to be was developed by the German 
physician Hermann von Helmholtz. In general, it would seem that one’s visual attention, for 
example, is tightly connected to the direction of one’s ocular gaze. Indeed, Armstrong, Schafer, 
Chang & Moore (2012) suggest that, “in the visual domain, attention and gaze are typically in 
register, such that the stimuli lying at the center of gaze, and on the most acute region of the 
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retina (the fovea), tend to be the focus of attention” (p. 151). However, Helmholtz (1867) was 
able to show empirically that one’s visual attention could be separated from the center of one’s 
ocular focus. He did this by building his own special sort of tachistoscope which consisted of a 
wooden box that was painted black on the inside with two view holes on one end and a pinhole 
for light on the other which was located at the center of a stimulus display card. Looking through 
the view holes, one would focus one’s eyes at the pinhole of light located in the center of the 
visual field. A brief flash of light would then be set off inside the box, illuminating the 
previously dark stimulus card which surrounded the pinhole for a segment of time too short for 
the eyes to shift focus—and, if one’s eyes moved after the illuminating flash of light passed, it 
would still not alter the position of the after-image upon one’s retinas. The stimulus card was 
covered in a random assortment of unevenly placed letters and it would later be used to 
determine perceptual accuracy after the initial experimental exposure. What Helmholtz 
discovered was that when he focused attention to a specific section of the visual field at a 
distance from the pinhole of light, while nevertheless keeping his eyes trained upon that central 
pinhole, he was able to accurately distinguish the stimulus card letters in that section. According 
to Wright & Ward (2008), “what Helmholtz had demonstrated was that, when their locations do 
not coincide, visual analysis required for object identification appears to depend on attentional 
focus more than on ocular focus” (p. 5). This showed that visual attention could be separated 
from the direction of gaze and it introduced a new layer of complexity that would require going 
beyond the standard understanding of attentional processes at that time. 
According to William James (1890), Helmholtz’s discovery was “one of the most 
important observations for a future theory of attention” (p. 438). However, despite this (as it 
would turn out prophetic) statement, James maintained that it was not the case that attention was 
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simply shifted from the center of ocular gaze. Rather, drawing upon the work of Hering, James 
claimed that attention was shared between the ocular focal point and the intended peripheral 
region of the stimulus card. Hering’s view would later be shown to be false161 but, it was 
nevertheless responsible for having led James to conclude that, in addition to one’s attention to 
what is directly in-line with the central focus of one’s eyes, objects outside of one’s ocular gaze 
could also be simultaneously “accommodated” by attention. In other words, Helmholtz’s work 
was seen to be the first empirical support for the idea that attention could be concurrently divided 
between different objects or tracking tasks. Of course, anecdotally, it was widely recognized—
long before Helmholtz—that, in some cases, attention may be divided among different objects or 
tasks at a time; however, perhaps the most significant contribution made here to later work in the 
psychology of attention was the idea that not only could attention be simultaneously divided 
between objects or tasks, but that studying attention under dual-task conditions provided a new 
way of experimentally examining and improving our understanding of the phenomenon of 
attention.  
Although the impact of this new “divided attention” experimental protocol would not be 
immediately realized, it would nevertheless significantly shape the majority of the research 
conducted by later theorists.
162
 It was not so much the fact that visual attention and ocular gaze, 
in particular, could be separated that would deeply influence the broader field of attention 
research, but rather, it was that attention in general could be divided between separate objects 
and tasks, and that studying attention during these instances could provide new insights that 
would turn out to be of greatest influence. Indeed, recently, Braun has claimed that, “a number of 
crucial advances in our understanding of attention are the fruit of divided attention experiments” 
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 See Wright & Ward (2008, p. 6). 
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 See Wright & Ward (2008, p. 12) & Armstrong et al. (2012, p. 151). 
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(1998, p. 345). And it was the innovative and original work of Helmholtz that helped to inspire 
further research along such lines.  
But not all divided attention experiments were restricted—like Helmholtz’s ground-
breaking work—to solely visual factors. Indeed, shifting away from the emphasis on visual 
attention, researchers recognized that human beings are, in some cases, able to divide their 
attention between different tasks or stimuli with respect to other sensory modalities as well. For 
instance, one of the commonly cited auditory experiences of divided attention is known as the 
cocktail party phenomenon. This auditory attentional phenomenon is characterized by the 
experiencer being engaged in listening to one conversation among many others in a crowd 
containing several separate groups of interlocutors and yet still recognizing when his or her 
name, for example, is mentioned amongst a different group of people within that crowd—and 
against a background of otherwise indistinguishable chatter.
163
 Perhaps not surprisingly, a 
number of researchers drew upon this sort of example in constructing different dual-task (i.e. 
dual-stimulus stream) experiments aimed at studying divided auditory attention. Indeed, the 
opportunity to present dichotic stimuli in virtue of the distinct physical positioning of the human 
ears is something that has been widely exploited by researchers.
164
  
While it is true that the majority of the experimental literature deals primarily with the 
visual or auditory modalities, in some cases, individuals have also been shown to divide their 
attention across these and other sensory modalities. What is of interest to researchers in most 
every case is where the division of attention leads to interference or a breakdown in the 
performance of either task. It is this interference between tasks that allows researchers to 
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 The basic fact that a listener could isolate his or her auditory attention to the conversation taking place 
amongst a particular group of speakers from within a larger crowd of concurrent conversations was itself a problem 
for attention theorists. See for example: Driver (2001, p. 54) & Baddeley (1990, p.118).  
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 See for example: Broadbent (1954); Treisman (1960). 
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quantify the effects of divided attention upon behavioural output. Indeed, as Braun notes, “when 
two tasks fail to interfere, relatively little can be concluded about attention” (1998, p. 339).165 In 
contrast, the failure to accomplish one or more of any two simultaneously attempted tasks—ones 
that can be successfully performed in isolation—is treated as revealing the limits of attention’s 
influence upon behaviour.  
There are many different dual-task (or dual-stimulus stream) experimental designs that 
have been deployed in the analysis of attention. In fact, there are far too many to elaborate upon 
here. However, in order to get a sense of what is involved in dual-task research, consider the 
following prototype example adapted from Allport et al. (1972): In this experiment, the first task 
that participants were given was an auditory shadowing task. This task consisted of a one minute 
segment of prose presented binaurally through earphones that participants were required to 
repeat word for word as the recording progressed. The second concurrent task to be performed 
was to sight-read a sheet of musical notes and play that music on a piano. Participants were 
instructed not to treat either task as primary and not to correct errors but to simply continue as 
evenly and accurately as possible for the duration of the trial. Both the verbal shadowing speech 
and the piano performance were separately recorded for later comparison with the actual stimuli 
to check for performance errors and interference.  
In the above example, each task was related to a specific sensory modality and each made 
performance demands upon the participants that were later evaluated in terms of 
precision/accuracy. In other experiments, each task might make demands upon the same sensory 
modality or, rely upon a combination of different modalities. In some cases, the only 
performance requirement might be a simple follow-up verbal report of attentional recall between 
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 However, see Allport, Antonis & Reynolds (1972) who use two examples of dual-task non-interference to 
argue against a general purpose limited-capacity view of attention. 
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two streams of presented stimuli. In other experiments, interference effects might be measured in 
terms of the reaction times of dual-task participants against their own reaction times from single 
task performances or against those of a control group. In short, experimental manipulations of 
the various aspects of dual-task research appear to be limited only by the imaginations of the 
researchers themselves and the questions about attention that they seek to have answered. 
Varying the experimental protocol along the lines mentioned above (and in other unmentioned 
ways) may produce markedly different results. In fact, it is the continuous refinement of the 
thoughts and questions about attention generated by an ever-changing—and sometimes 
conflicting
166—landscape of empirical data that is primarily responsible for the various theories 
of attention that will be considered below. The following several sub-sections present some of 
these notable theoretical advances in their chronological order of appearance as new data 
continued to apply revisionary pressure to earlier models.   
 
 
3.1.2 Broadbent’s Bottleneck Theory 
 
Although attention has been studied as a psychological phenomenon at least as far back as 
James’ (1890)167 treatment of it in his The Principles of Psychology, it wasn’t until the late 
1950’s when Donald Broadbent proposed a “bottleneck”168 model of attention that research in 
this area began to garner significant attention. Indeed, according to Moray, “the renaissance of 
                                                 
166
 See, for example: Wolters & Prinsen (1997, p. 764-765). 
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 In fact, the study of attention reaches at least as far back as Descartes if we widen our scope to include 
philosophical analyses of the concept.  
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 Bottleneck theories of attention are also commonly referred to as filter theories. Both terms will be used in 
the following.  
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attention theory in the late 1950s was truly radical” (2007, p. 3)169; and this is, in part, because 
psychological research in the West, for the previous several decades, had been dominated by 
behaviourism
170
 and its particular penchant (to put it mildly) for reductive (or even eliminative) 
approaches to human mental activity and cognition in general.
171
 Thankfully, by mid-century, the 
arrival on the scene of cognitive psychology gave rise to a more theoretically nuanced and 
experimentally interesting approach to the study of attention, and it was the publication of 
Broadbent’s (1958) Perception and Communication that helped to usher in this new way of 
conceptualizing its study. Broadbent’s model, apart from offering a more robust and realistic 
account of human attention than behaviourists could hope to provide
172
, also quickly became the 
dominant prototype for attention research. And the influence of his thinking upon cognitive 
psychology can still be felt today.
173
 Indeed, there remain a number of current researchers who 
continue to make use of bottleneck metaphors in theorizing about attention. We would do well 
then, to consider just what is involved in Broadbent’s bottleneck theory.  
In order to appreciate the context in which Broadbent’s views developed, as well as their 
implications, we must first acknowledge the importance of the notion of a limited capacity 
system. The notion of a limited capacity system is one that Broadbent appropriated from 
theorists of his day who were working on engineering challenges faced in the domain of 
information technology. Indeed, according to Mole, “It was the technology of the telephone 
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 This sentiment is echoed by Kahneman, who claims that “By the end of the 1950s, the situation had altered 
radically, and the newly legitimized concept of attention was a central topic in an emergent cognitive psychology” 
(1973, p. 2).  
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 See, for instance: Wright & Ward (2008, p. 11). 
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 See, for instance, chapter 10, section 3 of Dashiell’s (1928) Fundamentals of objective psychology wherein 
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to provide a label for some of the internal mechanisms that determine the significance of stimuli and thereby make it 
impossible to predict behavior by stimulus considerations alone” (1973, p. 2).  
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 See for example Driver (2001, p. 54 & 56). 
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exchange that most naturally suggested itself as a metaphor for attention at the time when 
Broadbent was writing” (2009, section 1.6). At that time, telephone exchanges were the bustling 
centers of activity where incoming telephone calls would be intercepted or filtered (by a 
telephone company employee) before being rewired to the appropriate channel. Such systems 
were representative of limited capacity in the sense that there existed a finite number of 
connections that could be maintained at any one time; and further, once a given channel was 
occupied, it could not accept any other inputs until the original connection was terminated. 
Broadbent maintained that information processing within the human brain was subject to similar 
capacity constraints. For him, the hub of activity for human cognitive processing took place at a 
single informational bottleneck between two cognitive systems which would normally operate as 
parts of a sequence. The first of these cognitive systems, the sensory registration and storage 
system, was believed to be capable of handling vast amounts of information from various 
modalities; whereas, the second system of perceptual analysis (the system responsible for 
delivering information to the attention of conscious awareness and response structures), was 
believed to have a far narrower informational bandwidth than the first. The central idea behind 
his model was that a vast amount of information would reach a cluster point wherefrom only 
certain pieces of data would make it through to further processing by the limited capacity 
perceptual analysis system and ultimately to conscious attention.
174
 
Researchers and theorists who adopted Broadbent’s views assumed that it was only once a 
bit of information made it through this filter phase that it became available to attention and 
response mechanisms. More precisely, any representational information that successfully made it 
past the bottleneck was inevitably taken to be information that was attended to and that could 
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 It should here be noted that, in addition to being influenced by ideas in information technology, Broadbent’s 
model was also largely shaped by the results of empirical research that he conducted in a number of dichotic 
listening experiments. See the entries under Broadbent in references for more detail.  
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therefore potentially be responded to. There was however, something of a longstanding debate 
about precisely where to position this supposed bottleneck
175
, with some theorists arguing that 
the bottleneck must be located at the large capacity sensory registration and storage stage (this 
was Broadbent’s view)176, while others177 argued that it was more likely to be found at the 
perceptual analysis stage just before response initiation. Those that maintained that the 
bottleneck was located at the initial sensory registration and storage stage were known as early 
selection theorists, whereas those that believed the bottleneck to be located at the perceptual 
analysis stage were considered late selection theorists.  
Early selection theory was characterized by the following two notions: First, that basic 
physical properties can be detected without the help of attention (this would be accomplished by 
the larger capacity sensory registration and storage system); and second, that the more 
sophisticated semantic properties require attention in order to be registered—this sort of 
information would be handled by the perceptual system and the attentional capacity at its 
disposal was taken to be limited to a small number of separate streams of semantic information 
(if greater than one, typically no greater than two). To illustrate this account of attention, 
consider the following example: one may automatically notice—without intending to, and simply 
by virtue of the basic physical property of sound—that one’s telephone answering machine is 
receiving a message in an adjacent room to the one in which one is located. However, in order to 
determine what exactly is being said by whoever is leaving the message requires that the 
meaning of the caller’s words become the focus of one’s conscious attending. Once again, the 
early selection view maintains that the mere sound of the caller’s message is registered by the 
initial sensory registration and storage system (along with numerous other basic sensory 
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 See for example Hancock, Oron-Gilad, & Szalma (2007, p. 46). 
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 See also: Treisman (1969). 
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 Most notably Deutsch & Deutsch (1963), but see also: Keele (1973) and Norman (1968). 
126 
 
impressions), but the comprehension of any semantic features requires the engagement of the 
perceptual system which selectively receives its contents only once the larger amount of general 
sensory data is inhibited at the earlier bottleneck.  
Although early selection theory appeared to adequately explain certain observed 
experimental effects, the model was not free from undesirable consequences. Indeed, one 
troublesome result of the view was that any unattended semantic properties could not be said to 
produce psychological effects since they would remain unrepresented and unanalyzed at that 
level; and this aspect of the view would draw serious criticism, since a vast body of data on 
priming effects stands as evidence to the contrary of this supposition. The theory would soon 
also face other experimentally motivated challenges and criticisms.
178
 These challenges were 
initially advanced by late selection theorists who, having conducted further experimental 
research of their own, found the early selection view to be either lacking in some critical respect 
or simply ill formulated to explain their findings. It is to this late selection view that we turn 
next. 
Unlike the early selection view of the limited capacity of the perceptual system, the late 
selection view maintained that the majority (if not all) of the perceptual stimuli that we encounter 
ends up being automatically processed by a large capacity system.
179
 Those who adopted this 
position argued that the bottleneck’s role was not to deny certain bits of perceptual information 
from being analyzed—but rather, these late selection theorists saw the bottleneck as the gateway 
between the numerous inputs that would each automatically undergo perceptual analysis and the 
few of those that would go on to become both conscious and available to memory. Indeed, what 
characterizes the late selection view is not that certain perceptual stimuli require conscious 
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perceptual system were large capacity systems. 
127 
 
attention in order to be analyzed (as the early selection view maintained), but instead, it is the 
fact that one becomes conscious of certain perceptual data and that this data is encoded in one’s 
working memory that is the hallmark of attention.  
Similarly to the early selection view, however, late selection theory also entails a 
problematic commitment; namely, that there exists a sharp separation between perceptual items 
that are analyzed but not attended to, and those that are attended to and remembered. The worry 
here is that late selection theory maintains that attention is not at all involved in the perceptual 
analyses that take place prior to the bottleneck; but recent neurological research by O’Connor, 
Fukui, Pinsk & Kastner (2002) and others
180
 reveals that this is not the case. Using fMRI, 
O’Connor et al. (2002) showed that “attention modulated neural activity in the human lateral 
geniculate nucleus (LGN)” (p. 1203)—an area of the brain that becomes active prior to the 
cortical processing centers. In their study, attention was shown to impact the LGN by improving 
neural responses to attended stimuli, reducing neural activity for unattended stimuli, and 
increasing baseline neural activity in the absence of visual stimuli (p. 1203). What this means is 
that the influence of attention in fact does appear to reach further down into the pre-bottleneck 
neural substratum than late selection theory (at least as it was originally conceived), would allow. 
As should now be clear, both the early and late selection theories faced some problems in 
that they each entailed certain commitments that would later be shown to be false.
 
As noted by 
Mole, a potential source of these sorts of problems for both the early and the late selection views 
is that they each ostensibly rely upon an “assumption about the linearity of the processing stream 
in which selection occurs” (2009, section 2.1.3). However, if the brain systems underlying 
attention make use of a parallel distributed processing architecture, then strict talk of “early” vs. 
“late” processes may not only be inaccurate and misleading, but it may also confound theoretical 
                                                 
180
 See also: Armstrong et al. (2012, p. 152); Braun (1998, p. 331); & Driver (2001, p. 70). 
128 
 
advancement in the face of conflicting evidence. And, according to Kahneman, studies of 
divided attention reveal that it is in fact the case that “parallel processing of simultaneous stimuli 
does occur” (1973, p. 121). Therefore, we can be reasonably confident that remaining bound to 
the notion of a neat sort of linearity simply won’t do. Moreover, the debate between the early and 
the late selection theorists would ultimately prove to offer little if anything by way of a payoff. 
Indeed, as Hancock et al. (2007) suggest, the debate “never really reached a definitive 
conclusion” (p. 46). Nevertheless, the notion of a limited capacity that was introduced by 
Broadbent would go on to influence a number of other theories of attention. In fact, numerous 
theoreticians recognized how useful it was to treat attention as a limited capacity system and 
therefore many retained that idea as a central element while constructing their new accounts. At 
the same time, many of these theoreticians would also attempt to avoid some of the problematic 
aspects of the filter theory debate mentioned above. Next, we will consider some of these 
additional accounts, beginning with another widely influential theory proposed by Daniel 
Kahneman.    
 
 
3.1.3 Kahneman’s Effort Theory 
 
Just as Broadbent treated the notion of a limited capacity system as the cornerstone of his 
theoretical framework, Kahneman’s later effort model of attention likewise regarded the idea of 
limited capacity to be central to the study and explanation of attention.
181
 Indeed, Kahneman 
even claimed that he intended his model to “compliment rather than supersede models of the 
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structure of information-processing” (1973, p. 11), like the one advanced by Broadbent. The 
main difference between the two being that, whereas Broadbent’s theory attempted to outline the 
structural architecture of the systems involved in attention, Kahneman’s focus was directed more 
precisely at the “relations of influence and control between components of a system” (1973, p. 
11). In other words, Kahneman claimed to be more interested in the mechanisms of selection and 
their functional roles above their mere structural organization.
182
 However, he nevertheless 
developed a schematic representation of the finer structural layout of the relations between the 
numerous components and cognitive sub-systems that he took to be involved in attention.
183
   
For Kahneman, the fact that the mechanisms of attentional selection existed was without 
question. Indeed, he noted, for example, the difficulty in predicting whether a pigeon that was 
trained to prefer a red triangle over a green circle would, on a later trial, prefer a red circle or a 
green triangle. The question is concerned with whether the animal would make an untrained 
selection based on the newly separated preferential features of colour or shape. Pigeon behaviour 
was found not to be uniform on such trials. What this and many other examples led Kahneman to 
believe was that an organism retains a certain degree of control or choice with respect to what 
stimuli will influence its behaviour.
184
 Indeed, he claimed that, “the organism selectively attends 
to some stimuli, or aspects of stimulation, in preference to others” (1973, p. 3); which renders the 
contention that attention may be a product of the strictly environmental control of behaviour 
implausible. Moreover, borrowing a classification from Treisman (1969), Kahneman proposed 
that there are a number of different sorts of selective activities available to an organism, each of 
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which might potentially operate according to a different set of rules and could possibly be 
controlled by different mechanisms.
185
 These different selective activities were classified in 
response to what they required of the experimental participant. For instance, the participant 
might be required to select “inputs (or stimuli) from a particular source; targets of a particular 
type; a particular attribute of objects; [or] outputs (or responses) in a particular category” (1973, 
p. 3). And it is important to remain cognizant of these differing task demands since, studies that 
focus upon different tasks—and that therefore make use of at least slightly different experimental 
procedures—may produce inconsistent data due to the possibility that they may actually be 
examining different selection mechanisms.
186
  
In addition to his acknowledgement of the varieties of selective attention, Kahneman was 
also deeply interested in building the case for what he called the intensive aspect of attention. 
Indeed, his careful treatment and development of this aspect of attention reveals it to be a 
primary and indispensable part of his effort theory. Drawing from common usage, Kahneman 
claimed that “the term ‘attention’ also refers to an aspect of amount and intensity [italics added]” 
(1973, p. 3). In other words, Kahneman both recognized and highlighted the fact that the amount 
of attention that an individual may allocate at a given time lies somewhere along a gradient. To 
illustrate this feature of intensity, Kahneman provided the image of a student who might not fully 
apply himself to a given lecture. The student may be either tired or, day-dreaming about 
something unrelated to the lecture. In the first case, because of his drowsiness, he has “less 
attention to pay” says Kahneman; while in the second, he may be charged with simply attending 
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 And this might help to make sense of some of the conflicting data produced by different experimental 
studies (i.e. in terms of the supposed location of a possible bottleneck somewhere in the system that was previously 
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 This view is consistent with that of the selection-for-action attention theorist Odmar Neumann whose views 
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to the wrong things. Another revealing example can be seen in the behaviour of most cooks 
when they perform complex cooking tasks. For instance, one may easily carry on a conversation 
with a helper while cooking for a number of guests at a dinner party and yet, one will often 
temporarily abandon such a conversation when working through the more complicated aspects of 
the preparation or, when faced with a pot that is boiling over or a dish that is burning or has 
caught fire. The fact that many will do such things (i.e. briefly put conversations on hold while 
focusing on more demanding tasks), seems to suggest that people in fact do have a limited 
amount of attention to pay to a select number of action options and, that some tasks require a 
greater amount of attention than others. Moreover, in this last example at least, it would seem 
clear that sometimes, our distributed (yet limited) amounts of attention need to be pooled 
together and away from less pressing matters in order to successfully navigate immediate and 
pertinent challenging tasks. 
How challenging or complex a task may be, along with its resulting effect upon the 
intensity of attention elicited or required, is something that Kahneman credits Berlyne (1960) for 
first noticing. In addition to complexity, Berlyne identified “novelty” and “incongruity” as 
further elements responsible for rendering certain stimuli more attention grabbing than others. 
However, Kahneman recognized that Berlyne’s research was centered primarily upon 
involuntary aspects of attention. As a result, Berlyne was mostly occupied with the “level of 
arousal” that various stimuli might elicit rather than the degree to which one voluntarily allocated 
one’s attention.  
Because Kahneman was interested in developing an account of voluntary selective 
attention, he had a different idea of what might impact the intensity of attention; namely, he 
maintained that, “in voluntary attention the subject attends to stimuli because they are relevant to 
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a task that he has chosen to perform [italics added], not because of their arousing quality” (1973, 
p. 4).
187
 Clearly then, Kahneman was more concerned with the individual’s own cognitive 
contribution to the degree of attention maintained than he was with the mere influence of 
environmental factors.
188
 The primary reason behind distinguishing between the involuntary and 
voluntary aspects of attentional intensity and its regulation, for Kahneman, was to disentangle his 
understanding of the effortful deployment of attention from the broader and less specific notion 
of arousal. Indeed, he claimed that “the intensive aspect of attention corresponds to effort rather 
than to [the] mere wakefulness [italics added]” (1973, p. 4) that is commonly denoted by arousal. 
Put differently, Kahneman maintained that “the effort that a subject invests at any one time 
corresponds to what he is doing, rather than to what is happening to him” (1973, p. 4).189 
Importantly then, Kahneman was not just concerned with the intensity of attention, but he also 
considered it often to be something actively engaged in by the individual; whereas he seemed to 
treat the intruding influence of certain external stimuli as (at least initially) a passive affair—i.e. 
as something that foists itself upon the individual without warning or relevance to current plans 
and intent.
190
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190
 However, he does suggest that the influence of such factors may be related to an individual’s “enduring 
dispositions” (1973, p. 4). Notice the parallel to Reason’s suggestion that previously conditioned motor programs 
may take over during actions slips mentioned in section 2.4. In both cases, when one’s active attention is not 
governing one’s arousal or behaviour, one’s level of alertness as well as what one does seems to fall back on 
previous (perhaps more entrenched) selections for action and response.  
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Returning to the central idea shared by both Broadbent and Kahneman that an individual’s 
attention is constrained by a limited capacity system, we find that whereas Broadbent maintained 
that there was a rather specific structural feature that was responsible for the limitation of 
attention (namely, because different sensory items were competing to bias a single mechanism in 
order to gain access through a single channel), Kahneman’s model, on the other hand, advanced 
a less restrictive view. Indeed, for him, the competition between potential items of attention was 
characterised not by appeal to a single monolithic mechanism, but rather, by the demands on 
attention that either of a number of potential tasks required.
191
 In this way, the effort model of 
attention was able to make some sense of how an individual’s attention could sometimes 
function adequately even while divided between tasks.
192
 Another feature of attention that 
appears to be better accounted for on the effort model has to do with the “variations in the 
difficulty of what a subject is trying to do [which] are faithfully reflected in variations of his 
arousal level” (1973, p. 9). Recall the cooking example provided earlier wherein a dinner party 
chef temporarily withdrew attention from a discussion while facing a particularly demanding 
aspect of the cooking task or while handling a more pressing concern such as a pot that is boiling 
over or a dish that has caught fire. Such behaviour reveals that there is more to attention than the 
mere filtration of select captured data and its eruption to the level of consciousness.
193
 Instead, 
this and similar behaviours suggest an extra feature of intensity or effort that is limited like 
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attention is
194
 and that functions in collaboration with the simpler selective aspects of the 
cognitive processing of stimuli.   
For Kahneman, this extra feature of effort fits into his theory of the attentional system in 
the following way: first, at any given time, there are a number of possible activities that are open 
to an individual; these activities are each evaluated in light of the demands that they make upon 
available attentional capacity (i.e. in light of how much effort they require). The available 
capacity itself is something that is influenced by various determinants of the individual’s arousal 
level (greater arousal tends to increase capacity enabling the individual to invest greater 
attentional effort; while low levels of arousal, on the other hand, reduce available capacity and 
diminish attentional effort). The final main component—the “allocation policy”, is influenced by 
the individual’s intentions or enduring dispositions, and the capacity demands of the tasks that 
may be performed. Together these operate to determine which of the possible activities to pursue 
and how much effort to invest.
195
  
The above paragraph describes, in outline, Kahneman’s effort model of attention which 
was both shaped in response to the challenging findings of empirical research on attention 
performed in the wake of Broadbent’s filter theory and developed to remedy some of the troubles 
of that earlier view. But Kahneman’s model was not the only proposal to address those findings 
and problems. Indeed, another theory known as the multiple-resource model would also turn out 
to be a major contender in post filter theory attention research. It is to this account that we turn to 
next. 
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 In fact, Kahneman says of this feature (or, as he calls it: “a nonspecific input”), that it “may be variously 
labeled ‘effort,’ ‘capacity,’ or ‘attention’” (1973, p. 9), effectively blurring any real distinction between his use of 
these terms.   
195
 Kahneman also notes that “there appears to be a rule that when two activities demand more capacity than is 
available, one is completed” (1973, p. 11), which suggests that the allocation policy is biased towards successful 
completion of one task at the cost of failing to complete another competing task, rather than evenly distributing 
insufficient effort to complete either of the two tasks. 
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3.1.4 Wickens’ Multiple Resource Model    
 
As was made clear in the previous section, Kahneman’s widely influential effort theory of 
attention was both inspired by and borrowed some key notions from Broadbent’s earlier model. 
Most importantly, it retained the idea of attention as a limited capacity system. Similarly, 
Wickens’ also widely influential multiple-resource model (MRM) of attention was inspired to a 
significant extent by the work of Kahneman—especially in terms of his treatment of attention as 
a sort of energetic resource (i.e. in terms of the intensity component). Indeed, Wickens claims, “I 
have always been heavily influenced by a dominant theme of Kahneman’s (1973) book: the 
association of attentional resources with a mental effort that can be allocated to tasks” (2007, p. 
243). The focus upon both attentional resources and multiple task demands is something that 
would greatly shape Wickens’ theoretical approach. His interest in and emphasis upon these two 
components, led his research to extend beyond the laboratory and into applied aspects of the 
study of attention and its impact on things like driving and piloting behaviour. As a result, his 
multiple-resource theory of attention has made a significant impact in the field of human factors 
and upon the engineering of interface designs for complex systems that require human operators. 
One of the obvious strengths of the MRM, then, is its applicability to practical concerns; but this 
doesn’t yet tell us what makes it superior to Kahneman’s earlier view—or if in fact it is, in any 
way, superior to it. Addressing that question requires that we look at the differences between the 
two views as well as Wickens’ reasons for rejecting certain aspects of Kahneman’s earlier 
model—or instead, his reasons for going beyond the initial account advanced by Kahneman. 
One of the main points of divergence for Wickens’ multiple-resource view from 
Kahneman’s original effort theory is that, whereas Kahneman seems to have taken a more 
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parsimonious approach by conceiving the attentional resource to be a single undifferentiated 
repository, Wickens, on the other hand, discovered reasons to posit several different and often 
unconnected reservoirs of attentional capacity. And just as the late selection theory was 
formulated in light of newer research that wasn’t entirely consistent with early selection theory, 
so too is Wickens’ argument for a multiple-resource view motivated by empirical data that 
doesn’t appear to sit well with the effort theory’s treatment of attention as being accounted for by 
a single undifferentiated reservoir.
196
 The relevant experimental findings come from dual-task 
studies which led Wickens (1984) to identify four different types of phenomena that, as 
mentioned, don’t fit comfortably with a single-resource account.   
The first of these phenomena is what Wickens calls “difficulty insensitivity”. On the 
single-resource view, one would expect that as a primary task becomes more difficult (i.e. as it 
ostensibly requires more effort or attentional resources), one’s performance on a secondary task 
would begin to suffer as a consequence. And this seems reasonable since, drawing a greater 
amount of resources for one task from a singular pool shared by both tasks ought to result in the 
secondary task having less attention to make use of (at least, given that a certain consumptive 
threshold is reached by the primary task). However, in a number of studies, it turns out that 
varying the degree of difficulty of a primary task does not lead to any difference in the amount of 
disturbance or errors produced on a secondary task.
197
 This suggests that in at least some cases, 
the different tasks that are engaged in concurrently during certain dual-task studies might be 
drawing upon different and independent attentional reservoirs. 
                                                 
196
 It is important here to note that there is no meaningful distinction between Kahneman’s use of the term 
“effort” and Wickens’ use of the term “resource”. Wickens merely preferred to frame attentional capacity in terms 
of resources rather than effort since he believed that, “…effort suggests a motivational variable that may (but does 
not necessarily have to) correlate with the commodity enabling performance” (1984, p. 67). Likewise then, in this 
dissertation, the terms “effort” and “resource” may be treated as referring to the same thing.   
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 See Wickens (1984, p. 76) for a list of studies that support this contention.  
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Another bit of evidence that is suggestive of the multiple-resource view has to do with the 
phenomenon of “perfect time-sharing” sometimes observed between different concurrent 
tasks.
198
 Perfect time-sharing is revealed by instances of dual-task performance wherein a 
participant simultaneously performs both tasks equally as well as each can be done on its own. 
Here Wickens (1984, p. 76) draws upon several different studies including the previously 
mentioned example from Allport et al. (1972) wherein participants were shown to be capable of 
sight-reading music and performing an auditory shadowing task at the same time and with the 
same degree of competence that they could display while performing each of those tasks one at a 
time. On a single-resource model, engaging in both of these tasks at the same time should result 
in poorer performance on at least one of them since they would each be drawing from the same 
attentional reservoir (so to speak). But the MRM can easily accommodate such findings, since it 
maintains that there are a number of non-overlapping sources of attentional capacity that an 
individual can make use of synchronically.   
The next kind of evidence in support of the multiple-resource view comes from what 
Wickens labels “structural alteration effects”. These sorts of effects are observed in studies 
wherein the difficulty of one of a pair of unrelated concurrently performed tasks is held constant 
but is nevertheless changed in some way; for instance, in terms of input modality (e.g. from 
visual to auditory), or response modality (e.g. from pressing a button to providing a verbal 
response). In such studies, the single-resource view would predict that so long as the difficulty 
level is held constant, then there should be no change in the degree of interference registered 
upon the secondary task. However, a number of studies show that such changes can in fact have 
an impact upon the degree of interference undergone on the secondary task. Moreover, the MRM 
of attention can explain such results since the initial task pairings may rely upon independent 
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138 
 
resource pools but changing the input or output modality may result in both tasks then relying 
upon the same resource, which would certainly be a reason for the noted interference effects to 
register a change even though the difficulty level of the primary task was unchanging.   
The last of the phenomena that Wickens mentions in support the MRM is what he refers to 
as the “uncoupling of difficulty and structure”. This phenomenon is elucidated by dividing an 
initial set of tasks (one of which is rated as being more difficult than the other) and separately 
pairing each of them with a third task. In some instances, the initial task that was rated as being 
more difficult actually produced less of a disturbance upon the performance of the third task than 
did the easier of the original two tasks. Of course, this is not what would be expected on a single-
resource view. Rather, on the reasonable assumption that the initial more difficult task simply 
requires more effort or attentional resources, the single-resource view would maintain that it 
should cause greater interference when paired with a third task than the easier task would 
produce—but, according to Wickens, this not always the case. Here again, the MRM of attention 
appears capable of readily explaining such an occurrence. Indeed, on the multiple-resource view, 
the differential—and counter-intuitive on the single-resource view—disturbance to the third task 
can be explained in terms of shared resources versus independent resources. That is to say, 
according to the MRM, the fact that the more difficult task is seen to produce less of a 
disturbance upon the third task than the easier task does can be explained by the fact that the 
more difficult task may simply be making use of a different resource, whereas the easier task 
may draw upon the same resource as the third, which would result in the observed greater 
interference.  
In response to the worries generated for the single-resource view by the sorts of dual-task 
findings mentioned above, Wickens developed a three-dimensional “box model” measure of 
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attentional resources and their effects in order to more accurately map the various components 
and interactions of the human attention system. The first parameter of Wickens’ model is 
concerned with the different “stages” of processing. It includes the encoding, central processing, 
and responding stages. According to the elaboration of Wickens’ MRM provided by Hancock et 
al., this parameter is “essentially a temporal axis reflecting the concern for the sequence of 
encoding, decision making, and response, which is made in seriatim in traditional stage models” 
(2007, p. 47)
199
, and which represents the different points at which task interference may occur. 
The second parameter has to do with what Wickens calls the “processing code” which is divided 
between the spatial and verbal aspects of a task. Next there is a parameter that records the 
“processing modality” which typically includes both auditory and visual sensory channels.200 
Finally, the types of responses that an individual may generate were separated into either manual 
or vocal behaviours (the former being associated with the “spatial code” and the latter with the 
“verbal code”).  
The above paragraph provides a rendering, in outline, of the heuristic model deployed by 
Wickens to make sense of the dual-task data and to predict the standard effects of various task 
combinations upon human attention. In short, it represents one of his major contributions to a 
multiple-resource view of attention. Worth noting, however, is that Wickens himself admonishes 
us not to invest too much into paradigmatic models of attention. He cautions: “do not become 
paradigm bound,” and he advocates instead that researchers, “examine the manifestations of the 
examined phenomena in real-world behaviour, with all of its multitask complexity” (2007, p. 
247). In that spirit, the final model that we will examine (and that we turn to next), which also 
represents a more recent way of conceptualizing human attention, appears to place one of the 
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 They also note, however, that Wickens did consider the possibility of parallel processing. 
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 Although, in principle, one might include any of the five senses available to humans, as well as 
proprioception. 
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central “real-world” aspects of attention at the forefront; namely, it recognizes that in normal 
contexts, attention is intimately related to action.    
 
 
3.1.5 Attention as Selection for Action 
 
At the end of the previous sub-section, we saw that Wickens encouraged researchers not to 
become “paradigm bound” and to instead turn to examining the phenomenon of attention as it 
occurs outside of the lab; regardless of how intricate such examples may turn out to be. The 
thought appears to be that ecological validity and applied research ought to trump theory 
construction and research projects aimed only at finding support for a given model. And one 
might agree with the pragmatic counsel that this impetus provides, at least where theory 
struggles to accommodate various seemingly inconsistent bits of data (such as would appear to 
have defined the history of the field of attention research).  
Turning to real-world examples, then, it is immediately noticed that one of the most salient 
features of the more commonplace types of attention to occur outside of the laboratory is that 
such instances are typically concerned with one or more actions. A number of researchers have 
recently chosen to reconsider the role of attention in light of this recognition and their changed 
vantage point represents a considerable break from how attention research has been conducted 
and conceptualized previously.
201
 Although a number of these researchers maintain that the 
selection-for-action view of attention is in the fledgling stage (i.e. that it is far from providing a 
thorough account), the view has nevertheless created something of stir, since it does not take for 
granted one of the fundamental assumptions of the earlier proposals—namely, that attention may 
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be explained primarily in reference to a limited capacity system.
202
 Instead, along with Allport, 
proponents of this more recent approach recognize that, “the concept of a central limited-
capacity system has exercised [a] hypnotic hold on theorists of ‘attention’” (1987, p. 410)203, and 
they are beginning to challenge this long-standing way of thinking about things. 
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that one of the common features of each of the various 
accounts of attention outlined in the previous three sub-sections was the centrality of the notion 
of a limited capacity system, be it differentiated—as the multiple-resource model maintains—or 
not. As Hommel (2010) puts it: “Most of the grand, influential attentional theories have 
considered attention as a mechanism that administers and organizes scarcity” (p. 122). In other 
words, attention is standardly conceived as something that the individual possesses in short 
supply. Interestingly, however, Neumann (1987) notes, “the lack of any physiologically 
established limit on the information that can be picked up [by the brain] at once” (p. 362). 
Perhaps, then, as the selection-for-action proponents maintain, the apparent limitation of 
attention is not in fact a property of the structural features of the brain but, rather, a consequence 
of selection processes and the action-plans adopted
 
.
204
 Such a proposal is certainly consistent 
with the empirical findings. Indeed, in support of this contention, Allport (1987) reminds us that, 
“in practice, the observable criterion for successful ‘attention’ to (or awareness of) an 
environmental event invariably turns on the ability of the subject to act voluntarily, or arbitrarily, 
in response to that event either at once, or subsequently in ‘recall’” (p. 408).205 So when it comes 
to experimental measures of attention, it seems that, whether or not we are thinking in terms of a 
limited-capacity system, we are always also taking account of some action(s). Furthermore, once 
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 See: Allport (1987, p. 411). 
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 See also: Driver (2001, p. 56), who suggests that Broadbent’s views have been “too influential” and have 
stifled other ways of thinking about attention. 
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 This is precisely what is persuasively argued in Neumann (1987).  
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 Voluntary acts are intentional or conscious whereas arbitrary acts may be treated as automatic. 
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the presumption of explaining attention by way of a limited capacity system is abandoned—or at 
least no longer treated as its only central and defining characteristic—and focus is instead placed 
upon how attention facilitates everyday action (i.e. what it enables an individual to do), 
researchers appear to be less bound by the earlier theoretical constructs and closer to a functional 
understanding of the role of attention as it manifests in the daily activity of regular people.  
According to selection-for-action proponents, one of the more serious worries for the 
capacity limitation models of attention—and a motivating reason to begin to consider alternative 
views—is, “…the failure of th[e] concept to provide explanatory power” (Allport, 1987, p. 
411).
206
 One issue is that, in a sense, invoking the theoretical device of a limited capacity system 
in order to explain the apparent fact that human attentional capacity is limited seems to amount 
to nothing more than a tautology. Indeed, as Neumann argues, “at the conceptual level, the 
problem is that this capacity concept can easily be used to produce pseudo-explanations that are 
in fact mere translations of findings on attention into the language of capacity” (1987, p. 364); 
but to simply re-describe the observed facts about attention is idle. Another worrisome issue that 
is contributing to the difficulties for capacity limitation views raised here is that, in most 
empirical studies, “the notion of ‘attention’ is generally left undefined” (Allport, 1987, p. 
408)
207; and this lack of clarity may be partly responsible for researchers’ failure to recognize 
when they are merely restating their observations in different terms rather than explaining things.    
One of the ways to overcome the explanatory shortcomings of capacity views, according to 
selection-for-action proponents, is to focus instead upon another of the basic features of 
attention; namely, its selectivity—and to try to explain what is involved in such discriminative 
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 See also Franconeri, Alvarez & Cavanagh (2013) who claim that, “unfortunately, words such as 
‘capacity’, ‘resources’, and ‘load’ relabel the effect without explaining why it occurs” (p. 134). 
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 Hancock et al. (2007) echo that this is a problem for theory as well when they suggest, for instance, that, 
“the multiple-resource model is, strictly speaking, only an architecture. It does not tell us what attention actually is” 
(p. 48). 
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processes and how they operate (i.e. to provide a functional account of the selectivity of 
attention). However, an awareness of the selective aspect of attention is not entirely new to 
attention researchers.
208
 Indeed, as Neumann asserts, “the selectivity of attention has traditionally 
been viewed as its second major attribute, besides limited capacity” (1987, p. 373). Moreover, he 
insists that it wasn’t that capacity theorists ignored the selective nature of attention, but instead 
that, “they regarded it as a secondary consequence of limited capacity” (1987, p 373), and 
thereby, failed both to elaborate much upon the role of selection in attention and action control
209
 
and to recognize just how important the feature of selectivity is to a thorough account of 
attention.  
In response to the arguably undeserved favour accorded to the notion of limited-capacity, 
selection-for-action proponents like Neumann propose to reverse the roles of the primary 
elements of the traditional view and instead treat, “limited capacity as a necessary by-product of 
the solution of selection problems” (1987, p. 374). By placing the selectivity of attention at the 
forefront and treating limited capacity as a consequence of selective operations, many of the 
earlier ways of looking at attention are transformed. For one thing, the earlier view that 
unselected stimuli are subject to no further processing once a target stimulus has been selected—
since this would be too costly to the limited capacity system—is seen to no longer necessarily 
follow. As Allport emphasizes, “the really important point to recognize…is that selection, in the 
sense of selective cueing, in no sense logically entails [the] rejection or exclusion of the noncued 
information from further processing” (1987, p 409). In other words, higher level operations upon 
non-selected stimuli are no longer seen as being constrained by a limited capacity. Instead, 
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 As was seen in section 3.1.3, Kahneman considered the selectivity of attention in some detail but his model 
was nevertheless centered upon the notion of effort/capacity. 
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 Most capacity theorists remained content to treat the selective aspect of attention as the simple allocation of 
resources (see: Neumann, 1987, p. 374).  
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attention is constrained by the selective arbitration between, and the carrying-out of, action-
plans—but this tells us nothing about whether or not or to what extent unselected stimuli receive 
further treatment. And, if this is correct, then the longstanding debate between the early and the 
late selection theorists of the filter theory view may have been the result of a mere erroneous 
over-emphasis upon the concept of capacity.  
From the perspective that selection-for-action plays a fundamental and paramount role in 
limiting attention there also emerge new issues to be addressed. According to Neumann, the two 
primary concerns for this view are, “the problem of effector recruitment (Which skills, related 
action goals, are given access to the effector system?), and the problem of parameter 
specification (Which of the possible specifications of an action’s parameters is put into effect?) 
[italics added]” (1987, p. 386). With respect to the problem of effector recruitment, Neumann 
argues that a certain degree of motivation along with a conducive environment are simply not 
enough to specify which effector systems
210
 are activated by which skills and action-plans. And 
this is because, in some cases, one’s motivational level and the objects in one’s environment 
might lend themselves to a number of different action-plans, each of which themselves may be 
accomplished by a number of different skillful means. One obvious constraint upon selection 
here is that one cannot simultaneously perform behaviours that are mutually exclusive since 
these would require the concurrent activation of the same effector mechanisms (e.g. one cannot 
clap one’s hands while swinging a baseball bat at the same time, since only one of these 
behaviours can be carried out at any given moment). Another obvious potential constraint would 
be the action-plans adopted by the individual but Neumann skirts this issue since he believes it 
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would introduce the difficult to quantify idea of intentionality
211
 (see Neumann (1987), p. 375). 
Finally, Neumann argues that the apparent capacity limitations of attention may simply be the 
result of “ongoing action [which] inhibits all other possible actions” (1987, p. 378). Thus, for an 
individual to be engaged in any occurrent action may itself act to constrain that individual’s 
behavioural activity such that it remains consistent and thereby represses any inconsistent 
behaviour. In other words, once an effector is recruited to a particular action-plan and engaged in 
carrying it out, it may then be generally unavailable to other attentional or behavioural 
operations. One might say that, once a selection is made it seems to stick.
212
  
The problem of parameter specification, on the other hand, presents a different set of 
challenges. First, one’s surroundings may not provide the kind of information required to carry 
out an action-plan (e.g. imagine trying to break open a moving piñata while blindfolded and after 
having been spun in a circle several times). One might also lack a certain ability or sub-skill to 
accomplish some action (e.g. one may lack the balance needed to walk across a narrow log 
bridge without falling into the creek below). Both of these examples amount to instances wherein 
the action is underspecified by the environment or one’s skillset. It can also happen that one’s 
actions are overspecified by the information present in the environment (e.g. one may plan to 
have some ice-cream but the thirty-two flavours on offer at the local ice-cream parlour are too 
many for one to eat at once). According to Neumann (1987), both of these mentioned aspects of 
parameter specification require selection mechanisms in order to guide behaviour effectively (p. 
376). Moreover, he argues that, “parameter specification demands that each parameter is given 
exactly one value at time [since] a movement cannot go into different directions at the same 
time” (1987, p. 383); and this is similar to the mutual exclusivity constraint on action mentioned 
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with respect to effector recruitment. In both cases, Neumann argues that mutually cancelling 
behaviours, whether they are the result of overlapping skillsets or effector activations, simply 
cannot obtain concurrently. The implication for instances of dual-task performance, according to 
Neumann, is that, “concurrent actions should therefore be possible only to the degree that they 
can use separate skills [or effectors]” (1987, p. 383). And he maintains that this view provides a 
better explanation of the dual-task data than has been advanced by the other capacity models of 
attention since it does not require the added component of resources which he thinks fail to 
capture the specific nature of interference effects.
213
  
The problem of overspecification, according to Neumann, can be split into two sub-
problems; namely, the “consistency of selection” and the “continuity of action” (1987, p. 384). 
He provides the example of picking an apple hanging among several others in a tree. At first 
glance, this may not appear to pose much of a problem. Indeed, it seems that all one needs to do 
is to identify the most appealing apple and then to grab it. However, Neumann alleges that things 
aren’t quite that straightforward. For instance, different properties of the apple (e.g. size, colour, 
distance from one’s body, et cetera) might serve to specify different selection-for-action 
parameters, and each of these may be distributed across different apples such that they may each 
specify different actions and yet, one cannot grasp at more than one of the available apples at a 
time. For example, one apple might have the optimal size, while another may possess the optimal 
colour, and a third one still may be at the optimal distance for an easy retrieval. This potential 
distribution of desirable properties reflects the problem of the consistency of the selection—that 
is to say that, once a selection is made, the choice must remain the same (i.e. consistent) for the 
action to be completed successfully. A related problem is that, given the distribution of desirable 
features among the apples, the one that appears to be the most desirable may fluctuate from 
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moment to moment. For instance, after making a selection, let us say a gust of wind sways the 
branch revealing a previously hidden apple with a more appealing colour or moves the branch 
closer to render picking another apple easier. With respect to this sort of case, what we have, 
according to Neumann, is a problem concerning the continuity of action. That is to say that, once 
an action is initiated, one must stay the course of that action in order for it to accomplish one’s 
goal. Although there are surely some more complicated cases than the apple picking example 
provided above, Neumann opts for a rather simple solution to at once address both of the 
identified problems
214
 by maintaining that, “in order to solve the overspecification problem, an 
animal selects one of the competing objects by directing itself towards its position in space” 
(1987, p. 385)
215
; so it is not just selection-for-action but also an action itself that helps to 
constrain selection and mitigate the kinds of problems mentioned above. In fact, it would appear 
to be the case that there is a kind of reciprocal influence at work here: the action of directing 
oneself toward some object helps to constrain one’s selection to that object alone and, one’s 
selection of that object in kind helps to constrain one’s further action with respect to it.216    
Now that we have considered several of the more influential theories of attention to have 
been advanced over the latter half of the last century, it is important to consider some of the 
shared issues arising in part from the standard empirical protocols that have informed each of 
these theories to date. The first of these issues to be examined in the following section is the 
connection between attention and memory.  
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 This might sound disturbingly close to Dashiell’s behaviourist proposal involving “posturing” mentioned in 
section 3.1.2, but Neumann is only suggesting that physically orientating one’s body towards an object may help to 
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3.2 Attention and Memory 
 
When examining the research and theorizing on memory, a few things that become 
immediately obvious are that: 1-there are numerous ways of thinking about memory; 2-there are 
also many ways of operationally defining it; and 3-one may characterize its essential features in 
different ways. Indeed, in the literature, the term ‘memory’ has been preceded by a plethora of 
adjectives, including: episodic, iconic, short-term, working, procedural, implicit, explicit, 
semantic, personal, direct, long-term, et cetera. For our purposes, we need not review such an 
extensive list. Instead, we can treat memory as being essentially characterised by a single 
distinction between its short-term and long-term aspects.
217
 Short-term memory (where rehearsal 
and maintenance is absent) is typically believed to be constrained to dealing with a limited 
number of items (normally less than ten), and to only be sustainable for a brief period of time 
(often on the order of mere seconds). Long-term memory, on the other hand, appears capable of 
sustaining an almost unlimited number of items nearly indefinitely. In addition to this basic 
distinction between short-term and long-term forms of memory, it should also be noted that we 
will be primarily concerned with explicit forms of memory (i.e. memories that can be accessed 
either verbally or in some other manner by an experimental participant) rather than with implicit 
memory (i.e. experimentally observable signs of memory influences of which the participant 
remains ignorant) since the bulk of the relevant attention research deals with explicit responses to 
stimuli.  
The vast majority of the dual-task experimental work to have shaped the theorizing on 
attention mentioned in the previous several sub-sections has also inadvertently tapped—and 
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potentially been conflated with—short-term memory. One of the worries that this generates for 
models of attention is that, for instance, the apparent ‘capacity limitations’ that have been 
attributed to attentional mechanisms may in some cases be the result of memory related factors 
instead of the supposed attentional constraints. While it is clear that theorists were aware of the 
connection between attention and memory—recall that the late selection theorists mentioned in 
section 3.1.2 maintained that attention was characterized both by the fact that one becomes aware 
of some stimuli and that it is then available to memory—whether or not sufficient pains were 
taken to ensure that attention and memory were kept from being conflated under conditions of 
empirical study remains ambiguous. Moreover, this ambiguity tends to undermine confidence in 
the conclusions about attention drawn from such studies.  
There is now hardly a doubt that “attention and VWM [visual working-memory; i.e. short-
term memory] are intertwined cognitive operations [italics added]” (Fougnie & Marois, 2006, p. 
533). Indeed, just as attention to an item may influence an individual’s ability to subsequently 
remember it, according to Chanon & Hopfinger (2008), “item memory [also] affects the 
allocation of attention, influencing both the guidance of attention and subsequent dwell time” (p. 
325). So the influence between attention and memory, it seems, operates in both directions. 
Additionally, in some cases, attention and short term memory can be shown to interfere with one 
another.
218
 But, perhaps most problematic for un-careful attention theorists is the recent evidence 
that short-term memory may be subject to capacity limitations independently of any influence 
from attentional processes.
219
 All of these recent findings present a challenge to theorists who 
would gloss the distinction between attention and memory in their experimental designs. The 
problem, in essence, concerns the conclusions that these researchers arrived at with respect to 
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attention since, as mentioned above, there is a serious worry that details about the functioning of 
memory may be confounding the results on attention that such studies would appear to support.  
Consider the fact that each of the theories of attention summarized in the sub-sections of 
section 3.1 relied substantially upon experimental designs that would track attention through 
monitoring the participant’s ability to either shadow, perform from instructions, or later recall 
and report what he or she could of the presented experimental stimuli. In every instance, 
regardless of how short the interval between stimulus exposure and response, the participant, in 
order to be successful, would be forced not only to attend to various stimuli, but to also hold that 
information in memory for at least some amount of time prior to generating a response. In 
support of this view, consider the claim made by Prinz (2000) that, if a perceptual input is not in 
some way encoded into memory, “it cannot be used to select purposeful responses” (p. 252). In 
other words, perception alone is not enough to enable an individual to deliberately react to 
stimuli. In cases where participants are required to recall and report upon their experience after 
an attention task (or a divided attention task), there is scarcely a doubt that memory is involved 
in the process. Yet, even with respect to auditory shadowing tasks, where the response follows 
the presentation of the stimulus much more rapidly, there must remain an impression of the 
words heard upon short-term memory in order for the participant to be capable of faithfully 
replicating the heard speech. Likewise for performance tasks such as sight reading from a sheet 
in order to play a piece of piano music. In this case, participants must make use of long-term 
memory and draw upon stored prior learning in order to enable them to decipher the meaning of 
the symbols on the sheet before being able to accurately re-produce the piece of music that is 
symbolically represented before them. 
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Much more could be said about the relation between attention and memory, but the above 
ought to be enough to raise a serious concern about the ‘purity’ of the findings on attention since, 
in experimental practice, both attention and memory have often been studied without an eye for 
keeping the two distinct from one another. In fact, as will be seen in the next section, the same 
worry about the conflation of memory and attention plays a part in a different problem with 
attention research. The next issue to be considered has its source in a particular and influential 
multi-component model of memory developed by Baddeley and Hitch in 1974. The problem that 
will be considered in the following section has to do with a component of their model known as 
the ‘central executive’ and its possible role in the control of behaviour.  
 
 
3.3 The Central Executive 
 
As mentioned at the end of the previous section, one of the early and highly influential 
models of working-memory was advanced by Baddeley and Hitch in 1974.
220
 Far from 
developing a theory of working-memory that treated memory and attention as separate and 
distinct processes, Baddeley and Hitch actually incorporated an attentional component within 
their model under the label of ‘the central executive’.221 According to them, working-memory 
consisted of three main component systems
222
: 1- The phonological loop (a short-term memory 
store able to hold and manipulate verbal content); 2- The visuo-spatial sketchpad (a short-term 
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 Their model was essentially a multi-component replacement for an earlier understanding of short-term 
memory as single unified system which had begun to look inadequate. See: Baddeley (1992, p. 556).  
221
 Indeed, Baddeley (1981) goes so far as to say that, “it seems likely that any adequate model of WM 
[working-memory] will also have to be a model of attention” (p. 22). 
222
 However, Baddeley would later propose a fourth component system known as the ‘episodic buffer’. See: 
Baddeley (2002a, p. 91-94). 
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memory store that could hold and manipulate visual and spatial content); and, 3- The central 
executive (an attentional oversight system responsible, in general, for regulating inputs and 
outputs with respect to the two memory stores). The first two of these components are often 
referred to as ‘slave systems’ (i.e. systems that operate primarily in an automatic manner) that 
are under the control of the central executive. The executive system, on the other hand, is 
characterized as overseeing, coordinating, and constraining the activity of both of these slave 
systems.  
Originally, the bulk of the research pursued by Baddeley and his colleagues was directed 
upon the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad since, according to Baddeley, “it 
seemed better to concentrate efforts on the more tractable problems of the two slave systems” 
(1996, p. 5-6). This early avoidance with respect to clarifying and analyzing the central executive 
component of the model led to charges that it was nothing more than a contemporary title for a 
homunculus.
223
 In other words, the ‘central executive’ label seemed merely a cover for all that 
remained to be explained by the model. The worry, in essence, is echoed by Attneave: “if all the 
responsibility for perception and action is attributed to a homunculus, explaining his behaviour 
poses exactly the same problem as explaining that of the whole organism, and we have got 
nowhere” (1960, p. 777). A mature cognitive science is unlikely to tolerate such an idea for long 
(if at all). But, to be fair, Baddeley openly acknowledged that the central executive played such a 
role in the beginning; however, he would go on to argue that positing such a thing as a central 
executive—even though it remained largely unexplained at the outset—served the pragmatic 
purpose of encouraging focused research into the two slave systems while maintaining an overall 
cohesive model of working-memory.
224
 Indeed, for him, the ‘homunculus’ that was the central 
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 In this context, the homunculus is essentially a metaphorical ‘little person in the head’. 
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 See: Baddeley (1996, p. 8). 
153 
 
executive component was “merely serving a holding function” (2002b, p. 247). Moreover, in 
time, Baddeley would again take up the problem of elaborating the functions of the central 
executive and gradually move beyond treating it as a place holder for all that remained 
unexplained about working-memory.
225
 
Baddeley was initially inspired to flesh-out the notion of the central executive in terms of 
the ‘supervisory attentional system’ (SAS) model advanced by Norman and Shallice (1980). On 
their model, “deliberate attention exerts itself indirectly through its effect on activation values” 
(1986, p. 5). This means that attention need not be directly involved in selection processes. 
Rather, they maintain that it is through the indirect biasing of neuronal activations that attention 
mediates the behavioural schemas that end up being adopted by the individual.
226
 Early attraction 
to and influence by the SAS model aside, Baddeley would later propose to analyze the central 
executive in terms of what he considered to be its four basic functional dimensions.
227
 These 
dimensions, according to Baddeley, included: 1- Focusing attention; 2- Dividing attention; 3-
Switching attention; and 4-Interfacing between the two slave systems and long term memory.
228
 
The study of these four dimensions would be undertaken by way of performing dual-task 
experiments with frontal lobe patients, Alzheimer’s disease patients, and comparative analyses 
between multiple age groups (among other strategies).
229
  
What is of greatest importance to our concerns is the fact that Baddeley’s notion of the 
central executive was (for some time) entirely cashed-out in terms of attentional processes. The 
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 See: Baddeley (2002a&b & 2007). 
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 There are many other important component features of the SAS that I will not go into here. For more detail, 
see Norman and Shallice (1986). 
227
 Although the argument has been made that the notion of a central executive is, by definition, a unitary 
system (see: Kimberg, D’Esposito & Farah (1997)), Baddeley (2007) maintains that it may nevertheless be 
“fractionated into subcomponents” (p. 119).   
228
 However, he would also consider this last dimension to be a distinct additional component of his model of 
working-memory dubbed the ‘episodic buffer’. See for example: Baddeley (2002a, p. 91). 
229
 See Baddeley (2007, chap. 7) for a modest summary of the results of these labours. 
154 
 
worry isn’t just that his findings with respect to the central executive functions might be muddled 
by their involvement as parts of a system of working memory—this problem with attention 
research has already been identified in the previous section—but rather, the problem is that 
defining the central executive in exclusively attentional terms fails to capture (arguably) the most 
pertinent feature of our capacity for centralized behaviour control; namely, the volitional and 
intentional nature of personal agency.
230
 In other words, Baddeley’s central executive functions, 
on a second look, appear to be operating more as a middle-management team. That is to say, 
although the attentional processes that Baddeley identifies may play a role in supporting or 
constraining the slave systems of memory in some way, they nevertheless do not appear to be the 
systems that have the final word with respect to the behaviours deliberately or willingly adopted 
by the individual. And this is surprising since, in one of his earlier papers, Baddeley 
acknowledged that, “an adequate theory of the Central Executive would probably include not 
only a specification of its method of manipulating control processes…but would also require an 
understanding of selective attention and probably of the role and function of consciousness” 
(1981, p. 21). Unfortunately, many of his later attempts to explain the central executive would 
seem to have forgotten this earlier recognition of the importance of the role of consciousness. 
Indeed, in a 2003 paper, he admits to making the “simplifying assumption that the executive was 
a purely attentional system” (p. 835). However, to be fair, in his most recent work, Baddeley 
(2007) again returned to consider the role of consciousness in the experience and production of 
deliberate action.
231
 And although he presented some important and interesting research in 
support of his latest view that consciousness is a crucial component of both working-memory 
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 As we saw in section 3.1.5, Neumann (1987, p. 375) was cautious to avoid this issue as well. 
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 Here he draws extensively upon the global workspace hypothesis of Baars (2002). 
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and human action in general, how conscious intention or volition operates upon or interacts with 
other so called executive systems and sub-systems remains underspecified in his analysis. 
It ought to be acknowledged that the problem of the avoidance of the notions of 
intentionality and volition is not restricted to those who would adopt a Baddeleyan model of 
working-memory or attention.
232
 Indeed, the avoidance of these ideas seems to be ubiquitous in 
the attention literature and research. Many researchers, it would appear, are comfortable enough 
with making references to executive systems—at least when doing so can’t seem to be avoided—
since, the functions of these executive systems, after all, may eventually be explained in terms of 
neural mechanisms. However, when it comes to the issue of explaining how these executive 
systems relate to or embody the intentions of the individual or what is willed by him or her—or 
even, how it is that intentions or volitions are psychologically represented at the level of 
mechanism—attention theorists have for the most part remained silent. To be fair, intentionality 
would appear to be an exceedingly challenging psychological element to quantify and to measure 
accurately—not least of which for the fact that it may be inextricably bound up with any number 
of different psychological contents—and thus, it is perhaps not very surprizing that researchers 
should aim to steer free from such concerns (at least for the time being). However, as the world 
outside of the psychological laboratory seems to operate, people tend to be more concerned with 
whether or not a given person is intentionally or willfully responsible for his or her actions than 
they are with whether or not some supposed executive system was involved in constraining that 
person’s memory or attention for a given period of time that the person was acting. Therefore, 
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 The Baddeley & Hitch (1974) model of working-memory (later developed primarily by Baddeley) serves 
merely as one of the more salient examples of the neglect of the ideas of intentionality and volition in the sphere of 
psychological research on attention in general. This neglect is made more apparent for the fact that their working-
memory model contains a component that is explicitly characterized as responsible for executing the executive 
control functions over an individual’s behaviour and awareness and yet, how the individual’s intentions or volitions 
are to play a role in that process remains almost entirely unclear.  
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the broader questions about how attentional systems interact with personal intentionality and 
volition, as well as what role such factors play in social accountability, remain on the horizon for 
any account of human behaviour that truly aims at thoroughness. 
Attention theorists (and psychological researchers in general), will often refer to ‘action-
plans’, ‘behavioural goals’, ‘schemas’ or the equivalent in the place of speaking about the 
intentionality of agents since, even though notions such as action-plans and behavioural goals 
may appear to be taken from the same lexicon as intentionality, they are at least readily 
specifiable whereas the nature and operation of intentionality appears to remain at least 
somewhat more elusive. I want to be clear that my highlighting of the fact that attention 
researchers seem to avoid the notions of intentionality and volition is not an indictment of the 
field. I am sympathetic to the challenges faced by these researchers in attempting to understand 
and explain the complex functioning of attentional processes in humans (and sometimes in other 
primates). And explaining something like intentionality, it may be argued, is beyond the scope of 
projects focused more exclusively upon understanding the basic processes of attention. Fair 
enough. However, insofar as attention is—at least in some instances—something that is 
fundamentally controlled by persons, it seems reasonable to anticipate that an explanation of how 
intentions and volitions not only factor into attentional processes, but how they operate on their 
own ought to be forthcoming. The disconnect between talk of executive systems, and action-
plans and goals, on the one hand, and the intentions or will of an agent or person on the other, is 
not just a problem for those working on attention.
233
 Indeed, it is particularly problematic for a 
theory of autonomy that looks to draw upon attention research in order to guard against 
automaticity, since autonomy is explicitly concerned with a person’s conscious intentions and 
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 The tension between these two approaches appears to be just one more example of the opposition of causal 
explanation and teleological explanation. 
157 
 
volitions and an understanding of attention that ignores these notions fails to fully integrate 
findings on attention with personal agency. In the next section, we will at last consider what role 
(if any), attention research might play in bolstering a theory of autonomy that seeks to restrict 
instances of automaticity from interfering with autonomous actions, and further, to bar them 
from counting as in any way expressive of an individual’s autonomy. 
 
 
3.4 Attention and Autonomy 
 
After having examined the attention literature, it would appear that researchers in this area 
have been primarily concerned with the constraints upon or limitations of attention (especially as 
it is examined in the condition of being divided between tasks). Because of this overriding focus 
upon limitation, it would appear that one of the primary contributions of attention research to our 
theory of autonomy is to reveal the general thresholds at which attention typically appears to 
break down for the average person.
234
 Beyond this important contribution of helping us to 
establish the limits of what we can reasonably expect an individual to be capable of attending to, 
research on conscious attending also continues to support the idea that active attention is to be 
counted as distinct from and contrary to instances of automaticity which can (at most) only 
accommodate forms of non-conscious, semi-passive registering of some environmental 
stimuli.
235
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 The details of which (too numerous to mention here) may be gathered by looking at the results of the 
various empirical studies referenced in this chapter. Importantly, this research is also ongoing and so we may expect 
our understanding of human potentials in this area to be undergoing perpetual revision and refinement. 
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 I use the term ‘semi-passive’ here because, as we saw in section 2.1, automatic processes may nevertheless 
be active enough to respond to changing environmental conditions and yet these processes unfold entirely below the 
threshold of conscious apprehension or choice.  
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However, when it comes to the structural outlines of the models provided, none of these, it 
would seem, are able to provide exactly what we are looking for. For instance, whether or not 
attention is the result of a structural bottleneck (Broadbent), or contains an intensive element 
(Kahneman), or consists of multiple resource pools (Wickens), or is constrained by selection 
processes rather than capacity limitations (selection-for-action view), leaves us with little 
certainty about how to impede instances of automaticity from interfering with otherwise 
autonomous actions.
236
 That is not to say that attention research has provided us with no insight 
into this question. Indeed, with respect to the general gradual onset of automaticity, researchers 
have often been careful enough to recognize when some task within a dual-task experimental 
protocol has been rendered less demanding upon attention due to the automatization of behaviour 
resulting from habituation to the requirements of the task. This finding, with respect to the 
impact of behavioural repetition and the consistent pairing of stimulus and response, sheds some 
light upon the typical conditions of instances of automaticity becoming manifest. But it falls 
short of telling us how exactly it might be that actions to which one pays attention could be 
protected from lapsing into automation, or how attention might be used to impede or halt the 
occurrence of automaticity altogether.
237
 Nevertheless, as suggested above, the individual 
experiments comprised in this vast area of empirical study do enlighten us with respect to the 
limits of our abilities to attend—and where it is generally found that human beings are incapable 
of attending to something (for instance, as a result of one’s attention being already divided 
between other tasks or due to a very low level of alertness), we can assume that, under such 
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 Nevertheless, the selection-for-action view appears to have the most in common with the model of 
autonomy being developed in this dissertation—and for that reason it is the most appealing of the theoretical 
frameworks described above to draw from—since both are centrally concerned with developing an understanding of 
human action and both take a functionalist approach. 
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 Indeed, researchers have, for the most part, simply treated automaticity as something to contradistinguish 
their views of attention from (e.g. Baddeley 1990, p. 125). And, as far as I am aware, there has been no sustained 
empirical effort to determine how attention may be used to counteract automaticity.   
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conditions, a person’s actions (or lack thereof) with respect to that thing are incapable of being 
autonomous. And the same applies to the earlier question about the relationship between raw 
desires and reflective desires and volitions mentioned at the outset of this chapter. Without the 
ability to attend to one’s raw desires, a conscious and reflective coherence cannot obtain. Indeed, 
it is implied by the very term ‘reflective’ itself that such desires and volitions must reflect the 
content of the raw desire in order to cohere with it and produce an autonomous action. In other 
words, it is impossible to reflectively consider—or mirror or oppose—some raw desire without 
in some way being able to attend to what that raw desire is. 
Although the contributions of attention research noted in the previous paragraph may 
appear to be somewhat limited, the above is not to suggest that attention does not play a more 
significant role in the maintenance of autonomous actions. As mentioned at the outset of this 
chapter, automaticity is in part characterized by a lack of conscious attention to one’s present 
behaviours. So not only is it the capacity to attend to what one is doing, but also actually 
deliberately attending to one’s actions that is clearly of central importance to acting 
autonomously. Moreover, the attention research has reminded us of the great complexity of 
human action (e.g. by way of selection problems identified in section 3.1.5) and the many 
potential systems (e.g. the components of working-memory, or the possible multiple resource 
stores, or selection mechanisms, et cetera) involved in the overall process of attentively acting 
and responding to one’s environment. However, merely attending to what it is that one is doing 
still does not appear to be enough to provide the kind of support that is needed by the model of 
autonomy being developed in this dissertation. Indeed, people often describe having experiences 
wherein they are fully aware of what is taking place within their immediate environment 
(including their own physical reactions and movements). And yet, often times, they will report 
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having been unable to react or behave in the desired ways. For example: an individual may slip 
and take a tumble down a flight of stairs while all along being conscious of what is happening 
after slipping the first step. Indeed, this individual might even recognize different points at which 
reaching out for the railing or to extending a leg would be optimal in order to halt the tumbling 
and yet fail to act on these observations. Such instances are not failures to attend to one’s 
environment (at least, in our example, not after the initial slip), but rather, they are more 
precisely failures to control one’s movements effectively in response to what one is made aware 
of by way of attention. These sorts of failures highlight a second essential characteristic of 
automaticity, which is a failure to consciously control one’s bodily movements. This type of 
failure appears to emerge by way of a disconnect between processes of conscious awareness and 
attention on the one hand, and processes of effective motor functioning and control on the other. 
In order to address this latter problem we must look beyond mere attention for a possible 
answer. Because the problem appears to be characterized by an inability to integrate and 
coordinate one’s conscious contents with one’s desired action, we will next turn to research on 
the unity of consciousness in an attempt to identify just what is required to keep both one’s 
conscious perceptions and desires as well as one’s intended behaviours working effectively and 
in synchrony.     
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Chapter 4 
 
No one ever had a simple sensation by itself. Consciousness, from our natal day, is of a 
teeming multiplicity of objects and relations, and what we call simple sensations are results 
of discriminative attention, pushed often to a very high degree. 
-William James 
 
…some preliminary clarifications concerning what I mean by ‘experience’ and 
‘consciousness’ are in order. There is of course a limit on what can be said on this topic: if 
you do not know what it is like to have experience, words will not help, and there is probably 
no ‘you’ there to find out. But although ‘consciousness’ and ‘experience’ are to some extent 
primitive notions, they are as hotly contested as any in philosophy. The literature is full of 
distinctions between different types of consciousness, theories about what can and cannot be 
said about consciousness, and the relationship between consciousness and the physical 
world. 
-Barry Dainton 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we looked at several of the major theoretical views on attention 
and some of their supporting research. This focus upon attention was motivated in part by the 
fact that attention to one’s behaviours is commonly treated as contrary to automaticity and, as 
suggested at the end of the first chapter, automaticity is a problem for an adequate theory of 
autonomy. So it was deemed important to figure out just what role (if any) attention might play 
in buffering a robust theory of autonomy from the worries associated with automatized 
behaviours. Although it was determined that attention is central to acting autonomously in 
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general
238
 (i.e. since it remains doubtful on any account that behaviours which are outside of 
one’s attentional purview could be actively ‘self-governed’), it was also seen that attention alone 
was not sufficient to protect autonomy from the threats generated by automaticity. And this is 
because the mere ability to attend to something is not yet enough to ensure that what one is 
aware of (in virtue of attending to it) coheres in the proper sorts of ways with what one is in fact 
doing (or even with what one simply intends to be doing).
239
 Thus, in order to guard against the 
possibility of an agent’s otherwise autonomous course of action becoming instead one or more 
protracted episodes of automaticity, we are going to need to look beyond mere attentiveness for 
an answer. Indeed, at the end of the previous chapter, we saw that it wasn’t just the absence of 
the agent’s attentive concentration upon what she was doing that was central to automaticity, but 
also that when behaving automatically, she likewise fails to actively consciously control her 
behaviour as well.   
The above mentioned lack of coherence between, on the one hand, the agent’s conscious 
attention, intentions, and desires, and on the other, the conscientious control over her own bodily 
movements is a fundamental characteristic of automaticity that alerts us to what we might need 
in addition to attention in order to reinforce our view of autonomy. Indeed, if automaticity is 
characterized not just in terms of a lack of attention to what one is doing, but also in terms of a 
certain lack of coherence and control between one’s conscious, willful mental life and one’s 
behaviours, then examining the research on what is involved in having a unified and coherent 
experience of the world and one’s volitional movements within it would appear to be a fruitful 
place to search for its antidote. It is for this reason that a substantial portion of this fourth and 
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 With respect to the model of autonomy being advanced and developed in this dissertation, attention was 
also seen to play a significant role in the coherence between one’s raw and reflective desires and volitions. 
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 Take, for example, the phenomenon known as “alien hand syndrome” wherein one may attend to all sort of 
things that one’s limb is doing without being at all capable of intervening in those motions. See also section 3.4 in 
the last chapter for a similar example of attention without action control that does not rely upon a rare disorder.  
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final chapter will be devoted to gleaning some useful insights from research on the unity of 
consciousness in the hopes that we may draw upon some of the relevant findings therein to help 
us develop a more robust account of autonomy—ideally, one that may withstand the problem of 
automaticity. 
Before we examine the relevant work on the unity of consciousness however, we would do 
well to say a few words on just what consciousness itself is—or at least, the way in which we 
will be treating it herein—in order to better understand why and how having a unified 
consciousness of a particular sort is crucial to establishing a form of autonomous agency sturdy 
enough to ward off automaticity. It is to these preliminary remarks about consciousness that we 
turn next. 
 
 
4.1 Consciousness: A Brief Sketch 
 
As we saw with respect to both of the previously treated concepts of autonomy and 
attention, there is likewise, a multitude of competing (and in some cases complimentary) 
understandings of consciousness on offer. Indeed, as suggested in the excerpt by Dainton at the 
outset of this chapter, there are numerous types of consciousness as well as theoretical views 
about how to understand consciousness and its relation to the physical world generally. I do not 
propose to advance anything like a definitive account of consciousness here. Such an attempt 
would be far too ambitious for a single chapter (let alone a subsection) and it would also divert 
focus away from the objective of this dissertation, which is to develop a theory of autonomy 
robust enough to deal with automaticity. Indeed, for our purposes, some basic distinctions will 
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suffice as an entry point into a specific sub-field of consciousness research that bears more 
directly upon our immediate concerns; namely, an understanding of the unity of consciousness 
that can be of service to our project.  
Allow me to begin with an incomplete description of my own conscious experience at this 
very moment: 
 
 I am sitting at my desk shifting between looking at the keys (some of which I am pressing and 
releasing in a deliberate sequence) and the screen of my laptop as well as the words that I have written 
and that I am currently writing. I see various other objects atop the desk (books, papers, pencils, et 
cetera), and the sand, orange, and red bricked wall behind it that I am facing. Toward the periphery of my 
line of vision I see other features of and various coloured objects in my room but in a more attenuated or 
increasingly ‘blurry’ way approaching the edges. I smell the incense that I lit to help to keep me a little 
more alert. I taste the honeyed Korean red ginseng slice in my mouth that is intended to serve the same 
purpose as the incense. I hear the sounds made by the fan in my humidifier coming from behind me. I feel 
a general stiffness in my neck and other muscles as well as the position and subtle movements of my 
limbs and body as a whole. I am occasionally distracted by apparently random thoughts and memories—
some partially related to my present concerns while others are less so. And I am pervaded by a slight 
sense of anxiousness to get this description finished quickly since, a few moments ago, I was informed 
that a renovations crew will be arriving at my apartment shortly to complete some work and I believe that 
once they are here, it will quickly get too loud and distracting for me to get any work done at my current 
location.  
 
This account contains a number of different conscious elements that together make up a 
recent portion of my experiential life. It mentions, at least in part, what I had consciously 
perceived by way of each of my five senses and via proprioception. The account also spoke to 
the sense of personal agency that I had and that was displayed by the claim to authorship of the 
thoughts entertained and writing being done as well as the intention behind my chewing the 
ginseng and having lit a stick of incense. It further made reference to intruding thoughts and 
memories as well as beliefs and a slight mood of anxiousness that was induced by my 
understanding some previously received information. Each of the above italicized components 
may be considered different types of consciousness, and although several different types were 
mentioned, they do not by any means exhaust the list of the possible sorts of experiences that one 
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might have. Nevertheless, what each of the above elements has in common is that they were 
collectively the components of my phenomenal consciousness. That is to say, each of these 
elements, for at least some stretch of time, contributed to ‘what it was like’ to be the creature that 
I am.
240
 Another way of putting things would be to say that any given conscious creature has its 
own point of view and the account just given amounts to my own personal experiential 
perspective for a brief portion of time. This phenomenal characterization
241
 of consciousness will 
be central to our understanding of what follows.
242
  
Another point that might be drawn from the description of my recent phenomenal life is 
that each of the elements mentioned in the previous paragraph were concerned with one or more 
‘objects’ (i.e. the incense that I could smell, the ginseng that I could taste, the intention that I use 
both to increase and maintain alertness, et cetera). These sorts of ‘objects’ may be considered the 
contents of consciousness. But there also appears to be a sense in which the underlying 
background consciousness (upon which such contents make their impressions) itself may be 
treated as different.
243
 For instance, I may see the object ‘laptop’ in front of me, but it might 
appear very different to me depending on whether I am in a normal wakeful ‘state’244, or drowsy, 
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 Similarly to Bayne (2010, p. 6) and Block (1997, p. 380), I adopt a ‘liberal’ view of phenomenal 
consciousness that includes things like thoughts, desires, beliefs, intentions, emotions, and understandings.   
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 Along with Block (1995, p. 230), I am not confident that I could provide any non-circular definition of 
phenomenal consciousness, nor am I troubled by that fact. 
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 In general, I will treat the terms ‘phenomenal’, ‘experiential’, ‘aware’ and ‘conscious’ synonymously. 
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 And this difference can make a difference by potentially restricting the selections of certain contents or the 
extent to which they are available to cognitive and behavioural control. See: Bayne (2010, p. 7-8).   
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 I refer to a ‘state’ of consciousness reluctantly here (and throughout) since it can be taken to convey 
something of a static quality that I am uncertain is ever actually true of consciousness (unless perhaps one is taking a 
‘time-slice’ view of it). To speak metaphorically, talk of ‘states’ evokes an image of a still or stagnant pond—
whereas, I think that consciousness, even when calm, focused, or undisturbed is never quite so stable or fixed. 
Indeed, the flowing stream metaphor of consciousness appears far more apt to me but I won’t press this point here. 
Rather, with respect to consciousness, I will use the term ‘state’ for linguistic convenience but I caution the reader 
not to take it for granted that I accept any of the above mentioned or other potentially chimeric qualities that might 
be implied by such use.    
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or dreaming, or drugged, et cetera.
245
 And beyond the potential difference in my experience of 
the particular content ‘laptop’ there is also something different it is like phenomenally to be in 
either of those background states in general. This is not to say that one can be more or less 
phenomenally conscious but only that phenomenal consciousness can take on a different 
character in these different background states and that these different background states might 
play a role in what—by way of contents—is available to functional use. For example, I may be 
conscious of a cup before me but the addition of another cup does not render me any more 
conscious; that is to say, my having more conscious contents does not thereby provide me with a 
greater amount of consciousness. Likewise, one’s dreaming about a cup involves no lesser 
degree of consciousness than experiencing a cup in front of one while wide awake; the difference 
has to do with what the awareness affords one the ability to do in either state. While awake, 
one’s awareness of a cup can be deployed for action control—for instance, one may take the cup 
and fill it with tea to drink; whereas, in the dream state (unless perhaps one is having a ‘lucid’ 
dream), one’s awareness of the cup may give rise to no real control with respect to what one may 
do with it. Again, different sorts of background consciousness can result in different functional 
and selective constraints upon the contents of consciousness, but no background state of 
consciousness is any more or less conscious than another. In other words, in my view, being a 
conscious creature is an all or nothing affair.     
Short of providing an actual definition of consciousness (since this task seems impossible 
to meet without relying upon circularity and synonymous terms), the above provides a basic idea 
of the sort of understanding of consciousness that will be important for our purposes. It mentions 
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 This point speaks to our understanding of automaticity in an important way: It suggests that being in an 
automatic state of consciousness may act to constrain which sorts of contents (if any) are either prominent within, or 
available at all to phenomenal awareness, as well as the extent to which any such contents can be used for the 
control of action. There will be more on this in what follows. 
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a number of the ways in which one can be conscious of things, and it calls to attention some of 
the different sorts of background character that consciousness can take on. However, there is one 
further highly useful distinction to be drawn with respect to our understanding of 
consciousness—a distinction that, as we will see, carries through into the coming discussion of 
the unity of consciousness in a way that will be central to our concerns. The distinction to be 
considered next was proposed by Ned Block (1995) in an important paper entitled “On a 
Confusion about a Function of Consciousness”. 
One of the important ideas that surfaced in the initial characterization of consciousness 
given above was that certain background states of consciousness might play a functional role 
with respect to just what phenomenal contents are selected as well as the extent to which any 
selected content is available to cognitive and behavioural control. This question about the 
functional profiles of different types of consciousness is central to the mentioned 1995 article by 
Block (as well as its 1997 revision).
246
 There, Block distinguishes between what he calls the 
phenomenal and access forms of consciousness. He characterises phenomenal consciousness 
(PC, or P-consciousness), as we have, in terms of the “what it is likeness” of a given totality of 
experiential contents or properties. Another way of understanding phenomenal consciousness is 
in terms of the subjective qualities of experience—also variously called ‘raw feel’ or ‘qualia’—
that is, the occurrent experiential richness provided by the senses and/or our internal mental 
imaginings, recollections, beliefs, desires, and intentions. For each of these mental states (or any 
possible number of them in combination), there is something it is like for a given conscious 
creature to be in such a state. Access consciousness (AC, or A-consciousness), on the other hand, 
he restricts to the contents of perceptual inputs that can be used to control reasoning and 
                                                 
246
 Although the initial article mentioned here was published in 1995, unless otherwise noted, the citations and 
references to follow will be drawn from the later 1997 revised version of the document.  
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behaviour (p. 379). More accurately, Block claims that “A state is A-conscious if it is poised for 
direct control of thought and action” (p. 382). By his use of the term ‘poised’ he means 
something “intermediate between actual use in reasoning, and so forth, and mere availability for 
use” (p. 384). To clarify further: by ‘intermediate between’ actual use and mere availability, I 
take it that he means to portray access conscious states as ‘ready at hand’ for deliberate 
deployment rather than representing something closer to dispositions or bare inclinations or 
propensities. Indeed, Block’s characterization of what AC affords us is essentially given in terms 
of more active cognitive operations like retrieval, reportability, and the rational control of 
behaviour.
247
 That is to say, it essentially concerns the functional roles of various mental states. 
He goes on to claim that although there may be no actual cases wherein what one may 
consciously access is separate from one’s phenomenal experience, it nevertheless appears to be 
the case that PC and AC are at least conceptually distinct (p. 386). And this conceptual 
distinction appears both important and useful since, for example, we may know what information 
is available to some other person to report or employ for behavioural guidance without knowing 
what it is like to be that person.
248
 Moreover, the noted conceptual distinctness appears to be 
supported by the fact that, as Block maintains, AC is a ‘functional notion’ and that it plays an 
essentially informational or representational role in reasoning and behaviour control (by way of 
its causal relations to other representations
249), whereas he claims that PC “is not a functional 
notion” (p. 383). Despite their apparent conceptual distinctness, Block suggests that “A-
consciousness and P-consciousness are almost always present or absent together” (p. 401), and 
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 There will be more on just what Block seems to want to convey by his particular use of the notions of 
‘poise’ and ‘rational control’ to follow.   
248
 Recall Frankfurt’s physician/psychotherapist—he knows what drives his patients to take the drug but 
desires to feel the pull of the first person craving that they experience in order to better assist them. In other words, 
he knows about what they draw upon in their states of access consciousness but not what it is like to be in the 
particular states of craving that they experience (i.e. the states that they phenomenally endure).     
249
 See his revised account (1997, p. 384). 
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that they also interact.
250
 For example, when one has the phenomenal impression of, say, a 
yellow banana peel, that individual is usually capable of reporting on this phenomenal state and 
using it to guide behaviour (say, to avoid stepping on the peel and slipping). It is perhaps the 
frequent (if not virtually ubiquitous) empirical co-occurrence of AC and PC as well as their 
interaction that tends to lead to the frequent conflation of these two distinct understandings of 
consciousness. In any event, Block’s central contention in the article is that an imprudent 
conflation of these two conceptually separate notions of consciousness has led to a number of 
confusions and erroneous claims in the research and literature dedicated to the topic. However, I 
will not comment any further upon the broader value of his proposed distinction to clearing up 
those confusions here.
251
 Instead, I want to consider one more important point about Block’s 
construal of AC before moving on to consider the way in which his distinction applies to and 
informs our concerns. 
One of the primary examples that Block draws upon in order to flesh-out his descriptions 
of both PC and AC (and their conflation/confusion) has to do with the rare medical condition 
known as blindsight. Block makes use of both real data derived from blindsight studies and 
invents extended hypothetical cases in order to press the example into a number of different 
services. The point of greatest relevance for us, however, is that he uses the standard case of 
blindsight as a backdrop against which to define the sense of ‘rational guidance’ afforded by AC. 
This is meant to add a little more clarity to his particular use of the term ‘poised’ when speaking 
about AC. Consider, as background, that in normal blindsight studies, subjects with damage to 
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 One example that Block provides of this interaction has to do with the contrast between the figure and 
ground of one’s experience; here, changing one’s perceptual access from figure to ground or vice-versa can affect 
one’s phenomenal state as well.  
251
 The interested reader may turn to the justifications of the distinction provided by Block himself in both the 
article’s 1995 version which is followed by a number of critiques along with a final response by Block, as well as 
the 1997 revised version.  
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their primary visual cortex commonly have ‘blind’ sections within their visual fields of which 
they claim to receive no visual information or impressions; and yet, they are nevertheless capable 
of ‘guessing’ correctly and reliably with respect to certain features of visual stimuli that are 
presented only within the ‘blind’ areas of their visual fields.252 It is this sort of ‘guessing’ 
(regardless of how reliable it may be) that Block wants to rule out when it to comes AC. For 
Block, such an ability to guess reliably does not amount to representations that are ‘poised’ for 
the rational control of thought and behaviour. Indeed, supposing that an individual with 
blindsight is presented with an ‘X’ in a blind portion of the visual field, Block claims, “The 
blindsight patient…has no X-representing A-conscious content, because although the 
information that there is an X affects his ‘guess,’ it is not available as a premise in reasoning 
(until he has the quite distinct state of hearing and believing his own guess), or for rational 
control of action or speech” (1997, p. 385). Thus, according to Block, when information is only 
available to an individual by way of being summoned by specific external prompts—the absence 
of which results in a content’s showing no influence upon the individual’s thought or 
behaviour—it should not be considered part of AC.253 Instead, it is only when a given conscious 
content is ready at hand to directly impact thought and behavioural control that it forms part of a 
creature’s AC.254     
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 See Block (1997, p. 375) for greater detail and suggested readings. 
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 Indeed, such contents would appear to be closer to inert subconscious impressions.  
254
 The astute reader will notice that the previous quote says something a little stronger than this still; namely, it 
claims that a given content must be available as a ‘premise in reasoning’ in order to count as part of AC. I’m not 
certain that I want to follow Block quite that far. It seems to me that to insist that any access conscious content ought 
to always be available as a ‘premise in reasoning’ might tether consciousness a little too tightly for comfort to 
language (i.e. it might render AC too rationalistic). Presumably, other ostensibly conscious creatures that lack 
language may still deploy some forms of, for instance, conscious cognitive retrieval, or behavioural control or 
adaptation in response to perceptually experienced stimuli. Instead of requiring that a conscious content be available 
as a premise in reasoning in order to count as AC, I think that the idea of a given content being ‘ready at hand’ to 
‘directly’ impact thought and behaviour control is enough to distinguish the sort of thing that Block is after from the 
sort of subconsciously supported guessing that he looks to exclude. And the benefit of refraining from an overly 
rationalistic construal is that we may then preserve the possibility that other non-linguistic creatures could 
nevertheless possess a sort of AC.  
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 Now that we have a thorough understanding of the distinction between PC and AC—as 
well as a qualified view of the way in which a given content must be ‘poised’ for use by AC—
we can consider how the distinction maps onto our understanding of instances of automatic 
behaviour. One thing that is immediately apparent when considering a standard episode of 
automaticity is that there is a significant asymmetry between the reach of AC and PC in such 
cases. And this difference in the scope of what is available to PC and AC during an episode of 
automaticity appears to be a hallmark feature of such examples. To consider one such potential 
manifestation of this asymmetry, let us return to the example of Tom provided in section 2.7. 
There, we saw that Tom’s PC was primarily occupied with the daydream of visiting a tropical 
location for a vacation while he nevertheless continued to automatically perform the gas tank 
check that he was tasked with. Now, it might be said that although he performed the behavioural 
requirements of his job automatically (i.e. without full awareness), there was nevertheless 
something it was like for him to be both performing such a task and daydreaming 
simultaneously. Of course, the phenomenal difference between his daydreaming while on the job 
and, say, on his couch at home, might be lost to Tom since, in either case, he would be so 
attentionally engrossed in the daydream that other details of his phenomenal setting might 
remain too peripheral to notice.
255
 But Tom’s presumed obliviousness to the background settings 
in which his daydreaming occurs does not discount the potential overall phenomenal difference 
between the two cases. Instead, for our purposes, the most noteworthy constraint to be 
recognized as operating upon Tom’s consciousness while on the job concerns his AC. Indeed, in 
the example, while on the job, he only has access to the daydream and none of his other 
behaviours for the duration of the automatic episode. He may be ‘going through the motions’ of 
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 Here we see that, as is typical in such cases, one’s focus of attention is more restricted than one’s overall 
phenomenal awareness. 
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the physical task that he is responsible for performing while in the state of automaticity, but he is 
in no direct conscious control of those behaviours. Indeed, even in those cases where an 
automatic sequence of behaviour is capable of making slight, apparently calculated adjustments 
to certain spontaneous environmental changes on the fly, these sorts of adjustments are not to be 
understood as the activity of AC. Rather, such adjustments, although they might be made in 
conformity with an agent’s aims or desires, are not ‘ready at hand’ in the sense of directly 
available for deliberate action control by the presently conscious agent—or at least, not by that 
part of the agent that is both present and conscious.
256
 This is a subtle but exceedingly important 
point to be clear on since, at first glance, one might think that a (in some sense degraded) form of 
AC appears to be responsible for the behaviour performed during episodes of automaticity given 
that the individual may appear to be behaviourally responsive to certain sudden environmental 
changes. Now, although such behavioural responsiveness may in fact be observed, the important 
point to remember about such physical activities—despite their potential sensitivity to 
environmental changes—is that they are not issuing in a way that is directly connected with the 
sort of control implied by AC. Rather, they occur below the threshold of presently conscious 
implementation. To connect the point to Block’s example of blindsight, we might imagine that a 
blindsighted patient is capable of automatically ducking in order to dodge a projectile that is 
heading in his or her direction even though the person may report having no idea why he or she 
just ducked (assuming that the projectile remained within the blind portion of the visual field). In 
such a case, although the agent appears to be acting with deliberate intent (i.e. to avoid being 
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 Recall that, as we saw with respect to the work of Reason (1979) in section 2.4, as well as in the Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis (2000) study presented in section 2.3.3, often times automatic behaviours will revert to previously 
dominant behavioural scripts as opposed to an agent’s currently willed behaviour. And although these scripts will be 
responsive to a given particular intentional framework that is attributable to the agent, these are often not in sync 
with the agent’s present will. And even where they are in synchrony with the agent’s will, they remain so only by 
chance and not by authentically active conscious control. 
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struck by the projectile), the behaviour is not at all responsive to or the result of any occurrently 
conscious state. Instead, it appears to be a purely mechanical response to certain non-conscious 
(or at least not AC) perceptual stimuli.  
The above example of Tom is consistent with what I think is a common feature of the sort 
of asymmetry to be found between AC and PC during episodes of automaticity; namely, that 
they are typically characterized in terms of a restricted degree of AC vis-à-vis PC. There are 
other important things to be said about both AC and PC with respect to our concerns with 
automaticity but more on that later. The important preliminary points about consciousness in 
general now covered, we will next take a closer look at just what is involved in having a unified 
conscious experience.  
 
 
4.2 Unified Consciousness 
 
 Research on the unity of consciousness has garnered significantly more attention over the 
past several years than it has in previous decades. Indeed, starting with Michael Tye’s (2003) 
“Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity”, followed by Barry Dainton’s (2006) “Stream 
of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience”, and most recently, Tim 
Bayne’s (2010) “The Unity of Consciousness”, the increasing list of publications clearly marks a 
growing interest in the topic. However, so far, the majority of the work in this area has been 
centered on attempting to show that consciousness (at the level of the subject) is in fact 
fundamentally unified and how we ought to make sense of that raw datum. For our purposes, 
however, whether or not consciousness is in fact fundamentally unified in some particular way is 
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not as pertinent a question to ask as the following two are: 1- In what ways can consciousness be 
unified? And, 2- Can maintaining any particular form of unified consciousness rule-out the 
possibility of an otherwise autonomous course of action lapsing into automaticity?
257
 
With these latter questions in mind, let us consider some of the proposed candidates for the 
underlying relation that is responsible for the unity of consciousness
258
 in order to determine 
whether any of these options might help us identify a form of unified consciousness that is 
resistant to automaticity.
259
  
First, and perhaps most naturally, we might consider what is known as objectual unity. 
Objectually unified conscious states are states that are focused upon the same object. For 
instance, one might see and hear the song of a blue jay in flight. Here, the colour of the blue jay’s 
plumes, its shape, its motion through the air, and the sound of its song are all unified in one’s 
conscious experience of the bird in a straightforward way. Clearly, given that the bird is together 
both seen and heard in this example, we recognize that an object can be consciously unified 
across different sensory modalities. However, two experiences can be experiences of the same 
object and nevertheless not be objectually unified. For instance, perhaps the bird’s song is 
projected—say, due to the echoic properties of the landscape—to originate somewhere other 
than the precise location of the bird. In that case, the modality specific experiences of the visual 
characteristics and the sound produced would not be objectually unified. Moreover, one’s 
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 The answer to the question of whether or not consciousness is in some sense fundamentally unified at the 
level of the subject does not concern us since, if it turns out that consciousness is fundamentally unified, then it must 
be a form of unity that entails automaticity—otherwise automaticity would represent a break in that unity—and 
would therefore be little use to us. Moreover, if consciousness turns out not to be fundamentally unified, it may 
nevertheless support forms of unity that could help us to overcome automaticity. For these reasons, I will avoid any 
argument for or against the fundamentally unified nature of consciousness in this section. 
258
 Philosophers have proposed a number of different forms of conscious unity in an attempt to identify which 
sort of unity might play that sought after fundamental relational role. For instance, they talk of subsumptive unity, 
subject unity, and gestalt unity among many others. However, many of these types of unity will not be given much if 
any attention here because they fail to provide us with any reason to think that the particular forms of unity that they 
isolate can be of any help in ruling out automatic behaviours.  
259
 My treatment of the kinds of conscious unity to follow owes much to the work of Bayne & Chalmers 
(2003), and Bayne (2010).  
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objectually unified states of consciousness need not even concern actual things in the world; for 
instance, one might be hallucinating the experience of the blue jay (and its shape, movement, and 
sound) and although the object ‘blue jay’ itself (as well as its properties) don’t in fact exist, one 
may still have the objectually unified experience of those properties as real and as belonging to a 
particular object. Indeed, according to Bayne & Chalmers (2003), “for objectual unity, what 
matters is that two states are experienced as being directed at a common object” (p. 25). Of 
course, such a form of unity is not limited to only involving two conscious states, but rather, it 
can include any number of conscious states, so long as each state is centered upon the same 
object. Imagine, for example, that one is holding a blue jay in one’s hands to protect it from a cat 
that had caught and injured it. Here, one’s visual impressions of the bird, its chirping sounds, as 
well as how its feathers and weight feel to the touch, together with the intention to keep it out of 
harm’s way and perhaps a slight mood of sadness for its having been injured can all count as 
components of a single objectually unified conscious state.  
A different yet related form of unified consciousness is known as spatial unity. For a given 
number of conscious states to count as spatially unified the objects of these states must be 
represented as parts of a single spatial expanse. Returning to the original example of the blue jay, 
it is not just the object ‘blue jay’ but also the visible sky behind it, the landscape below it, one’s 
position in reference to the moving bird and a number of other perceived objects in one’s 
environment that together make up a spatially unified conscious state. One of the characteristic 
features of this sort of unity is that the content of any two or more represented objects is 
comparable in terms of the spatial relations that obtain between them. Consider again the 
example of the blue jay that produces a song at a distance from its precise location due to the 
echoic properties of the landscape. In that case, from the perspective of spatial unity, both the 
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object ‘blue jay’ and the bird song belonging to it are spatially unified (despite the fact that they 
are not objectually unified), because they occur within the same overall space.  
Another form of conscious unity that appears relevant to our project is introspective unity. 
This form of unity concerns the experienced connection between reflectively approached internal 
mentations (i.e. thoughts, feelings, remembrances, et cetera). These sorts of unified experiences 
typically contain both a phenomenal ‘what it is like’ character as well as a certain cognitive 
accessibility that allows for comparison.
260
 A related form of unified consciousness is known as 
the unity of focal attention. This form of unified consciousness has to do with an experience of 
the many aspects of a single item (or a small set of items
261
) and the access relations such an item 
bears. These relations may include things like the instrumental value of the item attended to vis-
à-vis one’s goals or plans, whether or not the item poses a threat, et cetera. Focal attention is 
distinguished from a broad field of consciousness—one containing many items—by narrowing 
in on a single item (or restricted subset) for engagement. There is a mental state in which there is 
something (unified) it is like to attend to a single item and be simultaneously cognizant of many 
of its aspects and import. Focal unity thus brings a number of cognitive resources to bear on a 
single item (or restricted set).  
In terms of a more action centered notion of unity, one might also propose something along 
the lines of a means-ends unity in order to capture the conscious experience of carrying out a 
behavioural plan in the world in light of the reception of certain perceptually conscious 
information and the relation of that information to one’s beliefs, desires, and intentions to bring 
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 This kind of introspective unity appears to be present in the Frankfurtian form of reflection. It is also in 
sympathy with the attentional relation between one’s raw and reflective desires and volitions that was identified in 
section 3.4. 
261
 An ‘item’ is here taken to mean anything of which one may be conscious, including desires or internal 
mental imagery—thus, the unity of focal attention and introspective unity may overlap, though focal attention 
outruns introspection. 
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something about. This sort of unity would appear to at least somewhat capture our sense of the 
effectiveness of our own personal agency.
262
 However, this sort of unity relation is unlikely to be 
fundamental to conscious unity since one may be fully conscious while nonetheless physically 
incapacitated. 
One might also treat the above mentioned types of conscious unity as components of a 
more encompassing representational unity. According to Bayne, “conscious states are 
representationally unified to the degree that their contents are integrated with each other” (2010, 
p. 10). And such representational integration can include things like the perceptual properties of 
physical objects (either individually or in greater numbers), the spatial relations between objects 
(and their relation to the overall spatial ‘field’ of one’s experience), as well as non-perceptual 
thoughts. Representational unity is equivalent to and is synonymously referred to as content 
unity. Restated, such a form of unity has to do with the connections between objects of 
consciousness (or the connections between the experienced properties of a single object). If one 
experiences an object or content, one will also experience other objects or contents and at least 
some of these items will be experienced as part of single a group. For example, suppose I am 
currently conscious of the shoes on my feet and the door in the room. If these items were not 
unified, I would be incapable of answering comparative questions about the two contents such as 
their proximity to me or whether or not they are the same shade of brown. That conscious 
contents like these are to some degree integrated is what allows us to compare and evaluate 
various members of a single group of contents.  
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 This form of unity is also thoroughly consistent with Bratman’s planning model of autonomous agency—a 
central component of which, you may recall, is that we conceive of our power of agency as taking place across 
extended periods of time. Means-ends unity should thus be understood to be an essentially diachronic (i.e. 
temporally extended) form of conscious unity. 
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In addition to representational or content unity, there are also other forms of conscious 
unity which are broader in scope. The two of these that are of primary importance to our 
concerns are phenomenal unity and access unity. As we have already seen in section 4.1, Block’s 
distinction between PC and AC helped us to highlight a prototypical asymmetry discernable 
between these two forms of consciousness as they are manifest in cases of automaticity. Recall 
that Block’s characterization of the distinction between PC and AC takes the following form: 
 
 Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is 
what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is 
availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. (1995, p. 227) 
 
Although the original distinction provided above does not make reference to the notion of unity, 
we can nevertheless modify Block’s original account of this distinction to apply to a conception 
of consciousness as a unified phenomenon. To this end, we may follow Bayne & Chalmers 
(2003) in calling these new distinctions ‘access unity’ and ‘phenomenal unity’ respectively. 
According to Bayne & Chalmers, these new distinctions can be understood in the following 
terms: 
 
Broadly speaking, two conscious states are access-unified when they are jointly 
accessible: that is, when the subject has access to the contents of both states at once. Two 
conscious states are phenomenally unified when they are jointly experienced: when there is 
something it is like to be in both states at once. (2003, p. 29)         
 
Of course, neither of these types of unity should be taken to be restricted to only dealing with 
two conscious states at a time
263—rather, they may contain any number of a specified set of 
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 It is important to also note that, in the cited article, Bayne & Chalmers restrict their analysis of these two 
forms of unity to cover only conscious states at a time (i.e. synchronically) and not such states over time (i.e. 
diachronically). Nevertheless, I see no reason why these forms of conscious unity could not involve states that 
persist over time, and so I will, without hesitation, employ their distinctions in the service of developing a 
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conscious states or even the entirety of one’s conscious states at any particular instance. In order 
to provide a little more detail, with respect to phenomenal unity, let us return to the initial 
characterization (given in section 4.1) of the brief moment of time in which I described my 
conscious experience as a collection of various related conscious states while I was involved in 
writing. In that summary of my conscious states, I mentioned that I could both see, for instance, 
the multi-coloured brick wall in front of me as well as hear the fan from my humidifier behind 
me (among many other consciously experienced elements). Now, we might think of these two 
elements of my experience as representationally unified since, for instance, they can be 
compared with one another in terms of the sensory modalities by which I was made aware of 
each, and they can also be compared in terms of their locations with respect to one another 
(among other things). However, there is a unity to these experiences that is more primitive than 
the unity of their representational content. Indeed, this more primitive unity is captured, 
according to Bayne, by “the fact that these two experiences possess a conjoint experiential 
character” (2010, p. 10). My seeing the wall first makes a phenomenal impression in 
consciousness, my hearing the fan likewise makes another such phenomenal impression, and my 
seeing the wall while hearing the fan amounts to a conjoint phenomenal experience with its very 
own ‘what it’s likeness’ that is not contained by either of the individual impressions on their own 
and which also precedes any ability to work with those phenomenal impressions comparatively. 
Of course, I was phenomenally aware of many other conscious states in that description 
                                                                                                                                                             
temporally extended account of autonomous agency. The only significant difference between a synchronic approach 
to the unity of consciousness and a diachronic one to be found in the literature concerns the notion of transitivity. 
Most philosophers on this topic seem willing to agree that the conscious states of a synchronically unified totality 
must be transitive (i.e. if at time t, conscious state A is unified with conscious state B, and conscious state B is 
unified with conscious state C, then, at time t, conscious state A is unified with conscious state C). However, 
whether or not this sort of transitivity obtains diachronically is a little more complicated to workout. See Dainton 
(2006) for a thorough treatment of the issue.  
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simultaneously, so this more primitive phenomenal unity extends to include the totality of my 
phenomenal impressions as had together for that moment. 
Shifting our focus to access unity, we see that each of the elements of the earlier 
description of my conscious experience over the briefly detailed period were also access unified. 
That is to say that, each of the elements of which I was phenomenally conscious were also jointly 
accessible to me in the sense that I could use those conscious contents, singly or in combination, 
to guide and control my own thought and behaviour. For instance, rather than writing the 
description as I had, I could have instead written a poem about the sublime perfumed scent of the 
incense, or the sweetness of the honeyed Korean red ginseng. I could have also simply 
entertained the thought that these two elements in combination were much more effective for 
maintaining alertness than either one of them tends to be on its own. Alternatively, I could have 
written a complaint to my landlord about how frustrated I was of the short notice left to me 
regarding the impending renovation crew arrival given that I was in a the middle of working on 
something requiring a certain freedom from noise and intrusion, or I could have slammed my 
hands down hard on the desk in anger about how it disrupted my goal to continue writing. 
What’s important when it comes to access unity is not that one in fact accesses a given number 
of conscious elements in order to perform some behaviour or to carry out a particular thought, 
but rather, that one can directly access any of a number of unified conscious contents in the 
service of controlling thought or behaviour because those contents are poised or ready at hand 
for deliberate use. Moreover, as we saw with respect to AC generally, what distinguishes access 
unity is likewise the causal roles that these interconnected conscious states may occupy within 
the cognitive system. 
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Because both phenomenal unity and access unity—though remaining importantly 
conceptually distinct from one another—are more general in character, they may be used in 
combination with some of the earlier mentioned forms of conscious unity. So, for instance, one 
might have an introspective phenomenally unified experience. Such an experience might be 
characterized by the unified ‘what it is likeness’ of having some, say, happiness evoking 
emotional memory. Likewise, the experienced spatial unity that one has of one’s environment 
might be part of a greater access unified conscious state which enables one to navigate the terrain 
effectively, or which allows one to do so in light of the added intentions contained in one’s 
means-ends unity. Of course, like PC and AC in general, both phenomenal unity and access unity 
interact with one another as well as typically occur together. So, for the most part, from the 
perspective of an alert conscious mind, one can typically assume that whatever it is that is 
phenomenally unified within one’s awareness, will also be access unified as well. In other words, 
the totality of the contents of a phenomenally unified state, are often also the same totality of the 
contents of a simultaneously occurring access unified state. However, as we saw near the end of 
the previous section, there appears to be a significant asymmetry between the scope of PC and 
AC during episodes of automaticity.
264
 And this asymmetry is carried over into our consideration 
of phenomenal unity and access unity as well. That is to say that, during episodes of 
automaticity, the totality of the contents of one’s phenomenally unified conscious state does not 
appear to be identical to the totality of the contents of one’s co-occurring access unified 
conscious state. Moreover, it is this characteristic asymmetry between one’s phenomenal unity 
and one’s access unity during such automatic episodes that I believe reveals a key piece of the 
puzzle in terms of what is needed by our revised model of autonomy if it is to withstand the 
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threat of automaticity. Indeed, the commonly reduced degree of access unity in comparison to 
the degree of phenomenal unity in such cases speaks directly to the earlier identified lack of 
coherence and control between one’s presently willful mentations and one’s movements. Over 
the next two sections, I will use the insights gleaned so far about the various forms of conscious 
unity—drawing primarily upon phenomenal and access unity since these show some clear 
differences between normal and automatic behaviours—to help reassess several examples of 
automaticity, as well as build a more resilient account of autonomy. 
 
 
4.3 The Problem Clarified 
 
Now that we have an idea of the sorts of unified consciousness that may help to render our 
view of autonomy resistant to the worries associated with automaticity—most importantly, the 
overarching categories of phenomenal unity and access unity—we may begin to formulate an 
answer to the problem. However, before attempting to construct a solution to the potential 
interference of automaticity with an otherwise autonomous course of action, we would be well 
served by returning to our earlier examples of automatic behaviours in order to rehearse the 
precise ways in which automaticity undermines autonomy as well as to discover the effects that 
automaticity may have upon our conscious unity.  
In the example of Tom, the gas tank manufacturing line worker originally given in section 
2.7 and briefly reconsidered above near the end of section 4.1, we see that there are three central 
components to what is going on at the level of consciousness. First, it would appear that Tom’s 
phenomenal consciousness is unified in this case. That is to say, there is something it is like for 
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Tom to be engrossed in a daydream while nevertheless automatically preforming the menial task 
for which he is employed. As noted, we may contrast this ‘what it is likeness’ with his having an 
identical daydream while on his couch at home to show that there is an overall phenomenal 
difference between such experiences, even though what makes each experience phenomenally 
distinct from the other may be lost to Tom himself due to his being so singularly attentively 
focused upon the contents of the daydream. In other words, the phenomenal difference between 
these two possible background settings in which he may have the same daydream might not 
make the slightest difference to Tom’s thoughts or behaviours since, the way in which either of 
those dim background settings forms a part of his conscious life is merely phenomenally and 
nothing more. So far, we have identified two of the central components of Tom’s conscious 
experience: 1- his consciousness of both his daydreaming and his unfolding automatic behaviour 
in the world (that is to say, the totality of Tom’s conscious states) is phenomenally unified; and, 
2- his attention is restricted to the contents of his daydreaming alone. The final and most crucial 
component to notice in this example is that Tom’s AC, while unified in terms of the contents of 
his daydreaming (i.e. with respect to his focal attention), nevertheless contains only a fragment 
of the contents that are phenomenally unified for him. And it is only those contents that are 
access unified for Tom that may fall under his occurrent deliberate control. Quite clearly then, 
the fact that some behaviours may take place automatically means that access consciousness is 
not totally unified in such cases. But let us consider some of the other earlier examples of 
automatic behaviours (from section 2.7) to establish whether or not this restricted scope of access 
unity is, as I have suggested, a consistent theme when it comes to automaticity.  
  Recall the example of the aspiring college basketball player who had spent years honing 
her skill at performing the layup. In that example, in the middle of a game, she took possession 
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the ball and automatically performed the layup that she had practiced many times before. As with 
the example of Tom above, her conscious attention was entirely elsewhere (namely, worrying 
about her poor performance on a recent test that could lower her GPA and get her kicked off the 
team). During the course of her automatic movements she unintentionally struck an opposing 
player with her elbow as she jumped to complete a layup and the blow caused the opposing 
player to suffer a broken nose. A number of other psychological and emotional background 
details that don’t concern us here were also stipulated. What does concern us is that, because she 
was not consciously attending to her behaviours as they were unfolding (i.e. because she was in a 
state of automaticity), she both did not recognize the proximity of the opposing player in her way 
nor could she have stopped the blow from happening. Again, her bodily movements were 
disconnected from her occurrently conscious control in such a way as to render those movements 
divorced from anything like a presently autonomous will. Similarly to the last example, we may 
presume that her consciousness was phenomenally unified since what it is like for her to 
automatically perform the layup while being absorbed with her poor test score during the game is 
different from what it is like for her to be focused upon the identical worry and perform the same 
set of automated behaviours alone at her home driveway basketball net. Of course this 
phenomenal difference between the two settings might again be very faint or peripheral for her 
(that is, if she could recognize it herself at all)
265
 since her attention is so concentrated on her 
fears related to the test that the full extent of the difference between her overall phenomenal 
background experiences in either instance is likely not the sort of thing that she would be capable 
of fully appreciating while in such a state. Moreover, we also find here the same structural 
asymmetry that was noted in the last example between the individual’s phenomenal unity and her 
access unity to the contents of her consciousness (as well as that her attentional focus appears to 
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have set the boundary of her access unity). A further important point to recall is that, due to the 
sort of repetitive entrainment required for an instance of automaticity to obtain, what seems to be 
happening is that an initially deliberate and AC (likely even access unified) performance of some 
behaviour at some later point becomes activated by a subconscious cognitive sub-system. And 
although such a cognitive sub-system is capable of mirroring a previously deliberate and 
attention demanding sequence of behaviours it ultimately does so in an entirely mechanical 
fashion devoid of any occurrent conscious control or oversight. 
Another example of automaticity was given in section 2.7 that was somewhat different in 
character from the two examples treated above. The example drew from my own personal 
experience as a young martial arts competitor. In this case, the dissociation that occurred during 
the state of automaticity took the form of an experience of tunnel vision while my body 
automatically performed various offensive and defensive movements in the context of a 
tournament team fighting competition that I was engaged in. During the experience of tunnel 
vision in which I automatically performed the associated physical combat movements, my field 
of view narrowed to a small circle surrounded by complete darkness and I could barely tell what 
was going on in that limited window. Within that state, my awareness of the information 
normally provided by my other senses was entirely absent and the few images that did appear to 
me at the center of the tunnel were staggered, incoherent (i.e. insensible), and fleeting. Moreover, 
I had absolutely no recognition or awareness of any of my bodily movements while in the bizarre 
dissociated tunnel vision state; nor did I have any recollection of what those movements were 
after the fact.  
With respect to the above example, the case could perhaps be made that my consciousness 
was not phenomenally unified since all of my normal phenomenal sensory impressions—save for 
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a fragment of my visual field—were entirely absent. Nevertheless, although my phenomenology 
may have been severely restricted in this state (as compared to my normal alert conscious 
perception), it was certainly not (as far as I could perceive of it) fragmented or disunified; that is 
to say that, I did not undergo two separate or self-contained phenomenal experiences. In other 
words, although what it was like for me to have the experience seemed to have only contained a 
fraction of the amount and types of contents that are more common to my regular phenomenal 
awareness, that restricted set of contents—namely, the darkness of the tunnel and the staggered 
images arising at its center—nevertheless amounted to a single (i.e. unified) phenomenal state. 
However, even if the critic grants that my phenomenal experience was unified in the above 
example, the case might then be made that there was no asymmetry between my phenomenal 
unity and my access unity in this instance, since both states were significantly constrained to 
only the contents of the tunnel vision experience. While it is true that both my phenomenally 
unified and access unified states were apparently restricted to the same limited scope of contents 
in this case, there remains a sense in which my access unity suffered a still greater 
impoverishment than my phenomenal unity. That my access unity was more significantly 
constrained than my phenomenal unity in this case is revealed by the fact that access unity (and 
AC in general) normally entails the ability use perceptual data to affect thought and behaviour—
and in this case, it was limited to the mere recollection of only the perception of the tunnel 
vision, and only after the fact at that. So, although both my phenomenal unity and my access 
unity were concerned with the same contents, the normal effectiveness of that access unity was 
additionally hindered in a manner that was not suffered by my phenomenal unity at the time. 
While it may be debated whether or not this fact is sufficient to establish that an asymmetry 
between phenomenal unity and access unity still obtains here, I maintain that the extra and 
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uncommon hindrance to access unity in this case does result in a noteworthy contextual 
difference between the two forms of unity. It is obvious that the asymmetry identified in the 
earlier two examples was an asymmetry between the scopes of conscious contents of each 
distinct form of unity; whereas here, the asymmetry concerns not the scope of the contents, but 
rather, what is normally afforded by the sort of consciousness in question. Thus, in this example, 
the asymmetry at issue concerns the normal powers of the types of unified consciousness being 
compared. Phenomenal unity typically contains a number of ‘felt’ conscious impressions that are 
had together, whereas access unity typically allows us to do something with those impressions 
(or contents) in terms of deploying them in the service of thought or behaviour control. Because 
my access unity lacked these additional standard powers in this case, the normal symmetry 
between phenomenal unity and access unity, I maintain, was thrown out of balance.   
Another important difference between the tunnel vision example and the other two 
examples provided earlier is that there was no real error or accident involved in the current case. 
Recall that the earlier two examples of automaticity resulted in behaviours that each subject 
would disavow and reject as unintentional and involuntary. Still, there is nothing about my 
automatic physical performance and its having led me to victory in the present case that I would 
want to disavow. I entered into the match with the intention of performing to the best of my 
ability against an opponent that I believed would out-perform me, and my resulting win was 
nothing that I would reject as undesired or unintended by me. However, as mentioned in section 
2.7, there is no denying the fact that from my perspective, as the match was taking place, I was 
for the most part unaware of what was happening (except for the few unclear images seen 
through the tunnel which held no meaning to me at the time), and I had no sense of control over 
my body nor knowledge about what it was doing as the match unfolded. As stated previously, 
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my body could have done a number of different things while I was in that state: it could have 
stood frozen with fear, it could have fled, it could have behaved in a purely defensive manner, et 
cetera. No matter what might have happened, my conscious will had no input in the matter once 
I became dissociated as a result of the tunnel vision state. Thus, my automatic behaviours at that 
time were simply not occurrently self-governed or autonomous. And this state of affairs reveals 
another important implication of the sort of dissociation that is characteristic of automaticity—
namely, that it isn’t enough for one’s behaviours to by chance simply ‘fall in line with’ one’s 
earlier desires and intentions, since this might happen entirely outside of the active control of the 
individual.
266
 Instead, what seems needed is both an ability to attend to what it is that one is in 
fact doing, as well as an introspective access unity that is able to guide one’s behaviours in an 
attentionally responsive way in light of one’s occurrently coherent reflective volitions. So it 
would appear that one’s coherent intentions must also be introspectively access unified across 
time.  
The final example of automaticity that we will consider was also the first such example 
mentioned at the end of the first chapter in section 1.4. There, our central concern was raised in 
light of Bratman’s temporally extended account of autonomous agency. Now, as was mentioned 
in section 1.4, because Bratman’s decision to ground the subject’s autonomy in the temporally 
extended plans and policies that she has was motivated as a response to the regress objection to 
the earlier Frankfurtian (and Dworkinian) model of autonomy—an objection that we have found 
another way to address—we will abandon the notion that such plans or policies constitute the 
autonomous agency of the individual subject. The decision to abandon this component of 
Bratman’s view is also due to the worry that was advanced in section 1.4 that an agent may still 
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become dissociated from her plans and policies when she is in a state of automaticity. What we 
will keep in focus however, with respect to the Bratmanian view, is the understanding that what 
supports the individual’s autonomous agency are the interconnected psychological ties between 
one’s self and one’s memories, one’s future oriented intentions and their fulfillment, and the 
continuities between one’s desires and their kin. In addition to the overall coherence of these 
diachronically dispersed components we will need to add certain other features of consciousness 
considered so far. But first, let us return to the original example and the worry that it generated. 
In the example, we met an individual with the self-governing policy of always standing up 
for (or coming to the aid of) any other who appears to be in distress. This policy, it was 
suggested, had long since been entrenched—to the point of having become automatic—by this 
individual’s having always defended other children from the assaults of schoolyard bullies 
throughout childhood. The policy might have been reflectively adopted in the beginning, perhaps 
because the individual saw it as the right thing to do. And perhaps such a choice was reinforced 
by the thanks that would be returned by the victims that were spared from further abuse. In any 
event, later in our subject’s adult life, the policy would again become activated in the context of 
witnessing a mugging taking place. Unlike the minor risks or dangers attending allowing this 
policy to become activated in the schoolyard as a child however, as an adult, and in this more 
serious context, the activation of the policy might come at a far greater cost to the individual. As 
mentioned, the mugger might have been concealing a firearm and might respond by opening fire 
upon our would-be helper, perhaps shooting the initial victim first. It goes without saying that, 
neither of these violent outcomes would be the sort of thing that our agent would invite under 
normal circumstances. Nevertheless, because the policy was activated automatically, the 
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behaviours that it engendered—and the consequences that followed directly from them—were 
outside of our agent’s occurrent volitional control. 
The most salient difference between the above example and the ones treated just before it 
is that, in the present case, the agent’s attention to a situational trigger actually initiated the 
automated policy activation; whereas, in the earlier three cases, the agents’ conscious attention 
and control was constrained such that they each did not have access to the automated behaviours 
as they were unfolding. More precisely, in the earlier examples, an agent would have started out 
consciously with respect to some course of action, but at some point along the way, key parts of 
the agent’s consciousness simply receded or withdrew from actively monitoring those 
behaviours and instead allowed non-conscious systems to continue to automatically carry out 
those behavioural sequences. Along similar lines Bayne notes, “the agent as such seems to 
recede when dealing with representations that are able to drive only a restricted range of 
consuming systems, and with it our evidence that we are dealing with consciousness may also 
recede” (2010, p. 104). Our most recent example, on the other hand, reveals a somewhat 
different kind of automaticity at play. Indeed, in this example, our agent is fully conscious of the 
fact that another individual is being mugged. In fact, it is our agent’s ability to recognize this 
information that allows the policy to be brought into the service of generating behaviour. 
However, the activation of the policy itself and the activity that it engenders is not something 
over which our agent has any occurrently deliberate control.
267
 So, whereas the earlier cases are 
more clearly understood to involve a ‘dropping-out’ of conscious attention and control, in this 
case, attention plays a role in the activation of the automatized policy itself.  
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To some, the above state of affairs might make it appear as if consciousness is in fact 
access unified with respect to the automatic behaviour that follows from the policy activation 
since: 1- the agent at some earlier point did in fact coherently and reflectively endorse the policy 
in question; and, 2- the appropriate situational trigger successfully led to the activation of the 
appropriate policy; while, 3- the agent was consciously attending to that very situation when the 
activation occurred. However, the activation of the policy in this case was entirely outside of the 
agent’s occurrent conscious control. Indeed, in this example, our agent is no more in control of 
the activation of the policy that initiates behaviour than a participant in the early 1935 Stroop 
study (explained in section 2.3.3) is consciously in control of the interference produced by word 
stimuli upon colour identification. Put differently, the activation of the policy in this case is 
closer to a reflex than something that answers to the agent’s immediate and direct conscious 
choice. And this is the sort of thing that Block sought to rule-out from counting as AC. Clearly 
then, this last example does not display total access unity (again, because the agent was not in 
direct control of the policy’s becoming active). Nevertheless, the example does appear to fit with 
the earlier mentioned notion of means-ends unity since it successfully and coherently connects 
the previously adopted intention or policy with current perceptually relevant information and 
behaviour that conforms to the aims of the earlier intention. But this seems more like a reason for 
rejecting the idea that means-ends unity necessarily underlies autonomy than a reason for 
accepting it. 
The final important point to be made about this last example is that the earlier noted 
asymmetry between phenomenal unity and access unity appears to be preserved in this example 
as well. The difference may not appear to be quite as pronounced as it was in the first two 
examples but it can still be seen to be present. For instance, our agent, in this example, has a 
192 
 
phenomenally unified experience of witnessing the mugging that is taking place as well as what 
he says and perhaps physically does to try and intervene (among other things). Additionally, 
although his behaviours might be automatically initiated, they are nevertheless within the scope 
of his attentional grasp. Interestingly, however, there doesn’t seem to be a ‘something it is like’ 
for his automatized policy to become active; the agent’s phenomenal unity will include 
phenomenal impressions related to the behaviours that result from such an activation but the 
activation of that policy itself doesn’t appear to have any phenomenal content. In terms of the 
agent’s access unity however, we see that not only is the automatic activation of the policy not 
under the control of the agent’s AC but neither is the speech or behaviour that flow directly from 
that policy entirely under the control of an access unified consciousness. Even if we were to 
grant that the agent might have some limited AC control here—assuming, for instance, that he 
might be able to control whether his intervention remains purely verbal or instead involves 
physically defending the victim— he is nevertheless not in control of the fact that he intervenes 
on behalf of the victim (this activity is ensured by the automatic policy activation). Therefore, it 
is again the case in this example, as it was with the previous one, that the agent’s access unity is 
more severely constrained than his phenomenal unity. And that asymmetry, once again, concerns 
not the scope of the contents, but rather, what is normally afforded by the sort of consciousness 
in question. 
With each of the above examples reconsidered in light of our understanding of the over-
arching phenomenal and access forms of conscious unity (and disunity), we are now well 
situated to provide a positive account of what is required of a theory of autonomous agency if it 
is to rule out the possibility of automaticity. In the next section, that positive account will be 
given. 
193 
 
4.4 The Solution 
 
To begin with, we ought to take into account the pieces of our proposal that have already 
been provided; namely, those desires and volitions that must be coherent in order to support 
autonomous agency. Prior to making any changes to our internalist approach to autonomous 
agency (other than having abandoned the hierarchical language and conceptual framing of the 
early formulations), the image that we have of what is required for an agent to act autonomously 
includes a set of coherent raw and reflective desires and volitions that are (more or less) 
temporally extended. Moreover, for these mentioned reflective volitions to count (i.e. for them to 
be effective), they need to ensure that the desires with which they cohere are sufficiently 
powerful to carry the agent “all the way to action” as Frankfurt argued.268 Also, because some of 
the desires that an agent might have can take the form of long-term plans and policies, we have 
to include such forward-looking intentional structures within our overall apparatus of coherent 
willing and desiring. Finally, we know that because certain cognitive structures, like one’s 
policies, may become automated, that they may generate behaviours that fail to match-up with an 
agent’s occurrent and greater psychological unity (i.e. in terms of the coherence between the 
agent’s present willing and desiring). And that even when such automated behaviours are by 
chance consistent with the agent’s willing and desiring, they are nevertheless outside of the 
active control of the agent and thus do not amount to examples of genuine self-governance. 
Moreover, it is not just the danger of automated policies but the simple fact that behaviour can 
and often does unfold in a manner that is automatic that threatens the agent’s ability to behave 
consistently autonomously.  
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Now for a first pass at what is additionally required to block a course of autonomous action 
from succumbing to automaticity. The first thing that appears to be needed in order for any 
sequence of behaviours to count as autonomous is that the behaviours in question must fall 
within the agent’s attentional purview. Indeed, if an agent is unable to even attend to what it is 
that she is doing, it is hard to imagine that she could be actively “governing” her own 
behaviours. However, we are also already aware that mere attention to what it is that one is doing 
is insufficient on its own to guarantee that one is behaving autonomously (since one can attend to 
behaviours that are entirely outside of one’s intentional control). Clearly then, we need to build a 
certain type of active control over what it is that one is doing into our model of autonomy. As we 
have seen in the previous section, one of the ways in which an agent’s control over her own 
behaviour fails during episodes of automaticity has to do with the asymmetry that is standardly 
found between phenomenal unity and access unity in those cases. During such instances, access 
unity appears to be consistently under greater constraint (in terms of having fewer contents or a 
reduction to the normal capacities that it has) than phenomenal unity. Therefore, it makes sense 
to propose that in order for a sequence of behaviours to count as autonomously self-governed, 
they must have also flowed—in a continuous manner across time—from an agent’s unhindered 
and symmetrically unified phenomenal and access conscious unities. In order to keep things a 
little more manageable, we will refer to this kind of conscious unity as simply symmetrical unity.  
One thing that becomes immediately apparent with respect to this new requirement of 
symmetrical unity is that there is both a broad and a narrow way of conceiving of that unity. 
Beginning with the broad view, one might propose that the symmetry in question must hold 
across the totality of the phenomenally unified conscious state and the totality of the co-
occurring access unified conscious state in order to support autonomous agency. The narrow 
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version of the claim for symmetry, on the other hand, might require only that the symmetrical 
unity obtains with respect to the specific actions undertaken by the individual. Under this view, it 
matters not whether there may be some discrepancy between the totality of the agent’s 
phenomenally unified conscious state and the totality of her parallel access unified conscious 
state, so long as those contents which concern our agent’s actions in the world are symmetrically 
unified. 
Let us return once more to the example of Tom in order to help us flesh-out the difference 
between the broad and the narrow theses. The advocate of the broad view might argue that the 
totality of Tom’s phenomenal conscious unity included the sequence of behaviours that he 
automatically performed, and thus, if Tom’s access conscious unity had only extended to include 
the same totality of contents, then Tom would have had access to those behaviours and he would 
have also been in complete conscious control of them (and therefore acting autonomously). The 
advocate of the narrow view, on the other hand, will suggest that complete symmetry between 
Tom’s total phenomenally unified conscious state and his parallel total access unified conscious 
state goes further than is needed. Instead, the advocate of the narrow view will insist that all that 
is required in order for Tom to be acting autonomously is that he be in a state of symmetrical 
unity with respect to the behaviours in which he is engaged.  
Given that we have a choice to make between the broad and the narrow theses expressed 
above, something ought to be said about which approach appears to be preferable. I am 
persuaded to adopt the narrow view, but allow to me to show why I think it to be the better 
option by way of an example: In this scenario, let us assume that a driver named Jack has just 
witnessed an automobile collision at a busy city intersection in which both of the drivers and a 
cyclist were seriously injured. Jack, believing that the cyclist is the most seriously wounded 
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deliberately chooses to take the injured cyclist into his car and rush him to the nearest emergency 
room. As Jack is transferring the cyclist from the scene of the accident into his car the totality of 
his phenomenally unified consciousness includes the sound of an approaching ambulance siren. 
However, because Jack’s attention is so focused upon getting the wounded cyclist into his car, let 
us stipulate, he is not access conscious of that approaching siren. Here, I would argue that, 
despite Jack’s reduced degree of access conscious unity in comparison to his total phenomenally 
unified conscious state, he is nevertheless behaving autonomously—assuming his actions flow 
from an immediate coherent reflective volition and his attention and AC to what he is doing—
with respect to his moving the cyclist into his car in order to get the accident victim to a hospital 
as quickly as possible. Of course, it is probably a bad idea to attempt to move an injured person 
oneself (especially if one lacks any sort of medical training or know-how). But it is not Jack’s 
poorly reasoned choice to do so that is under examination here. Indeed, it seems obvious that 
people frequently make poorly reasoned decisions and nonetheless carry out various actions 
based on such decisions entirely autonomously. What is at issue here is whether or not Jack’s 
access conscious unity had to be symmetrical to the totality of his phenomenally unified 
consciousness in that moment in order for him to behave autonomously. I don’t think that such a 
state of affairs is necessary. Of course, the advocate of the broad view could argue that had 
Jack’s co-occurring access unity been symmetrical to his total phenomenal unity at the time, then 
Jack would have noticed the siren and could have paused and waited for the ambulance to arrive 
and for the EMS workers to tend to the wounded. While such a state of affairs might have been 
the more prudent course of action given all of the relevant situational information, I submit that 
his actions in the first instance are no less autonomous than they are had his symmetrical unity 
been total (and his behaviour therefor different). And this is because those contents of his 
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phenomenally unified and co-occurring access unified consciousness were symmetrically unified 
over the actions he was engaged in performing. Jack’s having AC to the sound of the 
approaching siren would have widened the scope of actions available to him to choose from—for 
instance, it would have given him an additional reason
269
 to wait for help to arrive—but even 
from within his narrow symmetrically unified state, his actions are fully within his deliberate 
conscious control. And we can easily imagine Jack himself asserting that his actions with respect 
to moving the cyclist were entirely autonomous. He may grant that he might have acted 
differently had he recognized (i.e. had conscious access to) the siren, but that point does nothing 
to undermine the fact that the actions that he did perform were completely under his willful and 
direct conscious control.  
So far, we have identified two of the central additional components required for an 
automaticity proof model of autonomy: 1- Attention to what it is that one is in fact doing; and, 2- 
a narrowly symmetrical conscious unity of what one is doing. But it will be helpful here to say a 
little more about what exactly the above two points ought to entail. As mentioned in section 4.2, 
phenomenal unity and access unity (similarly to representational or content unity) are two 
general, more encompassing ways of thinking about conscious unity. Indeed, it was shown that 
some of the other more specific forms of unity could be spoken about in combination with the 
overarching labels of phenomenal or access unity. Thus, one could be said to have introspective 
phenomenal unity or, spatial access unity for example. And a number of these different and more 
specific forms of unity also appear important to acting autonomously. First, it seems clear that 
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 This point reminds us of one of the central worries motivating the externalist “responsiveness to reasons” 
approach to autonomous agency identified all the way back in section 1.1; namely, that having an insufficient handle 
upon the many reasons there are for behaving in one way or another could be seen to undermine one’s autonomy 
(especially if being so under-informed leads one to perform actions that end up being against one’s best interests). 
However, since we have already rejected such an externalist approach, we won’t spend any more time on this point 
here. 
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what we earlier referred to as the unity of focal attention plays a significant role in our behaving 
autonomously. But this form of unity is essentially already incorporated into our model in terms 
of the requirement that the agent must be attending to what it is that she is doing. It is not just 
that the agent’s attention must be unified upon some object or conscious content but rather, that 
attention must be focally unified upon those behaviours that the agent is engaged in performing 
that counts. And that focal attention to what it is that one is doing needs to be unified in order for 
one’s behavioural control (i.e. AC) to be coherent and responsive to the circumstances of the 
unfolding of those behaviours. Therefore, when it is said that autonomous agency requires that 
an agent attend to what it is that she is doing, it ought to be assumed that the sort of attention 
involved is also unified in this particular way. 
Another more specific form of unity that is important to our understanding of autonomy is 
introspective unity. The way in which this form of unity is most closely related to our concerns is 
that it acts as the bridge between our coherent reflective volitions and our access unified 
conscious behavioural control. In other words, it is our introspective access unity that not only 
allows us to control our behavioural movements but which also ensures that those movements 
are responsive to our greater psychological coherence—i.e. our autonomous willing and 
intentions.
270
 Introspective access unity does this by ensuring that our coherent volitions are 
directly capable of shaping or guiding our behaviours. Crudely put, it is the glue that holds our 
coherent intentions and deliberate behaviours together. Without this specific form of unity one 
might nevertheless consciously control one’s behaviours or have coherent volitions, but one’s 
controlled behaviour would not be the result of one’s coherent volitions. Therefore, we ought to 
assume that narrowly symmetrical conscious unity encompasses this more specific form of unity. 
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 In fact, to include introspective access unity within our model is essentially to say that one’s entire occurrent 
psychological economy ought to be coherent in order to act autonomously.  
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There may be other sorts of circumstances where things like object or spatial access unity 
appear to play a vital role in shaping one’s autonomous behaviour as well. However, I think that 
for the most part, the relevant aspects (i.e. contents) of either object or spatial access unity would 
already be included within the agent’s unity of focal attention upon what it is that she is doing. 
So I won’t look to build these other specific forms of conscious unity into the model being 
developed here. 
To reiterate in a more precise way the key components of our new and improved internalist 
model of autonomy, we have: 1- A coherent psychological economy that includes sympathetic 
raw and reflective desires and volitions (which may be enshrined in certain long-term cognitive 
structures like plans and policies); 2- Unified attention to what it is that one is in fact doing; and, 
3- a narrowly symmetrical conscious unity of what one is doing (which includes introspective 
access unity). All of these components, I believe, are jointly necessary and collectively sufficient 
to ensure autonomous agency in light of the threat of automaticity. In any sequence of 
behaviours that one of the above three components fails to obtain, I think we have good reason to 
doubt that an individual behaved autonomously.  
Now that we have provided a positive characterization of the additional conscious elements 
needed to ensure autonomous agency against the menace of automaticity, we may turn to several 
challenges to this model to assess whether or not these opposing views warrant any further 
modifications or deeper structural changes to our proposal. 
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4.5 Objections and Replies 
 
In the previous section, the example of Jack brought back to our attention a worry that was 
partly responsible for motivating the externalist “responsiveness to reasons” view of autonomous 
agency given in section 1.1. This motivating worry revealed that an agent’s having a paucity of 
reasons for acting tends to undermine our confidence in that agent’s ability to act 
autonomously—especially where having a very limited grasp upon the reasons for action might 
lead to the performance of behaviours that run counter to the individual’s best interests. Despite 
this apparent concern about the number of reasons for action available to an agent, advocates of 
the responsiveness to reasons approach might nevertheless attempt to challenge our improved 
internalist model of autonomy advanced in the previous section by claiming that we often do 
have sufficient reason to treat automatic behaviours as still autonomous. Here, the 
responsiveness to reasons advocate might argue that it is frequently the case that when an agent 
behaves in a way that is automatic, her behaviours are nevertheless governed by the reasons for 
action that have shaped her choices. To return to an earlier example, they might claim that our 
star basketball player was in fact behaving entirely autonomously when she performed the layup 
that injured the member of the opposing team. They might insist that her behaviours were 
consistent with her selected reasons to perform (by any means) to the best of her ability during 
the game. And, although she may not have intended to injure the opposing player, her automatic 
performance of the layup was conditioned by and concordant with the reasons she had to play 
well. Turning to the empirical research, we see that, to a certain extent, the above challenge 
appears to be borne out by some of the findings on automatic behaviour. Recall the work done by 
Reason (1979) covered in section 2.4, as well as the Aarts & Dijksterhuis (2000) study presented 
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in section 2.3.3. In both of those studies, it was seen that automatic behaviours will often revert 
to previously dominant behavioural scripts—many of which we can assume to have been the 
result of an agent’s prior deliberate and reasoned selections for action (or so the responsiveness 
to reasons advocate might argue). Indeed, the type of repetition required for any sequence of 
behaviours to become regular or dominant enough to be activated in an automatic way would 
seem to defy their having been the result of spontaneous or entirely un-reasoned movements 
during the drawn-out conditioning phase. Given the apparent supporting evidence just 
mentioned, advocates of the responsiveness to reasons approach might then argue that we 
shouldn’t have a problem with—at the very least, occasionally—treating such behaviours as the 
outcomes of an individual’s reasons for action or, according to them, her autonomous agency. 
While I think that the above challenge deserves to be considered, I nevertheless believe 
that it fails to seriously undermine our proposal for a number of reasons. First, the argument 
given that some automated behaviours ought to nevertheless be considered autonomous entirely 
fails to capture the phenomenology of agency as it unfolds. Moreover, such a view ends up 
unrealistically simplifying autonomous action and appears to replace its explanation with simple 
ascription. With respect to its failure to accurately portray the phenomenology of agency, it 
would seem that by not acknowledging the experiential distinction between actions that are 
performed (as I would label them) autonomously, and those behaviours that are performed 
automatically, it misses something essential about the active mental lives of agents as they act 
deliberately in the world. Indeed, this experienced difference between genuinely autonomous and 
automatic states is what underlies the agent’s acknowledgement of her authorship and personal 
control of an action or her lack of control and potential disavowal of such behaviours 
respectively. In other words, such a view amounts to a severely impoverished—or worse, utterly 
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lacking—account of the richness and involvement of an agent’s immediate conscious willfulness 
with respect to the choices she makes and the actions in which she engages. Furthermore, 
behaviours performed while in a state of automaticity are often repudiated by the very people 
having performed them, and they are rejected in this way because behaviours performed 
automatically do not allow for the direct conscious control of action. But if such a lack of control 
can amount to plausible grounds for the disavowal of behaviour, then that very same lack of 
control should, at the very least, undermine our confidence that any behaviour produced in such 
a way could be legitimately considered to be autonomously authorized or regulated. Here, 
common sense would appear to dictate that if automatic behaviours can legitimately be rejected 
as involuntary because of the fact that they are automatic and not actively controlled (which it 
clearly seems they can), then these same sorts of behaviours cannot also be plausibly treated as 
part of actively ‘self-governed’ autonomous action. It is this failure to distinguish between 
occurrent consciously controlled actions and automatic behaviours that amounts to a gross 
oversimplification of autonomous agency. Rather than explaining the phenomenological 
difference between the two states, it simply treats any behaviour that can be traced back to some 
selected reason for action (regardless of, for example, how temporally removed the reason is 
from the behaviour) as autonomous. In other words, no matter how temporally, cognitively, or 
otherwise strained the connection between the reasons to act and the behaviours they are 
supposed to produce, insofar as that connection can be made at all, the responsiveness to reasons 
view suggests that we can attribute those behaviours to an autonomously reasoned selection; and 
that this therefore renders the behaviours themselves autonomous. But this approach will often 
fly in the face of the agent’s disavowal of such behaviours as involuntary. That is to say that, as 
has already been mentioned, although the behavioural sequences in question may have been 
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conditioned by a particular intentional framework that was at some point in time accepted by and 
attributable to the autonomous functioning of the agent, these behavioural sequences often do not 
match-up with the agent’s present will. And even where such behaviours are compatible with the 
agent’s will, they remain so only by chance and not by authentically active conscious control. 
For the above marshalled reasons against treating automatic behaviours as legitimate expressions 
of an individual’s autonomy, I think that the challenge here considered, framed in terms of the 
responsiveness to reasons based approach, fails to amount to a significant difficulty for our 
proposal and should therefore be rejected (i.e. independently of the reasons for rejecting the 
responsiveness to reasons approach in general). 
While the previous challenge to our model attempted to include at least some automatic 
behaviours within the domain of autonomous agency, the next challenge to be considered holds 
that all actions contain elements of automaticity and thus, one cannot help but behave 
automatically to some degree. If this is true, it seems impossible to conceive of autonomous 
agency as it has been modelled in this dissertation. The challenge can be put simply by 
considering that, for any given autonomous action, there are a number of smaller contributing 
actions that are not under the direct control of AC, or that are not attended to, or which do not 
precisely figure into the agent’s coherent desiring and willfulness. For instance, let’s assume that 
I autonomously get up from my seat and get a glass of water from the kitchen. That is to say, I 
have the coherent raw and reflective desire and volition to get up from my seat and go get a glass 
of water from the kitchen and, that I am attending to what it is that I am doing (in a unified way) 
while in a fluid narrow symmetrically unified conscious state for the entire course of the action. 
Now the challenge might be framed along the lines that although the overall or general structure 
of the action in question may be considered autonomous (on our view), it is nevertheless built-up 
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from smaller actions, many of which are not performed autonomously; and thus, our account of 
autonomy must be false. The fact that I lifted myself from the chair using my arms instead of not 
using them or that I then immediately turned right as opposed to left to get around the chair on 
my way to the kitchen, or that I walked instead of ran or skipped—and we can begin to see 
countless other potentially unconsidered fine details that could emerge between the 
consciousness of the coherent volition and completion of the action—are not only not precisely 
accounted for, but they may also fail to be the result of direct AC control. In other words, they 
may be closer to being automatically selected—even though they will likely still be consistent 
with my will. Let us call this objection the ‘problem of precision’ (PoP) since it identifies a 
worry about the more fine grained aspects of our ostensibly autonomous actions. 
 One noteworthy difference between the previous objection and the current worry is that, 
with respect to the former, the automatic behaviours in question might not sync with the agent’s 
occurrent will, whereas, with respect to the PoP challenge, it seems the same problem is 
precluded. But this fact alone doesn’t reduce the concern that the problem raises since, even 
though in the PoP case the more fine grained potentially automatic behaviours, it appears, would 
likely always be consistent with the agent’s greater occurrent will, they appear to remain 
uncontrolled to a certain extent (at least, this seems to be a genuine possibility) and the noted 
lack of control was one of the key reasons why we objected to the previous challenge, so it 
would be inconsistent to deploy the bare compatibility between an agent’s behaviour and volition 
for a contrary purpose here (i.e. we cannot claim that those component behaviours fail to be of 
concern simply because they may always be consistent with the agent’s occurrent willing). So 
the mere consistency of a given behaviour with an agent’s will does not appear to amount to a 
workable answer here. 
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It should also be recognized immediately that the PoP challenge seems to present a far 
more significant worry than the previous one. Indeed, while the previous challenge may have 
only occasioned a slight modification to our model if it had been successful—viz. to allow some 
automatic behaviours to count as autonomous in certain limited cases—the present objection, if it 
succeeds, would appear to render our model irredeemable since it would make automaticity 
inevitable.
271
 However, I don’t think that we are without recourse against this particular 
difficulty. In fact, there are a number of rather straightforward responses to this sort of objection. 
One is to reject the claim that some (or all) of the smaller ‘actions’ which make-up the larger 
supposed autonomously willed action are automatic simply because they appear to be 
indeterminately drawn from an indefinitely large pool of potential actions. As Davidson (1963) 
notes with respect to the act of turning on a light: 
 
 If I turned on the light, then I must have done it at a precise moment, in a particular 
way—every detail is fixed. But it makes no sense to demand that my want be directed to an 
action performed at any one moment or done in some unique manner. Any one of an 
indefinitely large number of actions would satisfy the want and can be considered equally 
eligible as its object. (p. 6) 
                
Following Davidson’s lead, we might argue that although those smaller component action details 
are not identified in our more general account of the autonomously willed action, they 
nevertheless continue to meet our requisite conditions for autonomy. However, I am somewhat 
hesitant to entirely get behind this particular line of response.
272
 When I consider my having got 
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 Such a problem however does not appear to only afflict the model of autonomy developed here. Instead, it 
would likely be problematic for any model of autonomy and perhaps even for action in general if successful. Thus, it 
would appear to entail that, unless this worry can be successfully addressed, any theory of autonomy would fail 
Dworkin’s (1988, p. 7-8) empirical possibility criterion. 
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 One reason for this hesitation is that I’m not sure that we should treat more precise component movements 
as individual objects for analysis (to do so would seem analogous to adopting the time-slice approach to 
understanding consciousness which I find dubious). Instead, it seems that our standard evaluations of autonomy 
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up from my seat to get a glass of water from the kitchen, my immediately turning right as 
opposed to left to get around the chair does not appear to have been specifically dictated by my 
guiding coherent volition (which was to get the glass of water). And although, as a component 
action, it partially satisfies my will, it’s not entirely clear whether my more fine grained 
movements on the way to performing some more general action are as thoroughly or consistently 
controlled by my AC in the same way that they might be when I say, perform a very simple and 
direct action like autonomously raising my right arm. Of course, it would appear that one could 
continue to press the PoP challenge in an ever finer or more subtle way; for instance, by arguing 
that even the simple action of my raising my right arm meant that my right hand took a certain 
trajectory through space that was not itself precisely selected or chosen by way of my AC. Taken 
to such an extreme, we might begin to wonder just how precise our control would have to be in 
order to count as autonomous in response to this problem. And I think that at the more extreme 
end of the problem is where we start to recognize the cracks in this particular objection. It seems 
to me that we simply do not individuate our autonomous actions in such a fine grained manner 
for ourselves—so again, the current objection seems to not be responsive to our own 
phenomenology or the level at which we psychologically understand ourselves and our own 
movements.
273
 Moreover, if those smaller component ‘actions’ are under our unified focal 
attention and symmetrically unified consciousness because they are components of what it is that 
we are in the process of (autonomously) doing then I think that though they may not be precisely 
                                                                                                                                                             
refer to more general complete actions that are framed and constrained by the reflective volitions of the agent and 
not some exhaustive account of the specifics of more refined component movements. 
273
 In this sense, the answer advanced here could be considered a ‘levels of explanation’ type of response where 
the level of precise fine motor control is simply beyond the range of the sorts of behaviours with which we are 
concerned. There is a parallel between my answer to the PoP objection and Tye’s characterization of the unity of 
bodily experience that is worth noting but that space and continuity will not allow me to elaborate upon here. See: 
Tye (2003, p. 47-48) for this supporting view. 
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constrained by AC, they nevertheless do fall under our active control.
274
 It seems clear that we 
would at the very least be able to immediately correct any movements which might have been 
too loosely controlled or that may have been afforded too wide a degree of freedom with respect 
to the range of motion in which they were permitted by AC to operate. In short, as the quote by 
Davidson provided above reveals, it isn’t that our coherent volitions must pick out radically 
precise timing and ultra-fine motor control specifications but rather, any number of loosely 
constrained, yet coordinated behaviours may satisfy our autonomous desires; and whatever the 
precise details of those actions may turn out to be, what matters to our autonomous agency as it 
unfolds is that we have the occurrent coherent psychological connection to and general control of 
our actions (i.e. in terms of what is set by our own occurrent reflective volitions) that has been 
proposed in section 4.4. To demand any greater precision of control from our autonomous 
volitions is to require something far more strict and detailed than is likely to even be consciously 
possible for creatures like us. In other words, the PoP not only appears to miss the target, it also 
sets the bar much too high. 
The final complaint against our view to be considered in this section is less of an objection 
than it is a simple recognition that the requisite conditions for autonomy proposed by our model 
would appear to vastly reduce the number of cases in which people will be treated as acting 
autonomously in comparison to the number of cases in which most would typically consider 
themselves to be acting autonomously at present. The idea here is that, for instance, most people 
may never acknowledge as distinct from autonomy for themselves—at least not without targeted 
prodding and prompting—those automatic movements which by chance agree with their 
coherent reflective volitions. And where they may normally have believed themselves to be 
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 Contrast this point with example of the automated policy activation identified in section 1.4 and elaborated 
in section 4.3 above. 
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entirely autonomous in such cases, our model marks the failure of so simple and unconsidered an 
approach. Moreover, given that automaticity is a fairly common and ubiquitous phenomenon, it 
follows that far fewer of our movements end up being autonomous than we might generally 
suppose. The heart of the worry appears to be that genuinely autonomous action (according to 
our model), might end up being an exceedingly rare phenomenon. And relatedly, that the wide 
range of uses that the concept is normally put to would be radically limited or reshaped such that 
it could cause problems for our general understanding and attributions of other notions that are 
standardly assessed in terms of how they connect with autonomy; namely, notions like 
responsibility, consent, culpability, et cetera. The problem then concerns not only autonomy 
proper but how it relates to a number of other important practical concepts as well—concepts 
which are not only tightly bound, but also subject to how we understand the contours of 
autonomous agency. 
So as to not stoke the somewhat alarmist sounding concerns raised above, I will begin by 
saying that the question of the frequency and extent of our automatic behaviours in the world 
would appear to be an empirically addressable one; and thus, I suggest that we at least 
provisionally exercise caution and restraint when it comes to our predictions about the extent to 
which treating automaticity as an impediment to autonomy might impact just how autonomous 
we commonly take ourselves to be.
275
 It could turn out that a significant amount of our daily 
behaviour may be automatically performed, but it might just the same be found that automatic 
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 If we take Reason’s (1979) study as a preliminary investigation into this question, we find that (as 
mentioned in section 2.4), although Reason relied upon an admittedly small thirty-five person sample size, 
participants reported on average only twelve instances of automatic behaviour over the two week trial period. That’s 
less than one recognized instance of automaticity a day, which doesn’t seem all that threatening. Of course, one 
important thing to point out is that Reason’s study was only concerned with those automatic behaviours which led to 
some error of action (i.e. actions not as planned). So, given that Reason’s study relied upon a small sample size, 
participant self-reports, and only focused upon automatic behaviours that amounted to some recognized error, one 
might remain reasonably unconviced that such research could be representative of normal levels of daily instances 
of automaticity. Nevertheless, the study may help to at least somewhat relax concerns about the scope of the impact 
of automatic behaviours upon autonomy.  
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behaviours affect only a small fraction of our daily lives and perhaps such behaviours are 
primarily restricted to highly routine tasks at that.
276
 Given that we are still awaiting further 
empirical data on the reach and frequency of automaticity, I think that we ought to remain 
prudent against inflating within our imaginations just how radical the proposal of this 
dissertation may be.  
The above said, even if it were to be discovered that a significant amount of our daily 
behaviour turned out to be accomplished automatically, I would not withdraw the proposal 
advanced herein. The model of autonomy that has been developed in this chapter is, I believe, 
more carefully consistent with and responsive to the underlying notion of active self-governance 
than any previous view. And if what we want in our model of autonomy is an honest account of 
active self-governance, then we must acknowledge the worries that led to its construction. 
Moreover, there are a number of other already recognized constraints upon autonomy that may 
likewise translate into autonomous actions being potentially very infrequent, and many of these 
constraints may have far more ambiguous boundaries. For instance, Dworkin’s (1988) 
identification of coercion (mentioned in section 1.2.2) as a factor that may undermine an 
individual’s autonomy could be characterized in terms of say, the result of a specific direct 
personal threat. However, it may alternatively be maintained that things like the political and 
economic systems within which people generally live and operate are equally coercive and 
constraining upon behaviour; and thus, that they equally undermine autonomy (and do so in a 
very broad way at that). Indeed if one accepts the latter view, one will already be inclined to 
think that autonomy is exceedingly rare. And if it in fact turns out that automaticity is so 
widespread that it forces us to re-examine other notions that are deeply connected with or 
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 Such a view would be consistent with what is known with respect to the common conditioning component 
of automaticity (as was covered in section 2.1).  
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dependent upon personal autonomy, then I think that we will simply have to reconsider our 
evaluations and understandings of those notions. Pretending that automaticity is not a genuine 
problem will not improve the accuracy of application of those types of dependant notions. 
Nevertheless, even if the data ends up supporting the view that automaticity is currently very 
widespread, there are reasons to think that things might not remain so. 
One benefit of accepting the model of autonomy advanced in this chapter is that, the more 
widely recognized the criteria for genuinely autonomous actions become, the more people are 
empowered to actively counteract instances of automaticity by recognizing the value of putting 
in the effort to remain attentively engaged in what they are doing as well as having acted from 
coherent reflective volitions and with a particular form of unified consciousness. And I don’t 
believe that such a suggestion is akin to wishful thinking. Indeed, there exist a number of what 
have often been referred to as “mindfulness” practices that appear to both hold a broad appeal, 
and are often also of an ancient pedigree. What this suggests to me is that, when people are 
introduced to ideas and techniques about how to become more consciously aware of themselves 
and their surroundings, they tend to value the outcomes of such practices enough to continue 
with them. And given that the model of autonomy that has been advanced in this chapter is 
essentially a form of active (perhaps non-meditative) “mindfulness”, I don’t see why it would be 
incapable of holding an at least equal level of general appeal and adoption once disseminated. 
And therefore, with this knowledge in hand, we may begin to counteract just how widespread 
instances of automaticity may be.  
For the above mentioned reasons, I don’t believe that we ought to be very concerned about 
what might follow from adopting the model of autonomy proposed in this dissertation (i.e. in 
terms of fears about a significant reduction to how autonomous we in fact are). In the next and 
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final section of this chapter, I will close with some final comments and suggestions for future 
research. 
 
 
4.6 Final Comments        
 
While this dissertation has certainly covered a lot of ground, beginning with a review and 
revamping of an internalist approach to autonomous agency, to elaborating a newly encountered 
significant threat to autonomy (i.e. automaticity), before finally considering how to address that 
problem, it is unlikely that the proposal advanced here will put an end to discussion and debate 
about the nature, structure, and impact of autonomy. And this is as it should be. Each of the 
major theoretical views that we have considered along the way has had something to contribute 
to the refinement of thinking upon the notion of autonomy, and although the contribution made 
by this dissertation may amount to a further degree of refinement in that thought, it is next to 
certain to not have had the last word on the matter. Given that the research upon and thinking 
about autonomy is likely to continue to develop over time, I would like to say some things about 
some areas of focus that I think are likely to be of significant benefit.  
One of the things that I aspire to have contributed to with this dissertation is an increased 
recognition of the value of empirical research to theorizing about autonomy. My work here is by 
no means the first to have embraced this sort of interdisciplinary approach but, the hope is that it 
might encourage further contact between research done in psychology and that done within 
philosophy. I believe that there are many fertile areas of research still waiting to be explored and 
developed at the intersection of psychological findings and philosophical theorizing. In fact, 
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many of the subsections of chapters two and three dealing with specific areas of psychological 
research could stand to be explored much more thoroughly than could be done here; areas like 
the research on habit, or attention as selection for action for example. And there are a number of 
other underexplored but equally interesting areas of psychological research that appear to have 
implications for autonomy; research on well-known phenomena like cognitive dissonance for 
example, or obedience studies. If the work done here at all stimulates further research along such 
lines, I will consider it to have been worthwhile. But as philosophy itself continues to splinter 
into distinct areas of specialization, I think that continuing to make connections between certain 
related specialized areas of purely philosophical research also holds great potential. Specifically, 
as was done in this dissertation, I think that looking for points of contact between the sub-
disciplines of research on agency or action theory and research on consciousness holds the 
potential for mutual impact and significant theoretical advancement. One specific area to 
mention here would be a more thorough consideration of how the different sorts of background 
states of consciousness might impact autonomous agency. As should be clear, there exists a 
number of exciting avenues open to further or fresh investigation before us. Looking back and 
recognizing just how far our thinking and research has brought us can be a source of great 
inspiration and encouragement to embark upon new future work. It has been a privilege to have 
made contact with the work that preceded this dissertation as it will be to continue to follow the 
future research on personal autonomy.          
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